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ABSTRACT 
This is a study of managers' perceptions of the strategic 
priorities in their strategic business unit (SBU). The perceptions 
managers have of the current competitive strategy of their SBU 
are used to explore four main research themes. Managers' 
perceptions are accessed through a brief, standardised 
questionnaire which contains statements about current strategic 
p r io r i t i es .  
Firstly, the perceptions of managers from the same SBU are used 
to make inferences about the realised strategy of that business. 
SBUs in the sample (38) are classified into i3ur realised st:a:egy 
categories. These are derived from Porter's (1 980) generic 
strategies. A number of hypotheses concerning the performance 
implications of these realised strategy categories are developed 
and tested. Additionally, hypotheses about relationships between 
consensus (the extent to which managers from the same SBU 
share the same perceptions of strategic priorities), realised 
strategy, performance and organizational change are developed 
and tested. 
Secondly, the perceptions of managers from rnany different SBUs 
are used to derive a "mznagerial theory" of competitive strategy. 
This is developed in the context of a critique zf F'o;:erls generic 
strategies.  
Thirdly, the research addresses the sources of influence on 
managers' perceptions of strategic priorities. Specifically, the 
influence of the function the manager belongs t o ,  and the industry 
the SBU conlpetes in are explored. Evidence of functicrnal and 
industry influence on perceptions is presented. 
Fourthly, the surfacing of managers' perceptions of current 
strategic priorities has been used to facilitate strategy debates 
with managenxnt teams. Examples of the issues raised, and the 
contributions to management discussion are presented. 
Finally, the thesis suggests ways in which the approaches taken 
in the study could be developed to address other issues in the 
field of strategic management. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SETTING OUT THE RESEARCH AGENDA 
1 .I INTRODUCTION 
This is a study into managers' perceptions of strategic 
priorities. The main part of the research uses these perceptions 
to infer the realised strategies of firms. (Realised strategy can 
be distinguished from intended or espoused strategy; it refers to 
the actual strategy currently being pursued by a business.) The 
study addresses four main themes: 
* relationships between realised competitive strategies, 
consensus and performance 
* managerial perceptions of competitive strategy 
* organizational, industry and functional infiuences on 
managerial perceptions of strategic priorities 
surfacing realised strategy in strategy debates 
In order to identify realised strategies a methodology has bee;] 
developed which is designed to access the perceptions managers 
have of the current strategic priorities in their business. The 
primary underpinning logic of this approach is that managers' 
perceptions of strategic priorities will affect their behaviour 
(the decisions they take, the priorities they communicate to 
their subordinates. the areas they choose to monitor and 
control). and, in this way, the managers' perceptions will work 
through the organization as management actions. These actions 
would, in aggregate, constitute the realised strategy of the 
business. 
A secondary justification for this approach is that, 
notwithstanding the hypothesised links between management 
perceptions and management actions, managers' perceptions per 
se should provide reasonably accurate insights into the realised 
strategies of their firms. The managers' perceptions are, 
therefore, being used to make inferences about the realised 
strategy of their firm. 
In conducting the research the following issues have been 
addressed: 
the content of strategic priorities 
* consensus (shared understanding) within a management 
team about strategic priorities, and links between consensus and 
performance 
* relationships between realised strategies and performance 
* relationships between managerial perceptions of strategies 
and Porter's (1 980;1985) "Generic Strategies" 
* shared perceptions of strategic priorities within samples 
of functional managers across many SBUs 
* shared perceptions of strategic priorities across SBUs 
within the same industry. 
This opening Chapter sets out, in broad terms, the research 
agenda. In Chapter 2 specific hypotheses are developed through a 
review of the relevant literature. Chapter 3 explains the 
methodological approach to the study, and describes in some 
detail the development and pilot testing of the research 
questionnaire. In Chapter 4 the results of the statistical analysis 
are presented and interpreted, and some conclusions are drawn. 
Chapter 5 focusses attention on the links between managerial 
perceptions of realised strategies and Porter's Generic 
Strategies. 
Chapter 6 explores the concept of industry "recipes", and 
functional bias in perceptions of strategic priorities across 
SBUs. Individual Strategic Business Unit (SBU) case examples are 
presented and discussed, concentrating particularly on the role 
that the research has played in the development of strategic 
thinking within Top Management Teams. The final chapter 
reviews the study, pointing up some methodological limitations, 
and outlining some suggestions for future research. 
This first chapter begins with a discussion of "rational" 
approaches to strategic management. This review contributes to 
the exploration of the following questions: 
* how is strategy formulated in firms? 
* can realised strategy be identified through the examination 
of strategic plans? 
in what ways might a shared understanding of strategy 
come about? 
1.2 PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT 
Most prescriptive strategy texts are constructed around an 
explicit or implicit rationale: good analysis leads to better 
strategy, and that, once implemented, the better strategy leads 
through to improved performance. In the implementation phase 
the strategy is (usually) made explicit, and the organization is 
changed in line with the new strategy. 
Strategy is defined in a number of ways in the prescriptive 
literature, but the definitions tend to take similar forms: 
"The determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives 
of the enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals" 
(Chandler 1962: 13). 
Chandler goes on to stress that "strategy must have an effect on 
the future of the enterprise" which evokes the shaping role of 
prescriptive strategy. This theme is reinforced by a definition 
from a standard US strategy text: 
"..the pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals stated in such a 
way as to define what business the company is in or is to be in, 
and the kind of company it is or is to be" (Christensen, Andrews 
and Bower 19733 07). 
Hofer and Schendel introduce the importance of matching the 
organization to not only its goals, but a!so to the environment: 
"...[strategy is] a match between an organization's resources and 
skills and the environmental opportunities and risks it faces, and 
the purposes it wishes to accomplish" (1978 : l l )  
A similar approach is taken by Miles: managers strive to 
maintain "satisfactory alignments of environmental 
opportunities and risks, on the one hand, and organizational 
capabilities and resources on the othert' (1 9823 4) 
In the strategy formulation processes advocated by prescriptive 
writers the procedure is described as essentially linear in 
approach (Chaffee 1985), a sequential planning process 
conducted by top management to achieve long range goals with 
respect to changes in markets and products. 
There is some debate as to whether strategy formulation should 
include the determination of goals, or objectives. For example, 
Schendel and Hofer argue that "it is clear that some 
organizations do formulate their desired ends (goals and 
objectives) separately from the means (strategy) they use to 
achieve these ends ..... research on structured problem solving and 
decision making indicates that superior perfornance occurs 
when the different steps of problem solving are considered 
separately" (Schendel and Hofer 1979:97). However, Hrebiniak 
and Joyce, view strategic decision making as a "series of means 
ends decisions beginning with the determination of long-term, 
global objectives (ends) and the development of shorter term, 
more local actions to obtain those objectives" (Hrebiniak and 
Joyce 1984:28). 
The explicit separation of ends from means has influenced recent 
research into consensus among top executives on the strategy of 
their business. Researchers have generally separated manager's 
perceptions of ends (objectives, goals) from means (competitive 
methods, strategies). (Bourgeois 1980a, Bourgeois and Sing h 
1983; Dess 1983) 
The definitions of strategy presented above indicate that top 
management should formulate strategy, and that this strategy is 
then implemented by managers reporting to them. They imply 
that the deliberate shaping of the organization's posture with 
respect to its environment is preferable to no shaping taking 
place at all. The purpose of strategy is to effect deliberate 
change in the organization to achieve alignment (or "fit") with 
the external environment in pursuit of stated goals: 
"Deliberate strategic change involves a planned intervention by 
senior executives, arising under certain environmental and 
organizational conditions, which attempts to guide emergent 
reactions toward making major changes in strategy andlor 
organization, resulting in a realignment between the firm and its 
environment" (Greiner and Bhambri 1989:68) 
Prescriptive writers who advocate deliberate strategy making 
processes tend not to devote a great deal of attention to the 
implementation of strategy. This can be evidenced by reviewing 
the amount of textbook space devoted to the formulation as 
opposed to the implementation of strategies (eg Wheelen and 
Hunger (1990) 2 Chapters out of 12; Thompson and Strickland 
(1 987): 2 out of 10). Kerr and Jackovsky (1 989) put it this way: 
"In the rational model, strategy implementation is viewed 
largely as a structural problem that is addressed by achieving 
congruence or "fit" between the organization's strategy, 
structure and organizational systems. Organizational structure 
is designed to correspond to the hierarchical goal structure 
(Richards 1986) and serves to channel appropriate authority, 
resources and information to those departments charged with 
strategic sub-tasks (Hrebiniak and Joyce 1984). Control and 
reward systems focus managers' attention on strategic 
objectives and provide behavioural and attitudinal incentives 
that support the strategy (Lorange, Scott-Morton and Ghoshal 
1 986; Stonich 1982). Information processing mechanisms provide 
the necessary level of integration and coordination (Galbraith 
and Kazarjian 1986). In short, the rational model views strategy 
as the primary determinant of organization structure and 
process, and the implementation task as essentially one of 
architecture and design" (Kerr and Jackovsky 1989:163) 
It could be implied, then, that proponents of the "rational model" 
would view implementation as a problem that can be addressed 
through analysis (of structures, information systems, control 
systems) and the construction of "rational" solutions. 
1.3 CONSENSUS IN STRATEGY FORMULATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
There is a strong implication running through the prescriptive 
approaches to strategy that managers should share the same 
view of the strategic direction the business should be taking. 
Dess (1 987) suggests that "many authors have supported the 
notion that strategy is formulated by consensus-building among 
members of the top management team" (Dess 1987:265). Ansoff 
(1965) emphasizes the importance of consensus on an 
appropriate set of objectives as an integral part of the strategy 
formulation process, and Bower and Doz (1979) also support the 
generation of a consensus around strategic objectives and 
policies as a prime requisite of strategy. (See also Hrebiniak and 
Joyce 1984, and Steiner 1979). 
In the past few years a good deal of interest has been generated 
in the Japanese style of management in which consensus building 
is seen as a key element (Ouchi 1981; Nonaka and Johansson 
1985). There have been studies into the use of consensus building 
in the formulation process in countries other than Japan (Van de 
Vliet 1984; Pegge 1986; Bolan and Wolf 1988). 
Consensus building around the strategy formulated by the top 
management team (TMT) has also received the attention of 
researchers. In these studies consensus building at levels below 
the TMT is viewed as a key element of strategy implementation. 
O'Reilly (1989), for example in a survey of managers from a 
diverse range of firms found that the norms most frequently 
cited which help to promote implementation include: 
* the elimination of mixed messages 
* shared visions and a common direction 
building consensus 
He suggests that the process of developing a skared set of 
expectations "begins with words and actions on the   art of the 
I - - group's leaders. Even if no explicit statemenis are made, 
subordinates will attempt to infer a pattern. I f  management is 
credible and communicates consistently, members of the group 
may begin to develop consistent expectations about what is 
important. When this consensus is also rewarded, clear norms 
can then emerge" (O'Reilly 1989:21) 
Therefore an important component of implementation is seen to 
be the communication of the strategy to managers below the top 
management team. These middle and lower level managers need 
to understand the strategy if they are to play a full part in its 
implementation (Neilsen 1981 :31). 
Ideally managers should not only understand the strategy, they 
should be committed to it as well (Wooldridge and Floyd 1990). If 
there was shared understanding with less than wholehearted 
enthusiasm amongst the managers below the top management 
team (TMT), the intended strategy may still, nevertheless, be 
realised. But here the organization would be relying on devices 
other than shared values to drive the strategy (eg control 
systems, staffing policies, structure, management style). We 
might therefore expect that shared understanding of the intended 
strategy would assist in the realisation of intended strategies 
with or without the normative involvement of the line 
management (Etzioni 1964). Consensus about the direction the 
business should be taking should help to guide functional 
manager's decision making, and to set priorities within their 
departments that are in line with the broader strategy. Shared 
understanding of business level priorities should help to promote 
cross-functional cooperation, reducing the conflicts that can 
result i f  functional managers pursue parochial objectives at the 
expense of business-level priorities. 
1.4 EFFECTIVENESS OF "RATIONAL" STRATEGY PROCESSES 
"Rational" approaches to the management of strategy usually 
involve analysis (of the external environment, and internal 
resources), the generation of strategic options, the selection of 
the most appropriate option, and its subsequent implementation. 
"Rational" strategy making processes often have a tangible 
outcome in the form of a strategic (or "corporate") plan. 
However, "rational" processes need not follow the prescribed 
routine of strategic planning, and the outcome may not 
necessarily take the from of a planning document (it could be a 
"mission statement" (David 1989), or it could be an espoused 
"vision"). 
A major issue confronting the proponents of rational strategy 
making processes is whether or not such processes lead to 
superior performance. Greenley (1986), in his survey of the 
relevant literature, finds that "it cannot be concluded that 
strategic planning is an effective, or indeed ineffective, tool for 
the overall management of organizations" (Greenley 1986:lOl). 
The studies into the effectiveness of planning approaches are 
equivocal. Of the nine studies surveyed by Greenley, five claim a 
positive relationship between strategic planning and 
performance, whereas four did not establish such a relationship. 
Newman (1 988) concludes that "the results of strategic planning, 
while positive, do not come up to expectations." Similarly, 
Pearce, Freeman and Robinson (1 987) found only a tenuous link 
between formal strategic planning and firm performance. Like 
Greenley, Wood and LaForge (1979) report mixed results from 
previous studies into the effectiveness of formal planning. 
There are problems in researching the links between formal 
strategic planning and firm performance, not the least of which 
would be the mass of other variables, most of them difficult to 
control for, that impact on firm performance. Greenley (1986) 
adds that the direction of causation could also be a problem: "it 
could be that indeed strategic planning does improve company 
erformance, but it could also be that improved performance 
ives the firm the capacity or ability to implement strategic 
l a m i n g ,  with improved profits yielding the resources for its 
tilization" (Greenley 1986:104). 
1.5 REALISING "RATIONAL" PLANS 
Kiechel (1 982) claims that too much attention has been paid to 
the formulation of strategy, when the real challenges lie in 
implementation. Dess and Davis (1984) conclude that "an 
observed discrepancy between intentions and realised strategy 
may arise from the inability of the firm to translate its intended 
strategies into actions because of environmental change, a lack 
of appropriate implementational capabilities, or unrealistic 
expectations. Singly, or in combination these factors may result 
in an emergent strategy that is observed to be different from the 
intended strategy" (Dess and Davis 1984:485) 
Smircich and Stubbart (1985) suggest that "failures in 
implementation seem to originate primarily in the [strategic 
management] field's inattention to the fundamentally social 
nature of the strategy formation and organizing processes" 
(Smircich and Stubbart 1985724) 
The problems of implementing planned, or deliberate, strategies 
have been well documented (Mintzberg 1989; Johnson 1987; 
Bowman and Asch 1987). Moreover, many organizations exhibit 
"momentum" (Miller and Friesen 1984), a state in which 
reversals in the direction of change in strategy or structure are 
relatively rare (Greiner 1972; Tushman and Romanelli 1986; 
Mintzberg 1978). 
If deliberate attempts to shape the strategy of the organization 
include plans to move the organization off into new areas, these 
writers' observations would suggest that such plans would be 
unlikely to be implemented. On the other hand. 'i the intended 
strategy merely indicated minor adjustments to the status quo, 
the plan might stand a better chance of being implemented. For 
- 
the researcher into the effectiveness of planned strategy this 
poses a problem. If the plan merely confirms the existing 
(realised strategy) then it will be more likely to be 
"implemented" as it requires no real change. So, in this case does 
planning improve performance? The realised strategy is 
effectively untouched by the planning process, and performance 
is determined by the appropriateness of the realised strategy, 
not the existence or otherwise of a planning system. Moreover, it 
is conceivable that managers may construct a plan which 
provides a acceptably "rational" explanation for their realised 
strategy. Thus the direction of causation is reversed: the 
realised strategy determines the plan. 
These findings would suggest that strategic plans may not be a 
reliable indicator of realised strategy, because, in many 
organizations the plan does not get implemented as intended. 
Instead, strategy "emerges" (Mintzberg 1978; Minrzberg and 
Waters 1985). 
1.6 THE FORMATION OF REALISED STRATEGY 
In contrast to the prescriptive writers on strategy, those who 
seek to understand and explain strategy making in practice have 
uncovered an organizational reality that is both complex and 
untidy. It appears that few organizations formulate strategy 
using "rational" analytical approaches (Mintzberg, Raisinghani 
and Theoret 1976), and, even if they do use a planning approach, 
the realised strategies that emerge often bear little relationship 
to the intended strategies derived from such plans. Various 
interpretations of the reality of strategy making have been 
advanced. 
Some see strategies as emerging from a series of disjointed, 
incremental decisions (Lindblom 1959). Here there is no attempt 
to specify ends or objectives. These can only be inferred from 
the actual policy decisions made. Strategy evolves through a 
series of "successive limited comparisons" of options, 
bargaining between different interest groups, and incremental 
adjustments to the status quo. 
Quinn (1980) argues that this incremental process can also be 
"logical", given the complexities and uncertain ties facing 
management teams. Top management respond to environmental 
uncertainty by establishing broad guidelines for the management 
of the core business, whilst at the same time permitting small 
scale experimental developments not necessarily driven by 
objectives set from the top. In this way the organization can 
learn to adapt to the environment as these strategic trials 
generate information, commitment, learning and confidence. Thus 
the incremental process is "logical"; it is not a disjointed, 
reactive response to complexity. 
Strategy can be conceived of as a "pattern in a stream of 
decisions" (Mintzberg and Waters 1985). Mintzberg (1978 ) 
suggests that "a strategy may form gradually, perhaps without 
intention, as [the CEO] makes his decisions one by one". This 
conception of strategy can be contrasted with the deliberate 
attempts to shape the strategy of the organization discussed 
earlier. "Purely deliberate strategy precludes learning once the 
strategy is formulated; emergent strategy fosters it. People take 
actions one by one and respond to them, so that patterns 
eventually form" (Mintzberg 1989: 32). Johnson (1987) interprets 
this emergent process as one in which "organizations 'feel their 
way' through the uncertainty and complexity of their environment 
with gradual or 'trial and error' changes" (Johnson 1987:20) 
Studies of strategic change in organizations have exposed 
periods of relative stability punctuated by infrequent, but major 
shifts in strategy (Miller and Friesen 1984; Chandler 1962). In 
the periods of stability the seeds of emergent strategies are 
being sown in parts of the organization, and, when revolutionary 
change becomes necessary, these emerging pat:erns can be 
developed into the dominant strategy (Mintzber; 1989). This 
concept is not dissimilar to Quinn's logical incrementalism, but 
it does not necessarily imply intention on the part of senior 
management to encourage or tolerate the "side bet" experiments. 
The organizational processes that bring about strategic changes 
have been characterized as being essentialiy political (Pettigrew 
1977; Cyert and March 1963; Allison 1971). Incremental changes 
in strategy come about through groups with conflicting interests 
bargaining over, essentially, scarce organizaiional resowces. 
Central to this interpretation is the power individuals and groups 
have to influence resource deployment decisions (Thompson 
1967; Hickson et al 1971). 
-'. 
An alternative explanation of incremental processes conceives of 
strategies being shaped by the culture of the organization 
(Johnson 1987), and by the existence of industry-wide "recipes" 
(Grinyer and Spender 1979; Huff 1982). 
Johnson stresses the role in strategic decision making played by 
an organizational "paradigm", a common set of beliefs and 
assumptions taken for granted by managers about, inter aiia, the 
organization's distinctive competences. The paradigm is 
reinforced and supported by various dimensions of the 
organization's culture (power structures, control systems, 
routines, rituals, symbols). The paradigm can so dominate 
strategic thinking that "objective" evidence from the 
environment that threatens the taken for granted assumptions 
may be reinterpreted, or dismissed by the management. The 
existence of a strong paradigm acts as a stabilising force, which 
can lead to "strategic drift" as the organization's strategic 
posture becomes increasingly out of line with ;he demands of the 
external environment. 
This approach forms part of a wider "interpretative" school of 
thought (Chaffee 1985; Weick 1983; Schein 1985; Bartunek 
1984). Strategy is a product of individual or collective sense 
making and interpretation of the organization and the 
environment within which it operates. The cognitive and 
symbolic interpretation of the world guides and directs strategic 
decision making. (Smircich and Stubbart 1985; Weick 1979). 
Managers possess 'scripts', 'causal maps', or 'ideologies' which 
act to make sense of situations and guide appropriate behaviour. 
Strategy is not separate from, but part of, or the outcome of, the 
ideology and culture of the organization (Johnson 1987). 
Fundamental ('quantum leap') strategic change requires a shift in 
organizational ideology, and, as a result such changes are 
infrequent and problematic. 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) and Aldrich (1979) add a further 
dimension into the intended vs emergent strategy debate, by 
arguing that the environment determines who will survive and 
prosper, and executives have only a minimal impact on corporate 
development. This ecological approach suggests ihat managers 
are severely constrained by the environment which limits their 
ability to exercise choice. 
1.7 INCREMENTALISM AND CONSENSUS 
Shared understanding of the emergent strategy may or may not 
result from these incremental, political and cultural processes. 
For example, if management thinking was dominated by a well- 
embedded "paradigm", one might expect a high degree of shared 
understanding about the strategy of the business (even if it was 
never explicitly discussed). Political processes may promote 
consensus, particularly if one function dominates the senior 
management positions. 
Gronhaug and Falkenberg (1989) argue that most firms experience 
very few changes to their strategies, even when under threat. 
Firms are likely to resort to what they perceive to be their basic 
competences as an intuitive reaction to threat. And Noel (1989) 
suggests that CEOs exhibit some rigidity in their visions, which 
he dubs "magnificent obsessions" . 
Boeker (1989) contrasts two views of organizat~onal change: the 
adaptive view and the inertial view. The adaptive view assumes 
that managers are able to exercise strategic choice, they 
monitor the environment and modify strategies to fit the 
changing environment (Andrews 1971 ; Child 1972; Schendel and 
Hofer 1979). In contrast, the inertial perspective assumes that 
organizations are constrained in their ability to adapt. 
Organizations have a general tendency to preserve strategy 
rather than to radically change it (Quinn 1980). As noted above, 
Miller and Friesen (1984) discuss strategic m o ~ e n t u m ,  a 
tendency towards persistence in organizations that makes 
organizations slow in adapting to environmental changes, which 
may lead to strategic drift (Johnson 1988). As Starbuck (1965) 
notes: "when an organization adopts one class of strategies, it 
automatically makes the adoption of other strategies difficult or 
impossible" (Starbuck 1965470). 
Picking up the theme from Starbuck, Boeker (1989) argues that 
\ 
"because the adoption of a particular strategy requires 
specific skills as well as investment in facilities and personnel 
that may only be marginally useful i f  a firm adopts a different 
strategy, firms adopting a single or dominant sxategy may be 
less likely to change their strategy than firms pursuing several 
strategies sirnuItaneously." (Boeker 1989:493) 
Staw (1981) suggests that the tendency to escalate commitment 
to the current strategy may overcome evidence that strongly 
indicates that the strategy is failing. This may be explained by a 
motivation amongst top management to self-j-:s:ify, or to prove 
the rationality of earlier decisions. Citing evidence from a 
laboratory study, Bateman and Zeithaml (3.9) suggest that 
"failure feedback from a past investment dec:sion will lead to 
significantly higher levels of investment ti-ar: success feedback" 
(Baternan and Zeithaml 1989:62) 
Oster (1982) asserts that "to have significance for the allocation 
of resources, a strategy must necessarily involve some 
commitment that is irreversible, at least for a time" (Oster 
1982:377). And Snow and Hambrick observe :-a: "... the general 
tendency of managers is to preserve rather :"a- change their 
organization's strategies" (Snow and Harnbrick ; 980:529). Taking 
an economists perspective, the presence oi in:ra-industry 
barriers to mobility (Caves and Porter 1977; Harrigan 1982) may 
require such an investment of scarce resources as to make 
strategic change or exit costly, if not prohib!:~ve. 
It is quite possible that political and cultural processes would 
lead to differing perceptions of business priorities. These 
processes may result in managers in different parts of the 
organization, and at different levels, perceiving quite different 
business-level priorities. For example, Mintzberg and McHug h 
(1 985) describe how emergent strategy "grows initially like 
weeds in a garden" (Mintzberg and McHugh 1985:194), which 
indicates a rather uncontrolled, haphazard process likely to lead 
to divergent perceptions of priorities in different parts of the 
organization. 
A number of questions emerge from this discussion: 
* how do managers get to understand the strategy of their 
business? 
does a shared understanding of business priorities 
("consensus") exist in a given business? 
at what levels in the hierarchy does consensus occur? 
does consensus exist across manage-.e:; levels, and across 
functional departments? 
* does consensus make a difference to the performance of a 
business? Is shared understanding a virtue, regardless of how it 
comes about? 
1.8 EXPLORING REALISED STRATEGY 
The realised strategy of a business could refer merely to its 
observable strategic position. From an outside observer's 
perspective, such a definition of realised strategy would be 
confined to the products/services it sells, the markets it 
competes in, its performance, financial struc:l;re, locations, 
tangible assets etc. All these aspects are (usually) knowable to 
an outsider, and could be referred to as the extant strategic 
position of the business. This information about the business is 
useful, but it really only tells us about the results of past 
strategic behaviour. 
Alongside this description of the extant strategic position of the 
business there is another dimension of realised strategy which 
is dynamic, and which will impact on the f u t u r e  strategic 
position of the business. This dimension of reaiised strategy 
refers to the extant strategic priorities in the business, the 
current thrusts, imperatives, or orientations that influence the 
evolving strategic posture of the business. I t  is this dimension 
of realised strategy that is the focus of in:erest in this 
research. 
From the preceeding discussions we can condude that intended 
or deliberate strategies often do not become realised strategies. 
Intentions to change the strategic direction of the business can 
get pushed aside by a wide variety of factors, including existing 
control systems, resistance to change, overriding operational 
issues, rapid environmental change, lack of management 
resources. Consequently, if we are interested in understanding 
the realised strategy being pursued by a business, inquiring after 
the intended strategy might not be a good place to start. 
The various interpretations of the realities of strategy making 
suggest that the processes whereby strategies emerge tend to be 
complex and multi-faceted. These processes may or may not lead 
to a shared understanding of strategic priorii~es across the 
organization. As intended strategies in the form of strategic 
plans are not likely to be a reliable indicator of actual, realised 
strategies, and, as the processes whereby strategies emerge are 
complex they do not lend themselves to empirical investigation. 
Researching the complex processes that produce realised 
strategies requires a particular kind of study (realistically, an 
in-depth study of a single organization over a number of years). 
However, if the focus of interest is not the processes that 
produce realised strategies, but the content of realised 
strategies, then other methodologies become viable. 
One way to try to get closer to the realised strategy might be to 
find out what managers perceive the current priorities of the 
business to be. The perceptions of strategic priorities#that 
managers (at many levels) have are likely to influence their 
behaviour, and hence shape the emerging strategy. As Miller 
notes 
"Perceived measures..[are] expected to have the strongest 
associations with business strategy since it is perceptions that 
strategists act on" (Miller 1988:291). 
Noel (1 989) notes that "CEOs .... concentrate on activities they feel 
are crucial to the survival or growth of their firm" (Noel 
198934) and that "in demarkating these stra:egic cores [through 
their actions] our CEOs also define for their subordinates the 
important issues to concentrate on" (Noel 198944).  Hence, 
priorities may be signalled to managers t h r o ~ g h  CEO actions. 
This may result in contradictions emerging between espoused 
strategies (eg the priorities set out in a "Mission Statement") 
and priorities perceived by managers through their observations 
of CEO actions. For example, the espoused strategy may 
emphasise the importance of excellent customer service, but the 
CEO appears to be more concerned with hitting budgets. 
If managers perceive the same priorities, their actions may well 
be guided along similar lines, and a coherent strategy might 
emerge. The shared perceptions may have resulted from political, 
cultural or logical incremental processes, or they may have 
resulted from successfuI efforts to shape the strategic direction 
of the business through planning activities instigated by the TMT. 
If the priorities managers perceive to be extant in the business 
influence their behaviour, then identifying these priorities 
should give a strong indication of the realised strategy of the 
business. If there is a high degree of consensus about strategic 
priorities then we could conclude that the business was pursuing 
a coherent strategy; all managers perceive the same set of 
priorities. This coherent realised strategy may or may not lead 
to good performance, depending upon whether or not the strategy 
itself is viable. 
A lack of agreement amongst the managers of a firm would 
indicate a realised strategy without coherence, with managers 
perceiving that the business is pursuing differing priorities, and 
therefore their actions are likely to be channelled in different 
d i rect ions.  
A number of issues emerge from the above discussion, but three 
linked themes are of particular interest in this study of realised 
s t ra tegy:  
1) Can we establish managers' perceptions of strategic 
p r i o r i t i e s ?  
2) Can we use managers' perceptions of strategic priorities to 
infer the content of the business's realised strategy? 
3) Does a shared understanding of business priorities make a 
difference to performance (regardless of how the consensus 
emerged)? 
1.9 MANAGERS PERCEPTIONS AND REALISED STRATEGY 
Daft and Weick (1 984) suggest that: 
"People in organizations are talented at normalizing deviant 
events, at reconciling outliers to a central tendency, at 
producing plausible displays, at making do with scraps of 
information, at translating equivocality into feasible 
alternatives, and at treating as sufficient whatever information 
is at hand." (Daft and Weick 1984:294) 
In the search to make sense of "reality" managers use various 
cognitive processes and devices which combine with learning 
from past experience, personality traits and values to produce 
the manager's perception of organizational reality. 
In an attempt to model this process, Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
focus on a few key influences that shape managerial perceptions. 
Harnbrick and Mason (1984) suggest that "executive backgrounds 
are reflected in strategic outcomes" (1984:197). They argue that 
the characteristics of the upper echelon team determine 
strategic choice, which in turn affects organizational 
performance. Hence, they are arguing a causal relationship 
between executive background (age, functional :rack, education, 
career experiences, socio-economic roots), sirategic choice and 
firm performance. 
In the context of this study, an intermediate step in this causal 
sequence, realised strategy, (a step not addressed by these 
authors), is the focus of attention. 
Figure 1.1 presents a model of the factors v~nich may influence 
how managers perceive strategic priorities, and how these 
perceptions may feed through into actions, and to firm 
performance. It is based on Hambrick and Mason's model of the 
cognitive processes of managers (Hambrick and Mason 19843 95). 
The model assumes that managers are unable to scan every 
aspect of the organizational environment, or trle external 
environment (Cyert and March 1963). The manager's field of 
vision, those areas to which attention is directed, is restricted, 
severely constraining the scope of perception. The manager's 
perceptions are further limited because one selectively 
perceives only some of the phenomena included in the field of 
vision. The pieces of information selected for processing are 
interpreted through a filter "woven by one's cognitive base and 
values" (Hambrick and Mason 1984:195). 
The cognitive base of the manager refers to his or her own set of 
"givens" (March and Simon 1958; Barnes 1984). These include 
knowledge or assumptions about future events, knowledge of 
alternatives, and knowledge of consequences attached to the 
alternatives. As Stubbart ( I  989) notes: 
"A manager copes with the constant threat of information 
overload by relying on a handy but imperfect set of problem 
solving procedures--heuristics, or rules of t h u n  b--that apply to 
a variety of problems." (Stubbart 1989:338) 
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The perceptual process is also influenced by :r,e manager's 
values: "principles for ordering consequences or alternatives 
according to preference" (Hambrick and Mason 1984:195). Guth 
and Tagiuri (1 965) maintain that: 
"Values can be thought of as the guidance system a 
personality uses when faced with choices of alternatives." (Guth 
and Tagiuri 1965325) 
Haley and Stumpf (1989) suggest that personality type is related 
to the cognitive style a manager adopts in strategic decision 
making, in particular personality influences the search for data, 
and the evaluation of data. 
The manager's cognitive base and values may be strongly 
influenced by his or her organizational experience. The presence 
of a strong "paradigm" (Johnson 1987) would result in a group of 
managers from the same organization sharing similar cognitive 
bases and value systems. 
Two broad categories of input stimuli are identified: those that 
occur within the boundaries of the organization (which would 
include: espoused strategies, control systems, management 
actions, physical resources, past history, stories and myths 
(Johnson 1987)) organization structure, status systems, 
communication procedures); those stimuli that stem from the 
external environment (including competitor actions, customer 
complaints, cultural norms, political actions, technological 
developments). 
The model suggests that a manager's perceprions of strategic 
priorities are an outcome of these complex processes. These 
perceptions of strategic priorities may feed through to affect 
1 
management actions. However, this connection is moderated by 
the manager's cognitive base (for example, the manager's beliefs 
about cause and effect relationships), and his or her values (the 
manager may perceive a priority to, say, cut overheads, but he or 
she is unwilling to fire loyal staff). 
Management behaviour, in turn, will influence realised strategy. 
This connection is moderated primarily by the internal 
organization. For example, the manager may wish to act to 
improve service quality but his actions are not wholly successful 
due to inadequate resources. The resultant performance of the 
business is strongly influenced by realised strategy, but it is 
also affected by the external environment (in particular, the 
structure of the industry (Porter 1980)). 
Good perceived performance may feed back through the model to 
reinforce, for example, the manager's cognitive base. In this way 
past success may lead to firmly held beliefs about the business's 
distinctive competences. Poor perceived performance may lead to 
a questionning of present strategy, and the emergence of 
different pr ior i t ies.  
A manager's perceptions of strategic priorities may be strongly 
influenced by an espoused deliberate strategy formulated in a 
"rational" way by the Top Management Team. The strategy may be 
effectively fed through the organization's communication 
channels, it may be reinforced by observable management 
actions, and resource deployments; the logic and appropriateness 
of the strategy may influence the manager's value system. In 
these ways the manager's perceptions of strategic priorities are 
likely to be strongly influenced by the espoused strategy, and, 
according to the model, these perceptions will feed through to 
management actions, and into realised strategy. Hence through 
this process the intended strategy would be translated into 
realised strategy. 
Perceptions of strategic priorities may, however, be influenced 
by other processes. The way a manager is introduced into the 
organization may strongly influence perceptions. These could be 
positive perceptions (with respect to Top Management 
intentions), or they could be negative perceptions. Control 
systems could play a large part in signalling to a manager what 
is important. The stories recounted, cultural artefacts, status 
symbols and perceived power relationships could all feed through 
to indicate particular priorities to managers. And, as noted 
above, CEO behavior may strongly influence some managers (Noel 
1989). Managers may be strongly influenced by their functional 
backgrounds (Dearborn and Simon 1958), which may bias their 
perceptions of strategic priorities. 
Direct feedback from customers, or competitors may influence a 
manager, bypassing the organization environment. This 
information could affect the manager to the extent that his 
perceptions run counter to his colleagues who have either not 
been exposed to this information, or who have filtered it, or 
reinterpreted it in line with their cognitive bases. 
The influences on managerst perceptions of strategic priorities 
could, therefore, stem from a host of sources. Some priorities 
can be embedded in the manager's cognitive base as a result of 
previous experience in other organizations (Hambrick and Ivlason 
1 984), or from his education, or his socio-cultura! background. 
Tracing through linkages between this broad spread of inflliences 
and realised strategy is clearly a huge research problem. The 
problem addressed in this study is, however, of much more 
manageable proportions. Whilst acknowledging that the 
processes whereby manager's perceptions of strategic priorities 
are established are multi-dimensional and complex, this study 
addresses the outcome of these processes, the priorities 
perceived, not the processes that influenced them. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) posed a much more complex research 
problem, establishing the relationships between the managerial 
backgrounds of executives and strategic choice (and 
performance). This study addresses the links between managers' 
perceptions of strategic priorities, realised strategy, and 
performance. The causal connection between perceptions of 
strategic priorities, management behaviour and realised strategy 
is not directly researched. It is assumed that managers' 
perceptions would influence their actions, and that these 
actions, taken across the organization would comprise the 
realised strategy. 
However, through the identification of managers' perceptions of 
strategic priorities one gains access to the informed opinion of 
interested parties to the firm's strategy. In this way, the 
validity of the approach does not rest solely on the assumed link 
between perceptions and actions; managers' perceptions of what 
is deemed currently to be important in their organization would 
be a valid source of data, notwithstanding the inferred 
connection between perceptions and behaviour (Dess 1987). So, in 
this way managers' perceptions have a dual role in serving the 
aims of this study: they serve as an indicator of realised 
strategy through the assumed connection between managers' 
perceptions and management actions; a r r n h e  manager's 
perceptions in any event could be regarded as valid observations 
of the reality of their organizations. 
For these reasons it is important that the scope of the study 
embraces managers from levels below the TMT, otherwise TMT 
perceptions alone may merely reflect TMT intentions rather than 
the priorities perceived to be extant by managers in other parts 
of the business. The managers below the TMT hence play a role as 
interested and informed observers of the organizational scene, 
and as implementors of perceived strategy. 
1.10 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The research explores relationships between realised strategy, 
consensus, performance and change in strategic business units. 
Secondly, the relationships between managers' perceptions of 
competitive strategy. and Porter's Generic Strategy concepts 
(1 980;1985) are examined. Thirdly, two impor:an? sources of 
influence on managers' perceptions are explored: the industry 
context, and the manager's functional position. Finally, the 
research explores how the surfacing of realised strategy can 
assist management teams in strategy debates. 
The following sections explain in outline the main themes of the 
research. 
1.1 0.1 REALISED STRATEGY 
As explained above, realised strategy is accessed through the 
identification of the perceptions managers have of their firm's 
strategic priorities. Figure 1.2 indicates the relationships 
researched in the study, and the specific hypotheses that are 
established and tested. 
The study focusses exclusively on Strategic Business Units 
(Thompson and Strickland 1987:219), which are defined as 
discrete organizations that have profit responsibilities, that are 
seen as distinct entities by corporate management, and by SBU 
management. They may be distinguished on the basis of product 
types, geography, markets served, or a combination of these. 
The study is, then, interested in strategy at the business level 
(in contrast to strategy at the corporate level), and the unit of 
analysis is the individual SBU. 
The main focus is on competitive strategy, how the SBU 
competes in its industry. This means that other dimensions of 
SBU strategy are not explicitly addressed eg: 
* the objectives of the SBU (eg. sales revenue growth, market 
share, gross profits, financial independence) 
* the direction of development (eg. withdrawal from some 
markets, consolidation. increased penetration of existing 
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markets, growth through new product development, 
d ive rs i f i ca t ion )  
the methods of development (eg. internal development, joint 
development, acquisition) 
There are two main arguments for focussing attention on 
competitive strategy. The first centres on the importance of this 
dimension in the strategic management literature. Porter's ideas, 
in particular the Generic Strategy concepts (Porter 1980, 1985), 
play a central role in this study. The generic strategies were 
used to inform the construction of the questionnaire used to 
identify managers' perceptions of strategic priorities. There 
were two motives behind this choice of conceptual framework. 
The first was one of acceptability; it was felt that by using this 
well known framework the research findings might be more 
acceptable to writers and researchers in strategic management 
(Skivington and Daft 1991). 
The second motive emerged in the early phases of the 
development of the questionnaire itself. It resulted from sorne 
doubts, initially quite small, about the usefulness of Porter's 
generic strategies. And, as this framework had already been 
selected for this study, the research could provide some 
opportunities to test out whether managers perceive their SBU's 
strategy in Porteresque ways (Stubbart 1989:333). Moreover, i f  
managers do perceive strategy in these terms, where managers 
perceive their SBUs pursuing Differentiation or Cost Leadership, 
do they outperform other firms in their industry ie. do Porter's 
Generic Strategies deliver superior profit performance? 
The second argument for concentrating attention on competitive 
strategy centres on the hypothesised relationship between 
perceived priorities and realised strategy. The responsibility for 
implementing strategy rests not just with the Top Management 
b 
Team. The prescriptive school of strategic management 
acknowledge the importance of the role playec by managers 
below the TMT in implementation. Moreover, in the  differ:^,^ 
explanations of emergent strategy discussed earlier, managers 
below the TMT are assumed to be playing an active part, not only 
in implementing strategy determined elsewhere, but in 
determining or shaping strategy through their own actions. 
Hence, it would appear to be crucial to a study of realised 
strategy to include the perceptions of managers at levels below 
the TMT. 
Although there are acknowledged to be several dimensions to 
strategy (including objective setting, diversification, 
acquisition), it is probable that managers below the TMT would 
only have a limited understanding of these aspects of strategy 
(Daft and Weick 1984). It is argued here, though, that the SBU's 
route to competitive advantage (its competitive strategy) w o  u 1 d 
be perceived by managers below the TMT. Managers at many 
levels, and across different functions are more likely to perceive 
the impact of, for example, cost cutting priorities, than they 
would broader strategic dimensions like market share 
objectives, joint venture strategies, or diversification 
intentions. 
For these reasons, the study focusses on business unit 
competitive strategy, and it includes managerial perceptions 
from the Top Management Team, and from functional managers 
below the TMT. 
1 .I 0.2 CONSENSUS 
The second main issue addressed is consensus. Consensus is 
defined here as the shared perceptions managers have of their 
SBU's strategy. It does not refer to the processes of strategic 
decision making, nor does it carry any normative dimension 
(Wooldridge and Floyd 1989); consensus does not imply 
agreement with what the manager perceives the priorities to be. 
The importance of these qualifications will be made clearer in 
Chapter 2. 
Until this study, the exploration of consensus among managers 
has been largely confined to members of the Top Management 
Team (Stagner 1969; Bourgeois 1980; Hrebiniak and Snow 1982). 
In this study, because of the importance of the connection 
between management perceptions and realised strategy, the 
study includes managers not only in the TMT but from levels 
below the TMT. Consensus (shared perceptions) spreading across 
and down the SBU may well be associated with better 
performance. Consensus may be associated with particular 
competitive strategies, and it may be affected by the degree of 
change experienced in the SBU. 
1.10.3 C H A N G E  
By including some dimensions of organizational change in the 
study relationships between change and consensus, realised 
strategy, and performance can be explored. Organizational change 
is seen to be  a critical strategic dimension which can affect 
performance (where the organization is unable to change in line 
with environmental change). It is also linked to competitive 
strategy (Miles and Snow 1978; Miller 1987,1988), and to 
consensus (Grinyer and Spender 1979; Boeker 1989; Khandwalla 
1976) .  
The fourth main theme of the study is the role that the surfacing 
of realised strategy can play in advancing strategy debates with 
groups of managers. In this context, dimensions of organizational 
change would provide useful additional insights into the SBU's 
situation. For example, particular realised strategies c o d d  be 
related to certain aspects of organization change. It may be that 
realised strategies concerned with cost control are linked with 
changes in business operations, but not, for example, with 
changes in structures or processes. Information about changes in 
strategic direction could be related to realised strategy. So, by 
including a change dimension in the survey, these and other 
issues can be explored with groups of managers. 
1.10.4 PERFORMANCE 
By including performance measures in the study i t  is possible to 
test hypotheses about realised strategies, consensus and change 
and their relationship with performance. Therefore, the research 
should be able to address issues relating to the effectiveness of  
different realised strategies, whether consensus makes a 
difference to performance, and whether change is associated 
with high or low performance. 
1.10.5 THE INFLUENCE OF INDUSTRY AND FUNCTlON ON 
MANAGER'S PERCEPTIONS 
The literature indicates that manager's perceptions of strategy 
may be strongly influenced by the industry context of the SBU 
(Grinyer and Spender 1979; Huff 1982)) and the manager's 
functional experience (Dearborn and Simon 1958; Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967; Newman 1988). These two important sources of 
potential influence are explored in Chapter 6. In addition, through 
the consideration of a number of case examples, the different 
strengths of influence on managers perceptions are also 
considered in this chapter. 
1 . I  0.6 SURFACING REALISED STRATEGY IN STRATEGY 
DEBATES 
As indicated above, the fourth major theme of the study concerns 
the processes of strategy making, and the role that this research 
into realised strategy can play in assisting strategy debates. 
Huff (1 990) suggests that: 
"...the designation of important concepts, categorization of 
concepts, causal links and arguments are all highly influenced by 
previous experience and by routine. Thus apparently 'fresh' 
analysis and decision is structured by what worked in the past. 
The analyst wishing to understand and predict decision making 
behavior must find a way to tap this underlying structure." (Huff 
1990:39) 
She also suggests that 
"A map defining concept dimensions and interrelationships 
might help sort out acceptable (even helpful) levels of 
disagreement among top executive groups" (Huff 1 990:26) 
In a similar vein Raimond and Eden (1990) argue that 
"As [managers] live from day to day inside the same 
corporation they habitually come to see it in a particular way, 
constraints become facts of life, customary interpretations 
become reality" (Raimond and Eden 1990:lOl) 
In order to assist management groups in making explicit some of 
the underlying dimensions of strategy, the research instruments 
developed to explore realised strategy and cor,sensus have been 
used with management teams in strategy debates. In particulat-, 
the reflecting back to the management team of a representation 
of realised strategy can often highlight the di'icrences between 
espoused or intended strategy (if one exists), and realised 
strategy. Where there is no clear statement of intended strategy, 
managers' implicit assumptions about what should be happening 
in the SBU can be compared with the realised strategy inferred 
from managerial perceptions of priorities. 
1.11 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The main issues explored in the study are summarised in Figure 
1.2. 
The thesis is organised into three parts, which correspond to the 
four main themes: 
* relationships between realised competitive strategies, 
consensus and performance (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) 
* managerial perceptions of competitive strategy (Chapter 5) 
* industry and functional influences on managerial 
perceptions of strategic priorities (Chapter 6) 
surfacing realised strategy in strategy debates (Chapter 6) 
In Chapter 2 a number of hypotheses are developed from a review 
of the literature. The hypotheses are established to explore a 
number of aspects of realised competitive strategy, consensus, 
change and performance. 
Chapter 3 develops the methodology to test the hypotheses set 
out in Chapter 2. The main issues addressed here include: the 
derivation and pilot testing of the "Perceptions of Strategic 
Priorities" questionnaire (the main research instrument); 
inferring realised strategies from the questionnaire responses; 
and deriving measures of consensus and performance. 
In Chapter 4 the hypotheses are tested, and tPIe results are 
~nterpreted. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the second main theme of the study. 
managerial perceptions of competitive strategy. In particular, 
this chapter develops a "managerial theory" of competitive 
strategy from the database of questionnaire responses. The 
chapter includes, inter alia, a critique of Porter's Generic 
Strategy concepts. 
In Chapter 6 the third and fourth themes are developed. The first 
part of the chapter deals with functional and industry influences 
on manager's perceptions. The second part addresses the 
surfacing of realised strategy in strategy debates. These 
contributions are explored through a number of case examples 
where the research has assisted managers in discussing and 
formulating strategy. 
Chapter 7 summarises the main contributions of the study, and 
sets out some limitations of the approaches used. It also sets 
out an agenda for future research. 
CHAPTER TWO 
DEVELOPING HYPOTHESES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to translate the broad relat ionshi~s 
between realised strategy, consensus, change and performance set 
out in Chapter 1 into specific hypotheses. The literature concerned 
with the other main themes of the research (industry and function 
influence on manager's perceptions, and the surfacing of realiced 
strategy in strategy debates) is explored in Chapter 6. 
Because the focus of the research into realised strategy is 
competitive strategy, the chapter begins with a brief review of 
the dominant prescriptive approach in the strategic managem~nt  
Iiterature, Porter's Generic Strategy concepts (this exploration of 
the literature is developed at greater length in Chapter 5 where 
the Generic Strategy concepts are evaluated in the light of the 
findings of this research). This is followed by an exploration of 
the literature concerning managerial agreement or consensus. This 
review of the Iiterature is important firstly, because it clearly 
relates to one of the central themes of the present study, out 
secondly, because the field of consensus research provides the 
most appropriate frameworks for investigating management 
perceptions of strategy dimensions. The two other dimensions, 
performance and change, are addressed in the context of the 
discussions of competitive strategy, and consensus. 
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2.2 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
Porter's Generic strategy concepts have had a profound impact on 
the discipline of strategic management (Porter 1980;1985). He 
contends that there are three ways in which a business can 
achieve above average industry average performance: 
Cost Leadership: here the business achieves the lowest 
cost position in the industry. Through the maintenance of 
"average" quality levels the firm is able to command average 
prices. The combination of average prices and lowest costs 
results in the firm achieving above average levels of profitability. 
* D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n :  the Differentiation strategy requires the 
firm to offer higher value products or services than the industry 
"average". The higher value products permit the firm to charge 
premium prices. As long as the firm is able to achieve average 
cost levels, the premium prices enable it to achieve above average 
pro f i tab i l i t y .  
* Focus: this is a "niche" strategy that concentrates a firm's 
attention on a specific type of customer, product or geographic 
area. The firm uses either a differentiation or a cost leadership 
strategy (or a combination of the two) within a particular part of 
the industry. 
Empirical research and theoretical contributions have offered 
some support for Porter's position (Hambrick 1983; Miller and 
Friesen 1984; Dess and Davis 1984), although other studies have 
cast doubt on the validity and usefulness of the framework 
(Murray 1988; Day and Wensley 1988; Dickson and Ginter 1987). 
Miller (1986) noted that there are at least two different types of 
differentiation strategies: those based on product innovation and 
those based on intensive marketing and image management. "The 
first strives to create the most up-to-date and attractive 
products by leading competitors in quality, efficiency, design 
innovations, or style. The second attempts to create a unique 
image for a product through marketing practices" (Miller 
1988:283). Miller suggests that the innovative differentiators are 
able to charge higher prices for their superior offerings. 
The literature offers examples of both types of differentiation 
(Miles and Snow 1978; Miller and Friesen 1984). Miller's 
innovative differentiators correspond to Miles and Snow's 
Prospectors, and Miller and Friesenls Adaptive firms. The 
marketing differentiators are more like Miller and Friesen's S l a  
firms which offer an attractive package, good service, convenient 
locations, and good product/service reliability (Miller and Friesen 
1984b). 
Porter argues that "effectively implementing any of the three 
generic strategies usually requires total colnmitment and 
supporting organizational arrangements that are diluted if there 
is more than one primary approach" (Porter 1980:35). He goes on to 
suggest that each generic strategy "implies different 
organizational arrangements, control procedures, and incentive 
systems1' (Porter 1980:40). 
Innovative differentiation often involves new technologies, 
unforeseen competitor (and customer) reactions, and the 
confluence of many unstructured marketing problems (Hofer and 
Schendel 1978; Miles and Snow 1978). These conspire to i~c rease  
the uncertainty and dynamism facing the SBU. 
Marketing differentiation may be particularly effective in 
unpredictable and dynamic environments where it can be used to 
avoid potentially more costly ways of competing (eg through 
price, or innovation) (Miller 1988). 
Cost leadership requires a great deal of effort be directed to cost 
control. Miles and Snow's (1978) 'defenders1 and Hambrick's (1985) 
"efficient misers' and "cost leaders" pursue this strategy. Product 
innovation will often be irrelevant to the cus:mers of the cost 
leader, and, because the pursuit of cost-efficiency usually 
requires great staoility, this strategy, in contrast to 
differentiation, is associated with low environmental change. and 
low unpredictability. Innovative differentiatior: is likely to 
require a highly differentiated structure, wi:h decentralized 
decision making (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Hage and Aitken 1970; 
Mintzberg 1979; Zaltman et al 1973). There are many ways of 
differentiating through innovation which may contribute to 
diversity of opinion within the managemen1 group (Scherer 1980; 
Bourgeo~s 1980). 
Complex innovation which requires s t ruc t~ ra l  differentiation 
creates reciprocal interdependencies (Thompson 1967; Mintzberg 
1979) between managers and "technocratst'. Unless extensive use 
is made of liaison devices, fragmentation of the structure, 
decentralization of decision making, and political behaviour will 
conspire to reduce the degree of consensus in the SBU. 
We may expect, however, that a strategy of marketing 
differentiation would not necessarily cause the same degree o: 
structural fragmentation as innovation, and hence would reduce 
the requirement for liaison devices, that innovation requires 
(Miller 1988). This is largely due to the more cosmetic nature of 
the changes required in marketing differentiation. As such, the 
requirement for innovation and change may well be restricted to 
the marketing function. 
If innovative differentiation requires a highly differentiated 
structure, and a consequent demand for liaison devices, cost 
leadership, in contrast, is likely to require organizational 
stability and stancardisation (Porter 1980; Mintzberg 1979; Miles 
and Snow 1978). 
The essentially straightforward nature of the stralegy of cost 
leadership would suggest that shared understanding of strategic 
priorities would be high. Low change, extensive standardization, 
and centralization of decision making (which is likely to be 
tactical, rather than strategic) would also increase the tendency 
to high consensus. The extensive use of control systems (costing, 
budgeting) would also serve to continually drive home to managers 
at all levels the TMT's priorities (Mintzberg 1979; Miles and Snow 
1978; Porter 1985). 
By definition, there can be only one cost leader in any industry. 
This strategy requires the firm to deliver acceptable quality (to 
enable the firm to command average prices for the industry) at 
lowest cost (Porter 1985). Porter stresses the importance of 
being THE cost leader, largely because, in pursuing scale and 
experience curve advantages the firm needs market share. The 
competition for market share may well be played out through a 
prolonged price war. Severe cuts in margin would mean that, 
ultimately, only one firm would be making profits, the cost leader. 
The strategy is essentially inward-looking, requiring that 
extensive management time and effort be devoted to squeezing 
cost out of the system (Porter 1985). It may also require heavy 
investment in plant that may take many years to repay the initial 
investment ("asset intensity": Macmillan and Hambrick 1983). 
Therefore, stability in demand (both in what the consumers want, 
and how much they require) is required. For these reasons, the 
cost leadership strategy would seem to be a risky option to 
pursue. The more low cost players there are in the industry the 
less likely it is that an individual SBU will succeed. 
In contrast, an industry can tolerate many differentiators (Porter 
1980). The strategy is outward looking as it requires the SBU to 
seek out segments, discover what those buyers truly value, and 
deliver it. Although the differentiation strategy requires that the 
SBU command premium prices (Porter 1980), it might be effective 
without this qualification if the SBU is able to carve out a niche 
of loyal customers. 
It follows that, should an SBU be able to pursue both 
differentiation and cost leadership simultaneoi:sly, it should be 
the best performer in its industry. However, Porter suggests that 
the contradictory requirements of these two options make the 
successful pursuit of both sources of advantage unlikely. The 
pursuit of both strategies simultaneously is referred to as a 
'hybrid' strategy in this study. 
This exploration of competitive strategy suggests a number of 
hypotheses that the research could address. 
As there can only be one cost leader in any industry we would 
expect this to be a relatively uncommon strategy. 
* H I :  Cost leadership will not be a commonly perceived 
compet i t ive  strategy 
Porter argues that the pursuit of cost leadership and 
differentiation simultaneously is difficult, and that, therefore 
this combined strategy would not be commonly found. In this study 
this combination of two generic strategies is referred to as a 
"Hybrid" strategy. 
* H2: The hybrid strategy will not be a commonly 
perceived strategy 
The essential premise of Porter's argument is that firms pursuing \ 
either of the generic strategies will be above average performers - 
( in terms of profitability) in their industries. This suggests the 
following hypotheses: 
* H3: Firms perceived to be pursuing cost leadership wiil 
be  above average performers in their industries 
* H4: Fi rms perceived to  be pursuing differentiation 
strategies w i l l  be above average performers in their 
i n d u s t r i e s  
* H5: Firms perceived to  be pursuing neither cost 
leadership nor differentiation wi l l  be average, or below 
average performers in  their  industr ies 
* H6: Firms perceived to  be pursuing hybrid strategies 
w i l l  be exceptional performers in  their industr ies 
Turning to the connections between competitive strategies and 
change, the literature indicates that cost leadership strategies 
are likely to be associated with organizational stability. 
Skivington and Daft (1991) suggest that: 
"Low cost decisions often do not entail a major shift in 
direction ...[ they] are implemented through extant systems, such as 
budget and operational expenditures. ... and are within the extant 
framework of norms, values, and member beliefs" (Skivington and 
Daft 1991 :51) 
This suggest the following hypothesis: 
* H7: Firms perceived to  be pursuing cost leadership 
strategies w i l l  experience low organizational change 
The links between competitive strategies and consensus, 
addressed briefly in the discussion above, will be developed 
further in the following section, which considers the second 
dimension of the study. managerial consensus. This summary is 
followed by a discussion of the different definitions of consensus. 
Then the scope of consensus, and the content of consensus studies 
are discussed. Then the process and context variables that 
influence the formation of managerial consensus are considered, 
including dimensions of organizational change. 
At the end of the section a number of hypotheses are proposed 
linking managerial consensus, competitive strategy, change and 
performance. 
2.3 CONSENSUS 
This section begins with a brief summary of the most relevant 
empirical studies of managerial consensus, and follows with a 
discussion of various definitions of consensus, before proposing a 
def in i t ion.  
An early attempt to investigate managers' perceptions was 
Dearborn and Simon's study of functional bias in perceptions of 
strategic issues (Dearborn and Simon 1958). This simple and 
extremely limited study has been extensively referenced as 
evidence that managers will "perceive those aspects of a situation 
that relate specifically to the activities and goals of his 
department" (Dearborn and Simon 1958:142). This apparent link 
between the functional role of the manager (linked to his past 
experience), and his or her perceptions is clearly of interest in the 
present study. For example, it could be that a strong functional 
bias may be helpful to an SBU, particularly if it was facing a 
complex task environment (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Mintzberg 
1979). The influence of functional background on managerial 
perceptions of strategy is explored further in Chapter 6. 
Stagner (1969) was the first in a series of studies that 
investigated agreement (or "consensus") among groups of 
managers about particular aspects of their organization. Stagner 
explored satisfaction with decision making. Grinyer and Norburn 
(I 975; 1977-78) addressed, inter aha, similar concerns to 
Stagner. They studied corporate planning systems, role 
perceptions, objectives and information channels. Their concern 
with consensus was largely a methodological issue: given the 
nature of their research design (based on multiple interviews with 
managers from within the same firm), what level of agreement 
among the managers should be reached before one could conclude 
that the responses were "true" (ie. that they accurately reflected 
the actual situation)? 
De Woot, Heyvaert and Martou (1977-78) were interested in the 
levels of agreement (within a large sample of Belgian firms) on 
the means for accomplishing innovation activities, and, more 
recently, Bourgeois (1980) studied managers perceptions of goals 
and means across 12 firms in different industries. His was the 
first study to focus on the Consensus-Performance relationship. 
Hrebiniak and Snow (1 982) investigated managerial agreement on 
firm strengths and weaknesses with respect to environmental 
context in 88 firms spread across four industries. A similar 
investigation by Bourgeois and Singh (1 983) measured 
disagreement among the Top Management Team (TMT) on the 
environment, goals and strategies (means). Bourgeois (1 985) 
looked at consensus with respect to the managers' perceptions of 
environmental uncertainty. 
In an attempt to build on Bourgeois' 1980 findings, Dess (1987) 
studied consensus on goals and means within 19 firms from the 
same industry, and like Bourgeois, in his study Dess related 
consensus to performance. 
These nine empirical studies all addressed consensus or 
agreement between groups of managers (usually the Top 
Management Team). The content of consensus (ie what the 
managers agreed or disagreed about) varies across a range of 
strategy dimensions. In all the studies it is agreement (or lack of 
agreement) that is the focus of attention, rather than the 
organizational (or other) processes that have caused agreement. 
These nine studies could, then, be described as "content" studies 
of consensus. 
There is a related body of research that is concerned with 
consensus as a decision making process. These include "laboratory 
studies" by Whitney and Smith (1983), Schweiger, Sandberg and 
Ragan (1986), and Tjosvold and Field (1983). In these studies 
agreement was measured among members of small groups 
focussing on a discrete problem. 
These two groups of studies, the "content" s l~d ies ,  and the 
"process" studies, raise some of the problems surrounding 
research into consensus. Some difficulty arlses from quite 
different uses of the term "consensus". The first group of studies 
refer to consensus as an outcome; consensus is a measure of the 
extent of "agreement". For example, in their summary of research 
into this field Dess and Origer (1987) suggest that "consensus [is] 
viewed as an outcome and is generally defined as agreement" 
(1987:317). Seen in this way, consensus lends itself to 
measurement, and hence to the testing of hypotheses. For example, 
Grinyer and Norburn define consensus as "a statistically 
significant level of shared perception" (Grinyer and Norburn 
1975:73). 
The other use of the term refers to consensus as a process (as in 
"the process of building consensus" Dess and Origer 1987: 313). 
The continuing debate surrounding the efficacy of "structuring" 
the strategic decision making process (dialectical enquiry (Dl), 
and devil's advocacy (DA)), has been extended to encompass a 
consensus seeking approach (Cosier 1978, Mason 1969, Schwenk 
and Cosier 1980, Cosier and Rechner 1985, Schweiger, Sandberg 
and Ragan 1986). Schweiger and Sandberg (1989) suggest that 
"consensus encourages open discussion among group members". In 
their instructions to students using a consensus approach they 
point out that "through discussion, questioning, and more complete 
exchange of information and opinion, the group seeks a better 
recommendation than might be produced by a single person. It is 
not necessary that each person be completely satisfied with the 
assumptions and recommendations-only that each can accept them 
on the basis of logic and a willingness to consider them as 
feasible. Consensus is said to exist when ALL group members can 
accept the assumptions and recommendations on this 
basis."(Schweiger and Sandberg 1989:34-35) 
In a similar vein, Skivington and Daft (1991) refer to senior 
management "champions" who work to bring about "changes in 
shared meaning and to build consensus concerning the new 
strategy" (Skivington and Daft 1991 :49). 
So, using this extended definition, consensus implies an 
improvement in the quality of the decision outcome, and it exists 
only when all members of the group can accept the 
recommendations. 
In a recent study into the involvement of middle managers in 
strategy formulation Wooldridge and Floyd (1  990) define 
consensus as "shared strategic understanding and commitment" 
(Wooldridge and Floyd 1990:232). Their theoretical modei posits 
that middle management involvement will improve both the 
content of strategies, and the implementation of strategies. 
So now the picture is further complicated. There is consensus as a 
measurable outcome, consensus as "agreement", consensus as 
unanimity, consensus as implying commitment. 
In this study consensus is defined as "shared perceptions" about, 
in this case, strategic priorities. This is a very restrictive 
definition. "Shared perceptions" does not imply any normative 
involvement with the priorities perceived. It does not, therefore, 
imply any commitment to these priorities. For example, we might 
record that a group of people perceive the government to be 
pursuing particular policies, but this would not imply that they 
necessarily agreed that these policies were "a good thing". So, 
there is no attempt, in this study, to investigate the processes 
that lead to consensus (or a lack of consensus), and there is also 
no attempt to gauge the commitment managers may or may not 
have to the strategic priorities they perceive to be extant in their 
SBU. 
This restrictive, but arguably more precise definition of 
consensus is appropriate to the research problem being addressed. 
As proposed in Chapter 1, the perceptions managers, across the 
SBU and at different levels of the hierarchy, have of the strategic 
priorities extant in the business are a valid source of information 
about SBU realised strategy. The assumed connections between 
these perceptions and realised strategy are strengthened if one 
assumes there to be causal links between managerial perceptions 
and managerial actions. Thus, through accessing the managers' 
perceptions of current SBU strategic priorities a "snapshot" of 
realised strategy can be inferred. In this way the multi- 
dimensional and complex processes that influence perceptions 
(the processes that preceed the taking of the "snapshot"), and the 
linkages between perceptions, actions and realised strategy that 
operate concurrently with the "snapshot" are excluded from direct 
empirical investigation. 
The processes and contextual variables that influence consensus, 
although not directly addressed in the methodology, are discussed 
below. This review and discussion of the literature will 
contribute to the interpretation of the results of the empirical 
investigations into managerial perceptions. 
2.4 CONSENSUS: SCOPE, CONTENT AND STRATEGY MAKING 
PROCESSES 
All the "content" studies of consensus have been restricted to the 
Top Management Team (TMT). The main argument for limiting the 
scope of these studies rests on the normative assumption that 
strategy is formulated by this group (Ansoff 1965; Andrews 1971 ; 
Thompson 1967). However, research into strategy making 
Processes has revealed a much wider involvement of managers 
(Ouchi 1981, Quinn 1980; Mintzberg and McHugh 7 985). This would 
suggest that restricting consensus studies to just the TMT might 
be a mistake (Wooldridge and Floyd 1989). Moreover, a lack of 
consensus about strategic priorities revealed between the top 
level and middle levels of the organization could signify problems 
in strategy implementation (MacMiIlan and Guth 1985; Wooldridge 
and Floyd 1989). 
The content of consensus refers to what managers agree about. 
Studies exploring consensus on means and ends are the most 
relevant to this research (Bourgeois 1980; Dess 1987). Synoptic 
models of strategy formulation (Fredrickson 1983) require that 
strategic goals and methods are sequentially identified. Strategic 
choice among alternative means is based on their contribution to 
goal attainment. Strategy formulation is followed by a distinct 
phase of strategy implementation that involves a variety of 
administrative tactics (Galbraith and Kazanjian 1986). 
In contrast, incremental models of strategy making acknowledge 
the non-comprehensiveness of the process. Decision makers have a 
limited capacity for processing information (Lindblom 1959), 
organizations are political (and hence "non-rational") (Narayanan 
and Fahey, 1982; Mintzberg 1983), and that strategy often results 
from autonomous initiatives at operational levels in the 
organization (Burgelman 1983). Between the extremes of the 
rational-comprehensive model and "muddling through" lie the real- 
world approaches we would expect to see in organizations 
(Mintzberg and Waters 1985). 
Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) argue that, because in the synoptic 
approach the involvement of middle management is restricted to 
implementation, and because "strategy forniulation is the domain 
of the TMT ... the scope of consensus is likely to be restricted to 
TMT members" (Wooldridge and Floyd 1989:297). They go on to 
suggest that the content of consensus develops sequentially in the 
synoptic context (consensus about the environment, followed by 
ends consensus, then means consensus). They propose that, as the 
level of synopticism in the strategic process increases SO does 
the probability that shared understanding among the TMT will be 
high. 
However, it could be argued that synoptic processes are more 
likely to be features of stable organizations facing stable 
e n v i ~ ~ m e n t s  (Fredrickson and laquinto 1989), and, i f  strategy 
formulation is kept exclusively as the preserve of the TMT, then it 
is likely that the the organization is not facing complexity, or 
diversity in its environment (Quinn, Mintzberg and James 1988; 
Bowman and Asch 1987;). These contextual conditions would 
indicate that strategic changes are unlikely to be large in scope, 
or frequent, and that the "mission" of the organization is likely to 
be well understood by managers at many levels of the hierarchy, 
not just the TMT. For these reasons we might expect that, even 
where synoptic processes are being used, consensus may be high 
across organizational levels, as well as within the TMT. 
The more informal, decentralized incremental processes 
(Fredrickson 1986; Quinn et al 1988; Pascale, 1984) suggest that 
the scope of consensus encompasses individuals both within and 
outside the I M T .  "Formal organizational position may have little 
to do with who participates in, or their relative influence on, the 
strategic process." (Wooldridge and Floyd 1 989:298). Bower (1 970) 
contends that lower level managers can be rather influential in 
the outcome of strategic decisions, and Schilit (1 990) presents 
empirical evidence that indicates that middle level managers are 
very successful in exerting upward influence on strategic 
decisions. But "while the scope of consensus may or may not 
include the TMT early in the process, incremental decisions 
ultimately involve top management agreement" (Wooldridge and 
Floyd 1989:298). 
Due to the non-comprehensive nature of incremental processes 
only a severely limited range of options is considered (Lindblom 
1959), and ends can often only be inferred from emergent 
decisions. ~ l t h o u g h  incrementalism can be viewed as a consensus- 
seeking process, the process can also involve bargaining, and 
acquiesence from groups outside the initiating coalition 
(Narayanan and Fahey 1982). This would suggest that 
incrementalism may lead to shared understanding of the emerging 
strategy, but that commitment to the strategy may only be strong 
within the initiating group. 
Because of problems with synoptic processes, particularly 
problems in implementation, and through personal experience of 
working with senior managers from a wide variety of firms, I 
would conclude that in most firms the strategy processes tend 
towards the incremental end of the synoptic-incremental 
continuum. This would suggest that distinguishing between means 
and ends in the rational-comprehensive sense may not be 
particularly useful in this research, notwithstanding the fact that 
the two most directly comparable studies to this one maintained 
this distinction (Bourgeois 1980; Dess 1987). 
These studies of consensus and performance have produced some 
puzzling relationships. Bourgeois (1 980) found that goals 
disagreement was related to good performance, Dess (1987) found 
that good performance was associated with either consensus on 
means, or consensus on ends, but not consensus on both means and 
ends. Grinyer and Norburn (1 977-78) found no significant 
relationship between goal consensus and performance for the 
whole sample, and a negative relationship among the six highest 
performing firms (ie goal disagreement related positively to 
performance). Further, Bourgeois (1978), in a study of strategy 
making processes in 20 American firms, found that goals 
disagreement correlated positively with economic performance. 
These inconclusive and somewhat contradictory results may be 
explained in part by the rather vague nature of the goals 
researched (eg "Employee rewards and benefits; company prestige; 
innovation; service to the community" Bourgeois 1980:245; 
"~ecogn i t ion  as an innovative firm; retaining key personnel; 
market penetration; management developmen:. selection" Dess 
1987:269). It is possible that even members of the TMT might find 
it difficult to operationalise goals couched in these terms. 
Furthermore, invoking the concept of equifinality (Kast and 
Rosenzweig 1974), there may be many routes to the achievement 
of these goals, which might complicate the links between ends and 
means in this type of research. 
There have been attempts to explain negahve relationships 
between goals agreement and performance. For example, Bourgeois 
(1 980) concludes that "managements of high performing firms 
held divergent goal sets as a reflection of multiple advocacy 
resulting from recognition of diverse environmental 
constituencies (customers, suppliers, stockholders etc)" 
(Bourgeois 1980:233). Others have argued the positive aspects of 
goal diversity (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Weick 1977; Murray 
1989). Diversity in management perspectives, backgrounds and 
values rnay be functional particularly where the organization 
faces a dynamic environment (Murray 1989). And Hrebiniak and 
Snow (1982) tentatively suggest that consensus may be negatively 
related to performance under conditions of high environmental 
complexity (Hrebiniak and Snow 1982:1141). 
Bourgeois' (1980) results may well be more a reflection of a 
poorly posed research problem, rather than an indication of a 
substantive issue in the strategic management of firms. For 
example, Wooldridge and Floyd (1 990) suggest that an important 
variable, the decision process, was excluded from the Dess and 
Bourgeois studies. They argue that: 
"consensus on ends and means may not be relevant to 
incremental processes; instead consensus forms around specific 
strategic actions ... Less explicit than the goals and means of 
synoptic strategy, TMT consensus in an incremental setting also 
reflects realized TMT priorities" (Wooldridge and Floyd 1989:300). 
They go on to argue that, as priorities are observable from 
decisions made, they are transmitted up, do-n and across the 
organization whether or not there are formal attempts to 
communicate them. As a result, consensus on priorities does not 
depend on an explicit articulation of ends and means. Priorities 
can also be derived from synoptically formulated goals and means. 
For instance, if a firm's objective is market dominance, and the 
strategy is cost leadership, priorities may be expressed by 
encouraging automation, improved logistics, overhead cost 
reduction, etc. "Thus, since priorities have both an intended and 
emergent character, they have the potential to reflect the content 
of consensus in both synoptic and incrementil settings" 
(Wooldridge and Floyd 1989:300). 
The contributions of Wooldridge and Floyd (1 989,1990) arrived 
after the decisions about the scope and content of this research 
were made. However, the construct used in this research is very 
similar to Wooldridge and Floyd's 'priorities'. Because the focus of 
the research is realised strategy, in many respects "ends" are not 
directly relevant. Intentions behind strategic actions, and the 
extent that intended strategy (if there is one) feeds through to 
become realised strategy is not of immediate concern here. In 
Chapter 3 the derivation of the research instrument is explained 
in detail. At this stage, we can summarise the preceeding 
discussion and its implications for this study as follows: 
(1) Consensus is defined here as "shared perceptions" of 
strategic priorities. It is not used in its "process" sense; it does 
not imply commitment; it should be capable of measurement. 
(2) The "content" of consensus, strategic priorities, is a 
"process neutral construct" (Wooldridge and Floyd 1989:301). 
(3) Because the focus of the research is realised strategy, and 
because of the theoretical and methodological problems outlined 
above, perceptions of "ends" or "goals" have been excluded from 
this study. 
The associations between strategy making processes and 
consensus were first introduced in Chapter 1. This discussion 
addressed the normative assumptions in the prescriptive strategy 
literature that a shared understanding of the strategic direction 
of the firm was important for successful strategy 
implementation, and hence to firm performance. Furthermore, a 
major theme of the consensus studies discussed above is the link 
between consensus and firm performance. This suggests that the 
following hypothesis would be usefully investigated in the present 
study. 
* H8: Consensus on strategic priorities is positively 
related to SBU performance 
2.5 CAUSES OF SHARED PERCEPTIONS OF REALISED 
STRATEGY 
In this section we explore the process dimensions, in addition to 
the strategy making processes, that might have an impact on the 
formation of consensus about an SBU's strategic priorities. The 
following section studies contextual, or situational factors that 
might affect the extent to which managers may perceive the same 
strategic priorit ies. 
2.5.1 CONSENSUS AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES 
Firstly, we should consider process variables that are likely to 
lead to stability in the realised strategy. Stinchcornbe (1 965) 
noted that pressures for the permanence of organizational 
characteristics are the result of two separate sets of influences: 
conditions at the time of the organization's founding, which he 
called "imprinting forces", that strongly define initial 
characteristics and create internal consensus around the initial 
form of the organization; and "traditionalizing forcesM-events 
subsequent to founding- that tend to preserve previously adopted 
organizational characteristics. Boeker (1 989) suggests that "the 
extent to which consensus develops around a strategy at founding 
may make the strategy less open to subsequent questioning or 
redirection by organizational participants" (Boeker 1989:492). 
Over time a given strategy attracts and fosters a set of 
managerial values and philosophies that are wedded to the 
strategy (Guth and Tagiuri 1965), limiting the range of future 
strategic choices that are considered. Hurst et al argue that 
diversity in the personality types of Top Management Team is 
important if organizations are to be able to continually be 
creative and innovative (Hurst, Rush and White 1989). Srivastava 
(1985) suggests that reaching a consensus understanding of 
problems is affected by symbolism, ceremony and rituals, while 
choosing strategic solutions is influenced by value systems. 
Johnson (1987) points up the powerful influence of culture in 
preserving a "paradigm". He found that "this set of beliefs, which 
evolved over time, embraced assumptions about the nature of the 
organizational environment, the managerial style in the 
organization and the nature of its leaders, and the operational 
routines important to ensure the success of the organization" 
(Johnson 1987:271). 
Schein (1 986) indicates the positive role culture can play if it 
helps to provide consensus on mission, means and criteria for 
measuring results. However, he suggests that the most powerful 
mechanisms for embedding and reinforcing culture are found in the 
actions, functions and behaviours of management. Kerr and 
Jackovsky (1989) point out how "training and orientation sessions 
can be used overtly for socialization and exposure to the 
organization's values" (Kerr and Jackovsky 1989:160-161). 
The effects of different decision making processes have already 
been considered. If incremental processes involve many levels of 
management in the formulation of the emerging strategy, there is 
likely to be a high degree of shared perception about the strategic 
direction of the SBU. In synoptic processes centralization of 
authority may be related to consensus building (Miller 1987). 
Three of Bourgeois and Brodwin's (1984) styles of strategy 
implementation are likely to encourage shared perceptions about 
strategy (the "collaborative", "cultural" and "crescive" 
approaches). 
TMT stability is linked to stability in realised strategy. Grinyer 
and Spender (1979) found that organizations initiated basic 
changes in strategy or structure only after replacement of senior 
managers or the departure of the founding entrepreneur, and 
Helmich and Brown (1972) found that executive succession leads 
to organizational changes. 
There are general cultural norms supporting the notion that good 
leaders and managers are consistent and remain committed to 
decisions once they have made them (Boeker 1989; Staw 1981). 
Groupthink pressures can operate to preserve the existing 
strategic direction (Janis 1972), and cohesiveness leads to 
reduced receptivity to information which conflicts with group 
beliefs (Whitney and Smith 1983). 
"As long as profit performance is satisfactory, firms will 
continue to allocate internal resources using whatever rules of 
thumb they've used in the past" (Oster 1982:377), and Mintzberg 
(1 983) noted that high-performing organizations are seldom faced 
with stakeholders who advocate fundamental changes in basic 
operations. Dess (1 987) argues that". .hig her levels of performance 
lead to consensus among TMTs on either objectives or competitive 
methods if for no other reason than everybody likes to be 
identified with a winner" (Dess 1987:266), and Boeker coins the 
phrase "if it isn't broke, don't fix it" (Boeker 1989:496). 
These contributions would suggest that consensus about strategic 
priorities would be negatively related to organizational change, ie 
the greater the turbulence in the organization the less the 
likelihood that stable, shared perceptions of the the organizations 
strategic direction would emerge. 
However, Hambrick (1981) reports that the results of his study 
"consistently indicated that strategic awareness is greater in 
organizations that have recently underaone Y strategic change than 
in those that have not" (Hambrick 1981 :272) .  His results suggest 
that managers tend to lose sight of an enduring strategy, and, 
"rather than it becoming embedded in their minds, it slips from 
their minds" (Hambrick 1981:273). Hence t:vo plausible, but 
opposite relationships between consensus and change can be 
inferred from the literature. H9 sets out to test for a negative 
relationship between consensus and change. 
* H9: Consensus on  strategic pr ior i t ies is negatively 
related to organizat ional  change 
We now consider process effects that might lead to strategy 
instability, and possibly to a lack of consensus about the strategic 
direction of the SBU. 
Dess argues that "environmental perceptions vary with such 
factors as individual differences, individual repertoires and social 
expectations and they serve to influence the objectives and 
competitive methods espoused by TMT members" (Dess 1987:265). 
Astley et al contend that the organization's division of labour 
creates 'local' perspectives on each topic. Dearborn and Simon 
(1958) found that managers perceived issues in a selective way, 
depending on their functional background, and Dess (1989) argues 
tha t :  
"if the roles among members of the TMT are highly 
differentiated--resulting in a higher division of labour--one may 
expect a lower level of consensus or shared perspectives among 
the TMT. ... If all (or several) members of the TMT are not privy to 
the same strategy-related information, or if the information must 
pass through several layers in the organizational hierarchy 
(leading to information distortion) before reaching members of 
the TMT, a lower level of consensus is likely to result" (Dess 
1987:265). 
In-fighting or hidden agendas held by managers would tend to 
suppress consensus, primarily because it would make compromise 
difficult and lead to entrenched positions on the strategic 
direction for the SBU. 
It is possible that poor performance may lead to conflict and 
disagreement regarding what the strategy should be, and hence to 
a lack of consensus, particularly if the SBU is in a state of flux as 
the old consensus about strategy is challenged and discredited 
(Johnson 1987). Thus, the direction of causation hypothesised in 
H9 may be reversed in some circumstances. If the "snapshot" of 
managerial perceptions coincides with this state of flux poor 
performance may have determined low consensus. 
We now address the environmental variables that may impact on 
the formation of shared perceptions amongst a management group. 
2.5.2 CONSENSUS AND ENVIRONMENT 
Contingency theorists have argued that innovation, and the 
uncertain environments that seem to necessitate it, require 
organismic (Burns and Stalker 1961)) decentralized, and 
differentiated (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), and intensively 
integrated structures (Galbraith 1973; Thompson I 967). 
Flexibility in the structure, coupled with decentralization may 
lead to divergent interpretations of strategic priorities, and hence 
to low consensus. 
~ f e f f e r  and Leblebici (1973) argue that competition increases the 
external pressure or constraints placed on an organization. They 
hypothesize that greater competition leads to "a demand for even 
more interlocking of organizational behavior and more 
coordination and control within the organization" (Pfeffer and 
Leblebici 1973:270). Dess (1987) suggests that, in competitive 
environments "a high level of consensus should lead to a higher 
level of performance because during periods of resource scarcity a 
'unified direction' for the organization becomes of primary 
importance" (Dess 1987:266). However, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 
(1987) suggest that attempting to build consensus may be 
hazardous if the firm is facing a high-velocity, high-tech 
environment, due to the time lags involved in consensus-building 
processes. 
Bourgeois (1981) suggests that organizational slack serves as a 
resource for goal conflict resolution and as a means for 
experimenting with new strategies. Slack resources may mean 
that TMT participants are not forced to select a few goals, or a 
limited number of means from the many available. 
Khandwalla (1 976) found that when managers perceive their 
environments as dynamic and uncertain their strategies are likely 
to be more multi-faceted. And Pfeffer and Leblebici (1973) imply 
that differences between industries, such as the amount of 
competitive pressure in the industry, affect the executives' 
awareness of their firm's strategy; strong competitive pressure 
increases awareness of strategy, which should result in higher 
consensus. Duncan (1 971) established that individuals in SBUs 
facing dynamic and complex environments experience the greatest 
amount of uncertainty in decision making. Environmental 
dynamism and complexity may therefore be associated with low 
consensus about the strategic priorities the SBU should pursue. 
To summarise, SBUs facing dynamic and complex environments are 
'likely to respond with organizational struc:ures that are flexible, 
decentralized and differentiated. On the other hand, in hostile 
environments (which do not permit the generation of slack) unity 
of direction is likely to be necessary for above average 
performance. Dess and Origer (1984) propose that "higher 
performing firms that compete in an industry characterized by 
high complexity (andlor high dynamism) have a higher level of 
integrating structure [committees, teams, task forces, 
coordinators] than less successful firms" (Dess and Origei 
1984:328). So, SBUs facing hostile, dynamic, complex 
environments may find it hardest to generate shared perspectives 
of organizational priorities, but those that succeed are likely to 
be above average performers. 
Therefore, if an SBU displays a low degree of consensus about 
strategic priorities this could be explained by the process 
variables and/or the environmental variables discussed above. 
To conclude the chapter the connections between competitive 
strategy and consensus, introduced earlier, are revisited. 
2.6 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND CONSENSUS 
The review of the literature concerning competitive strategy, and 
consensus suggests that SBUs pursuing cost leadership strategies 
are likely to be facing relatively stable environments. Asset 
intensity, and organizational arrangements of a machine 
bureaucratic nature (Miller 1986) associated with cost leadership, 
would indicate the presence of organizational stability. This 
stability coupled with the essentially straightforward nature of 
the strategy would generate a high degree of consensus, not only 
about what the strategic priorities are, but also about what the 
SBU is NOT trying to achieve (eg priorities to do with 
differentiation). 
In contrast, Govindarajan (1988) argues that the choice of a 
differentiation strategy rather than a low-cost strategy would 
increase the uncertainty in a firm's environment, with the 
uncertainty arising out of both environmental unpredictability 
and complexity. This uncertainty may well result in a relative 
absence of consensus about strategic priorities in firms pursuing 
differentiation strategies. 
This suggests the following hypothesis: 
* H10: Where managers perceive their SBUs to be 
pursuing a strategy of cost leadership there will be a 
high degree of consensus about all dimensions of 
compet i t ive  strategy.  
2.7 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: ACADEMICS' PERCEPTIONS 
AND MANAGERS' PERCEPTIONS 
This study provides an opportunity to test out whether managers 
do conceive of competitive strategy in the same way as 
academics. Specifically, do Porter's generic strategy concepts 
coincide with the way managers view the strategy of their SBU? 
Because the research design is based on a Portersque notion of 
competitive strategy (for the reasons outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter) it is not appropriate to address this interesting 
research problem in the main body of the thesis. As a result the 
following hypothesis is explored in a separate chapter (Chapter 5) 
where the relevant methodology is outlined and explained. 
* H11: Managers perceive of competitive strategy in line 
with Porter 's Generic Strategy concepts 
CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the approach used to address the following 
aspects of the statistically-based part of the study: 
* establishing an appropriate sample 
* questionnaire design, and pilot testing 
* the classification of SBU realised strategies 
* the measurement of SBU performance 
* the measurement of consensus 
* the measurement of change 
* hypothesis testing 
To begin the exploration of these methodolcyical issues some 
general aspects of research design are addressed. 
According to Weick (1979), the sacrifice of simplicity fcr 
accuracy is one of the inevitable trade-offs that must be made 
to avoid inconclusive or trivial research findings which result 
from simultaneously pursuing generalizability, accuracy and 
simplicity. In the context of this study the major trade-off is 
between an in-depth understanding of a very fe1.i SBUs, or 
limited insights into a larger number of SBUs  At the extreme the 
research could be located in one SBU (Johnson 7987). Such a 
focus would result in an accurate picture of the SBU, and this 
type of research can also help us to examine, explicate and 
critique theory. However, one drawback of these studies is that 
there may be problems if the conclusions drawn from an in-depth 
study of one organization are inappropriately extrapolated to 
other situations. Hence, care needs to exercised in generalizing 
the results of such studies. 
The main research instrument used here is a 21 statement 
questionnaire which requires the manager to rate his SBU1s 
current situation on statements about strategic priorities, and 
dimensions of organizational change. This approach rests cn an 
assumption that, firstly, managers' respomes to the statements 
reflect their "true" perceptions of their SBU's situation. In :his 
role, the managers are acting as informed observers of the SBU's 
activities. Secondly, as outlined in Chapter 1, the individual 
manager's perceptions will affect his or her behaviour, and, in 
turn, this behaviour influences the realised strategy of the SBU. 
Thus, by accessing managers' perceptions we can then make 
inferences about the realised strategy of the SBU. 
Previous studies into consensus (Dess 1987; Bourgeois 1980) 
have implicitly assumed that perceptions, revealed through 
questionnaire responses, indicate realised strategy. But the 
connections between perceptions, responses, behaviour, realised 
strategy and performance were only partially worked through in 
these studies. For instance, Dess and Davis (1 984) report that 
"when the research instrument was constructed it was assumed 
that all members of the top management team had knowledge of 
the strategy of their firms, and that the strategy could be 
inferred on the basis of the emphasis or importance given 
various competitive methods available to the firm" (Dess and 
Davis 1984:470). Similarly, Snow and Hrebiniak assume a 
connection between managers' perceptions of distinctive 
competence and actual (or realised) distinctive competence. 
The perceptions-behaviour connection is supported by 
subscribers to cognitive theories of reality construction (Berger 
and Luckmann 1966). Perceptions are models of reality, they 
guide and direct behaviour (Gronhaug and Falkenberg 1989; Gioia 
and Sims 1986). People have limited cognitive capacities, and 
cognitive models are used to interpret, "make senses of" 
complexity (March and Simon 1958). 
The link between the research tool for measuring perceptions, 
and the "actual" way the manager sees the strategy of the SBU is 
another problem area. Does the terminology used in the 
questionnaire have meaning for the respondent? Does it have the 
same meaning for the respondent and the researcher (Stubbart 
1989)? Managers may define categories differently from 
researchers (Ford and Hegarty 1984; Shrivastava and Lim 7 984). 
Jackson and Dutton (1987) found that managers do not 
necessarily perceive opportunities and threats as opposites, and 
Stephenson found that different criteria and frames of reference 
were being used to classify strengths, and weaknesses. 
Competitors may also be perceived differently (Baden-Fuller et 
al 1987; Hodgkinson and Johnson 1987; Reger 1987). 
These issues are discussed further in the sections on the 
development and pilot testing of the questionnaire below. 
3.2 SAMPLING 
Support for the use of multi-industry samples comes from Snow 
and Hrebiniak (1980), who suggest that "the power of the 
theoretical framework [they developed and researched] would be 
increased substantially if the predicted relationships. ..were 
observed in widely divergent industries." (Hrebiniak and Snow 
I 980:322) (Skivington and Daft also point out the advantages in 
being able to generalize from "coarse grain" studies, 1991 :50). In 
three previous studies into consensus rnuI!ipIe industry SBU 
samples were used: 
Grinyer and Norburn (1977-78): 91 managers from 13 
industr ies 
* Bourgeois (1980): 67 managers from 12 SBUs from 11 
industr ies 
Stagner (1969): 217 executives from 109 Fortune 500 
However, reviewing these and other studies Dess (1987) argues 
that the "conflicting results obtained in previous field studies on 
the relationship between consensus and performance may be 
partially due to samples consisting of firms facing different 
industry environments" (Dess 1987:261) 
This is a strong argt~ment for locating studies that research 
links between some dimensions of the SBU, and performance, in 
the same industry. Dess and Origer (1987) broaden the criticism 
of previous multi-industry studies by pointing up the absence, in 
many of the studies, of a framework which integrates important 
variables which may explain and predict the nature of the 
consensus-performance relationship. To overcome the problems 
posed by sampling from different industry environme~~ts, Dess 
locates his study in a single industry: the paints and allied 
products industry in the USA. It is worth examining this approach 
in some detail in order to identify its strengths and 
shortcomings. 
Dess (1987) cites evidence to suggest that his chosen industry 
was highly competitive, resulting in poor average profitability. 
It might well be the case that the particular circumstances in 
this industry would result in commodity-like competitive 
conditions, with competition being mainly based on price, and a 
heavy emphasis on cost reduction strategies. If this was indeed 
the situation in the paints and allied products industry, we 
might, a priori, expect there to be a high degree of consensus on 
competitive methods across the whole industry. Efficiency and 
competing on price are strategies which are relatively clear and 
unambiguous, and there are well understood zanagement 
routines to aid implementation (cost measurement and control). 
By selecting firms in the same industry the advantages of having 
meaningful performance measures need to be offset by two 
industry specific conditions which are central to the research 
questions set by Dess. So, by selecting this poor performing 
industry, which is mature, and in some respects, commodity- 
like, there is likely to be a high degree of consensus on 
competitive methods (evidenced by Dess 1987 Table 3), and 
little variance in firm performance. 
There are other problems with the single industry study. The 
definition of the industry is an art not a science. Dess (1987) 
used the standard US industrial classification to generate his 
database. But in this geographically fragmented industry, SBUs 
may not be in competition with each other, and there may be 
local industry conditions which permit certain SBUs to perform 
well above or well below the average. These conditions may 
overwhelm the consensus effects being studied. 
The second problem of industry definition returns us to the 
differences between the researcher's definition of the 
competition, and the manager's definition. Dess (1 987) imposes 
his industry definition on the managers, who may well take a 
different view of who their competitors are. This problem is 
central to Porter's important contributions on the effect of 
industry structure on industry performance. It provides many 
opportunities for academics and managers to disagree. Moreover, 
the managers may perceive the competition in terms of firms 
who make the same things; consumers may define the firm's 
rivals on the basis of needs they want satisfying. Hence the 
blurring between the two categories of competitive rivals, and 
providers of substitute products or services. 
With respect to Dess and Origer's (1 987) criticism that previous 
studies have lacked an integrating framework, the model 
introduced in Chapter 1 provides just such a framework. Of 
relevance in this discussion are the moderating effects of 
industry environment, organizational environment, management 
values and cognitive bases. All these will moderate the causal 
links between perceptions, consensus and performance. 
The main argument supporting the use of single industry samples 
rests on the measurement of performance, and the impact of 
industry structure on SBU performance. This problem is explored 
in more depth later in this chapter. 
To gain the benefits of having SBUs representing a spread of 
industries, and, in order to compare firms within a single 
industry, the sample of SBUs used in this study contains 
businesses from service industries, manufacturing industries, 
and 11 SBUs from the same industry, publishing. 
The number of SBUs in the sample should be large enough to 
permit meaningful statistical testing. Following Terpstra (1 981) 
a sample size of greater than 30 was deemed the minimum 
acceptable. In fact, the final sample was made up of 38 SBUs. 
In order to address the second major theme of the study, namely 
managerial perceptions of competitive strategy and their 
relationship to Porter's generic strategies, a minimum mixed (ie 
multi-SBU) sample of managers of 300 was considered 
appropriate (based on the requirements of factor analysis: 
Terpstra 1981; Dess and Davis 1984). In the event, the 
"managerial database" included over 11 00 managers. 
3.3.1 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN: CONTENT 
In selecting the dimensions of realised strategy to be researched 
the issue of the possible differences between academics' 
perceptions of competitive strategies, and managers' 
perceptions must be addressed. In addition, the scope of the 
research into realised strategy needs to be considered. For 
example, should the study take a broad definition of strategy 
which encompasses all the following dimensions: 
A) the objectives of the SBU (eg. sales revenue growth, market 
share, gross profits, financial independence) 
B) the direction of developme.nt (eg. withdrawal from some 
markets, consolidation, increased penetration of existing 
markets, growth through new product development, 
d ivers i f i ca t ion)  
C) the methods of development (eg. internal development, joint 
development, acquisition) 
D) the bases of competition (eg specialization, 
innovation,branding, low price, product quality, channels of 
distribution, pricing policy) 
Or should a more restricted scope be adopted? Previous studies 
have focussed on sub-sets of these four categories: goals, and 
"means", competitive methods (Dess and Davis 1984; Dess 1987; 
Govindarajan 1988); strategic priorities (Wooldridge and Floyd 
1990); distinctive competences (Hitt and Ireland 1985). 
In determining the more restricted scope of the questionnaire, it 
was important to clarify the differences between this research 
and previous, similar studies. Previous research into perceptions 
of strategy dimensions have focussed on the top management 
team. It is realistic to expect that the top management team 
would have views about all four of the broad strategy dimensions 
listed above (ie objectives, direction of development, methods of 
development, competitive strategy). However, an important 
difference in this research is the inclusion of managers below 
the TMT in the survey. These managers may well be unaware of 
some of these strategic dimensions, particularly the current 
thinking about methods and direction of development. It might 
also be the case that managers below the TFAT may have only 
sketchy understanding of the explicit objectives of the SBU (and. 
of course, they may be even less aware of implicit goals). 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that strategic 
priorities associated with the competitive strategy of the SBU 
may be understood at middle and lower levels of the hierarchy. 
The suggestion is that functional managers would be aware of 
SBU level strategic priorities, as they would experience the 
implications of these priorities in their everyday managerial 
work. These priorities can be conceived of as intermediate level 
constructs, less general than Mission Statements (eg "to provide 
excellent service to our target customers"), but less specific 
than functional objectives ("to reduce scrap and reworking 
costs by 25°/0"). The priorities are directed at the competitive 
strategy of the SBU, and may be viewed as critical success 
factors that, in combination, summarise and determine the 
realised competitive strategy of the SBU. 
The problem of differing perspectives between academics and 
researchers with respect to relevant dimensions of competitive 
strategy poses a major difficulty. In seeking to derive a research 
instrument that is generalizable previous researchers have 
looked to established strategic typologies (notably Porter 1980, 
and Miles and Snow 1978). The advantages of using an existing 
widely used typology as a basis for generating the questionnaire 
statements are, firstly, that the findings of the research will be 
more easily interpretable by other researchers, and, secondly, 
using an existing typology provides an opportunity to empirically 
test that typology. 
But there are stro:-~g arguments against using such typologies. 
Porter's generic strategies are grounded in theoretical argument 
augmented by anecdotal, case-based examples. Miles and Snow's 
typology was derived from a study of a small (in research terms) 
number of firms. So neither of these popular typologies has a 
solid grounding in empirical research. The second problem with 
these typologies is that they are couched in terms that make 
sense to the academic, and they use their own terminology. If one 
were to use either of these approaches in researching managers 
perceptions the terms used by Porter and Miles and Snow would 
probably need to be "translated" into language more likely to be 
familiar to practising managers (eg "differentiation". 
"analyser"). 
But the biggest problem in using standard typologies is that they 
assume an approach to competitive strategy that may bear little 
relationship to how strategy is actually conceived of by 
practising managers (Stubbart 1989). It may also be the case 
that Porter has not captured all the alternative ways of gaining 
competitive advantage, and in a given industry there may be 
different categories of strategic behaviour to those proposed by 
Miles and Snow. So the danger is that by using an existing 
typology we already constrain the research, narrowing the 
possible outcomes to those assumed in the design stage of the 
questionnaire. 
A viable alternative would be to research individual SBUs 
without a preconceived typology. For example, structured 
interviews could be held with senior managers to derive a set of 
statements that captured the relevant dimensions of strategy 
for that SBU. This set of statements could then be used to 
explore the extent of consensus across levels, and across 
functions. Alternatively, repertory grid techniques could be used 
to derive managerial constructs (Reger 1987). However, although 
these approaches would probably improve the accuracy of the 
research, they may severely restrict the generalizability of the 
study. reducing opportunities to aggregate data, and to make 
comparisons across SBUs. 
3.3.2 DERIVING THE STRATEGIC PRIORITY STATEMENTS 
The approach adopted here is to base the questionnaire around an 
existing academically derived typology. In order to reduce the 
problems of interpretation, and problems resulting from a 
possible lack of relevance to priorities perceived by managers, 
the questionnaire has been extensively pilot tested and refined. 
Following Dess and Davis (1984), this study uses strategic 
priority statements derived from Porter's Generic Strategy 
concepts (Porter 1980;1985). Although Porter suggests there are 
three Generic Strategies (Cost Leadership, Differentiation and 
Focus), the Focus strategy has been excluded from this study as: 
"the focus strategy ... merely takes the form of either the low- 
cost or differentiation strategy "focussed" on a specific industry 
segment." (Govindarajan 1 986:847) 
In line with Dess and Davis's study (1984), the writings of 
Porter and other strategy researchers (including Child 1975; 
Bourgeois 1980, and Khandwalla 1976) were reviewed to enhance 
the content validity of the statements of competitive methods. 
Boeker (1989) argues for the use of strategic typologies in this 
kind of research: "such typologies are especially useful for 
parsimoniously conveying fundamental differences in the 
strategic approaches taken by organizations." (Boeker 1989:491). 
Other relevant prior research includes tnose studies that have 
tried to, inter alia, test the validity of the Generic Strategy 
concepts (Hambrick 1983 and 1985; Miller 1988 and 1986). 
In seeking to dissemble competitive strategies into specific 
statements researchers have adopted various approaches. 
Govindarajan (1 988) asked SBU general managers to position 
their products relative to those of leading competitors in the 
following areas: selling price; percent of sales spent on R&D; 
percent of sales spent on marketing; product quality; brand 
image; product features (Govindarajan 1988:851). Dess (1 987) 
derives a much longer list of "competitive methods" which 
include a number of statements which seem to have only tenuous 
links to competitiveness: 
minimising the use of outside financing 
forecasting market growth 
Bourgeois (1980) lists 23 competitive methods which include 
financial liquidity, new sources of funds and employee morale, 
as well as more straightforward method of competing (low 
price, brand image, customer credit). 
Wooldridge and Floyd (1 989) suggest that: 
"priorities seem well suited to describe the content of 
consensus ...[ they] are consistent with incremental processes. 
Since they are observable from decisions made, priorities are 
transmitted up, down and across the organization whether or not 
there are fcrmal attempts to communicate them. As a result, 
consensus on priorities does not depend on an explicit 
articulation of ends and means ... Priorities can be derived from 
synoptically formulated goals and means..Thus, since priorities 
have both an intended and emergent character, they have the 
potential to reflect the content of consensus in both synoptic 
and incremental settings." (Wooldridge and Floyd 1989:300) 
Hence, priorities are a process neutral construct. 
The statements derived from Porter's generic strategies are 
couched in terms which accord with Wooldridge and Floyd's 
concept of priorities. The current research is directed at 
realised strategy, not at the decision making processes that have 
led to realised strategy. Thus, the fact that the statements about 
strategic priorities used here are "process neutral" means that 
there should be no unintended bias introduced into the research. 
that may result from not controlling for the strategy making 
processes used by the SBU. 
3.3.3 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN: SCALE AND RUBRIC 
Dess (1987) uses a five-point scale in his questionnaire where 1 
= "not at all important", 5 = "extremely important". Each 
respondent was asked to indicate how important a list of 
competitive methods was to their firm. Dess stresses that he is 
trying to "obtain an indication of the extent of consensus or 
'shared perspectives' regarding the relative importance of 
different aspects of what a given firm's strategy actually is.." 
and "the purpose was neither to determine the process by which 
consensus (or lack thereof) was obtained nor individual 
preference orderings among TMT members concerning what the 
strategy of a given firm should be". Despite this aim to exclude a 
normative element from the research, by using "important" in the 
rating scale this may be misconstrued by the respondent. For 
example, the manager may reason that "I believe this statement 
IS important, but we're not doing it now". (See also Dess and 
Davis 1 984). 
This approach was also adopted by Bourgeois (1980). His 
instructions read: 
"Below are listed several items which might be used as methods 
for competing in your industry. Please indicate the degree of 
importance your firm attaches to each item as a part of its 
overall strategy" (Bourgeois 1980) 
Both Dess and Bourgeois attempt to validate the statements by 
referring them to CEOs in the chosen industries. Bourgeois asks 
CEOs to rank the five most critical "competitive weapons" from 
those on the list plus any the CEO wished to add to the list. The 
instrument derive by Dess and Davis (1984) was "modified" after 
discussions with CEOs in the chosen industry "in order to 
enhance [the questionnaire's] ability to capture competitive 
methods that identify the strategic orientation of a firm's 
decision makers" (Dess and Davis 1984:471). This approach was 
manageable because the research was conducted from within one 
industry, the paint and allied products industry. 
Hitt and Ireland's (1985) study of corporate level distinctive 
competences used a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
"greatest strategic significance" to "completely strategically 
insignificant" (Hitt and Ireland 1985:279). Snow and Hrebiniak 
(1980) favoured a three category scale where activities were to 
be rated as a "strength", a "weakness" or "OK" (presumably some 
neutral judgement in between strength or weakness). 
In this study the respondents were asked to rate their SBU on a 
five-point scale where l="This statement does not apply to our 
firm", and 5="This statement accurately describes the situation 
in our firm". The respondents were instructed in the introduction 
to the questionnaire as follows: 
"If the statement does not apply at all to your firm then 
circle (1). If the statement accurately describes the situaiion in 
the firm, circle (5). The numbers (2) to (4) enable you to indicate 
intermediate positions in between these two extremes1' 
The introductory rubric continues as follows: 
"Please note that we are interested in your firm's CURRENT 
STRATEGY; the statements refer to what your firm is doing NOW, 
not what you think it might be doing some time in the future." 
In contrast to the brief statements of competitive methods used 
by Bourgeois (1980) and Dess (1987), most using only two or 
three words, this study uses complete sentences (eg. "We aim to 
be the lowest cost producer in our industry"). 
This style of questionnaire was adopted for the following 
reasons: 
The rubric to the rating scale was constructed to exclude 
any normative element or implication. In this way the 
respondent, in his or her role as an informed observer of the 
organizational scene, could reflect his or her perceptions of 
current strategic priorities without necessarily being 
committed to them. 
* It was felt that complete sentences would reduce problems 
of ambiguity and differing interpretations. 
The development and pilot testing of the questionnaire is 
considered next. 
3.4.1 DEVELOPING THE "PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC 
PRIORITIES" QUESTIONNAIRE 
In deriving a list of statements about competitive strategy, 
strategic management texts, in addition to Porter (Johnson and 
Scholes 1988; Thompson and Strickland 1987) were consulted, 
discussions were held with colleagues both within the Strategy 
Group at Cranfield School of Management, and those from other 
groups who were familiar with the Generic Strategy concepts. 
(Dess and Davis 1984 used a similar approach involving 
"academicians selected on the basis of their experience and 
expertise in the field of strategic management" (Dess and Davis 
1984:474)) 
Only "Cost Leadership" and "Differentiation" strategies were to 
be included. "Focus" per se is not a competitive strategy, it 
merely defines a narrower competitive arena. Within this arena 
the firm still has to consider which source of competitive 
advantage it is seeking (cost leadership, differentiation or a 
combination of both). 
From these sources a list of 41 statements was drawn up. All 
the statements were couched in the present tense to emphasize 
that the statements referred to what was happening now in the 
SBU rather than some vaguely understood future intentions. 
This list of 41 statements was then tested with 7 colleagues 
who teach strategic management at Cranfield. They were asked 
independently to categorise each statement as follows: 
"The statement applies essentially to either: 
(a) a cost leadership strategy 
(b) a general strategy of differentiation 
(c) a specific differentiation strategy (either through 
innovation, or marketing effort) (based on Miller 1987) 
(d) the statement could apply to either, or both generic 
s t rategies"  
The responses were used to construct a draft of the 
questionnaire. Statements that had been unanimously categorised 
as clearly pertaining to one or the other of the generic 
strategies were included. There were 6 cost leadership 
statements, and 7 differentiation statements that were 
unanimously unambiguously categorised. To these were added 4 
cost leadership statements, and 3 differentiation statements 
that were classified as such by 6 out of the 7 respondents, 
making 10 statements for each generic strategy, 20 statements 
in all. 
Colleagues had also made suggestions about the wording of some 
statements, particularly ones that were slightly ambiguous, or 
which might contain terminology not familiar to some managers. 
These suggestions were incorporated in the 20 statement 
version. 
The same group of experts were then asked to classify this 
restricted set of statements. They were all unanimously 
classified as pertaining to either a strategy of cost leadership, 
or to a strategy of differentiation. 
* Thus, as a result of these processes a set of statements 
were derived that, in the opinion of the expert panel, related 
unambiguously to the two Porter generic strategies. 
3.4.2 PILOTING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
This 20 statement questionnaire was then pilot tested initially 
with a group of middlekenior managers from a large 
construction materials company. The aim of this test was to see 
whether practicing managers were able to complete the 
questionnaire without difficulty. In particular, were the 
statements meaningful and were they capable of being related to 
their firrri? 
The manaqers - completed the questionnaire without difficulty, in 
my presence, but I was asked for some clarification as to the 
definition of the "business" to which the statements referred. 
This was clearly a problem for some managers. For example, do 
the statements refer to the quarry he manages? or do they relate 
to the construction materials division? or to the corporation as 
a whole? 
As a result of this feedback the wording in the introduction to 
the questionnaire was amended to make it clearer that the 
statements refer to SBU level strategy, not corporate level 
strategy. The managers responses indicated a high level of 
positive agreement (consensus) on some statements, and also 
agreement that some statements did not apply to their SBU. 
No manager indicated that he had any difficulty in referring the 
statements to his business. 
This first pilot test, then, indicated that managers were 
able to understand the wording of the statements, and the 
statements had meaning for them. 
3.4.3 INTRODUCING THE "CHANGE" STATEMENTS, AND 
FURTHER TESTING 
The research design includes a dimension o! organizational 
change (see Figure 1.2). In Chapter 2 possible relationships were 
discussed between consensus, realised strategy, and 
organizational change, and two hypotheses address these 
relationships explicitly. In addition, the "change" dimension 
would help the interpretation of the SBU's situation in the third 
part of the study (using "realised" strategies in strategy debates 
with SBU managers). In particular, information about perceive 
strategic, structural or operational changes could be used to 
explore the appropriateness of recent strategic actions (eg 
restructuring; changing business operations). If there had b r z n  
operational or structural changes that were not part of a 
deliberate attempt to change strategy, the implications cf these 
actions could be discussed, and debates about strategy rnaking 
processes within the SBU would be enhanced. 
Therefore, in order to research this dimension the perc~pt ions of 
strategic priorities questionnaire was augmented with a set of 
statements concerned with organizational change. 
1-0 the list of 20 strategy statements were added 10 rnore 
statements referring to various aspects of organization21 
change. The basis for selecting and constructing the statements 
was Miles and Snow's (1978) 
strategy typology. This conceptual framework integrates 
competitive strategy with organization stri:c:ures and processes 
to derive four gestalts, or configurations. The typology has been 
extensively used as a basis for empirical research. By adopting 
some of the Miles and Snow dimensions opportunities may be 
presented to test their theory. Accordingly, statements were 
constructed around the following dimensions of organizational 
change: 
changes in strategic direction 
changes in business operations 
* changes in products/services offered 
* changes in organization structures and processes 
The resultant 30 statement questionnaire was then tested with 
3 groups of managers attending management development 
programmes at Cranfield School of Managerlent. These managers 
came from a wide spread of firms, from several countries. 
The three groups of managers produced 39 responses. 
In order to test whether the responses from these managers 
corresponded to the three intended strategy dimensions (Cost 
Leadership, Differentiation, and Change), the responses were 
factor analysed, specifying a 3 factor solution. As Dess and 
Davis (1 984) suggest "factor analysis has the ability to produce 
descriptive summaries of data matrices, which aid in detecting 
the presence of meaningful patterns among a set of variables" 
(Dess and Davis 1984:472). In this situation, the factor analysis 
was also used to reduce the number of statements in the 
questionnaire, in the interests of producing a parsimonious 
research instrument. 
The rotated factors were then interpreted . The three factors 
could be interpreted as "Cost Leadershipicost reduction", 
"Change" and "Differentiation". There were, however, a number of 
statements which did not load "cleanly" on one of these three 
factors. 
Because the intention was to produce a questionnaire that not 
only reflected Porter's generic strategies, but one that was also 
straightforward for managers to complete, it was important that 
the language of the statements was free of "jargon", and that the 
questionnaire was concise. Using the information derived from 
the factor analysis, and through discussions with colleagues, the 
30 statement questionnaire was reduced to 21 statements. 
* These processes of testing and factor analysis indicated 
that the statements in the questionnaire were seen by managers 
as relating to the two generic strategies, and to organizational 
change. 
3.4.4 FURTHER PILOT TESTING 
The 21 statement questionnaire (which now had 8 Cost 
LeadershipKost Reduction orientated statements, 6 
Differentiation orientated statements, and 7 change related 
statements) was further tested with two mixed groups of 
managers. In addition to testing the ease of use of the 
questionnaire, and whether there were any remaining problems in 
interpreting the instructions or the statements, the opportunity 
was taken to test whether the questionnaire results accorded 
with the respondents view of the strategy of his or her firm. 
The first group of managers were asked to complete the 
questionnaire. Then they were introduced to Porter's generic 
strategy concepts via a video, and a class discussion (taking 
about 2 hours). They were then asked to locate their firm on a 
simple graph, which essentially required them to judge whether 
the firm was pursuing a Cost LeadershipICost Reduction 
orientated strategy, or a Differentiation strategy. They were 
then fed back the results of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire responses were factor analysed to produce 
factor scores for each manager for each of the three factors. The 
two competitive strategy factor scores were used to plot each 
respondent on a graph (see Figure 3.1). 
The results from this test were as follows: 
* out of 18 managers, 14 of them located their graph position 
as the same as the questionnaire result. eg the questionnaire 
result was "Cost leadershiplcost Control orientation", and they 
plotted their SBU accordingly on their graph 
* two manager's graph positions did not correspond to the 
questionnaire result, although in one case the manager did not 
produce a strong strategy orientation in his questionnaire. 
two other managers were non-committal in their graph 
plots; they located their firms on the 45 degree line dividing the 
cost leadershiplcost reduction orientation from differentiation 
or ientat ion.  
Thus, following an explanation of the generic strategy concepts, 
these managers could categorise their SBU in generic strategy 
terms. These classifications coincided with the questionnaire 
derived classifications. It could be concluded, then, from this 
test, that, within the constraints of the generic strategy 
framework, the questionnaire results generally coincided with 
the manager's expressed classification of his SBU. 
In order to simplify the descriptive label of the Cost 
LeadershipICost Reduction orientation it was summarised 
subsequently as an "Efficiency" orientation. This change was also 
made as a result of difficulties some respondents expressed 
with the concept of Cost Leadership. Whils: they were 
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FIGURE 3.1 REPRESENTING MANAGER'S PERCEPTIONS OF 
STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
comfortable with a description of their SBU's strategy that 
emphasised cost reduction and efficiency, they were less sure 
about classifying their SBU as being in pursuit of cost 
leadership. This concern with the concept of cost leadership, and 
the possibility that managers may perceive this strategy 
differently from the Porteresque view is taken up in Chapter 5. 
The next test was with a group of 26 senior managers. To 
overcome the problem of managers locating themselves on the 45 
degree line, they were asked to classify their SBU as being in one 
of the four quadrants of the diagram in Figure 3.2. This diagram 
suggests four possible competitive strategy orientations: 
"Pure Efficiency". Here the SBU is concerned essentially 
with cost reduction and cost control 
"Pure Differentiation". SBUs pursuing this orientation 
emphasise product uniqueness and premium pricing. There is 
little concentration on cost reduction. 
* "Hybrid". These SBUs would be pursuing Efficiency and 
Differentiation with equal vigour 
"Impoverished". SBUs located in this quadrant do not 
emphasise either of the competitive strategy orientations 
The same sequence of events was undertaken in this test 
(complete questionnaire, video based discussion of generic 
strategies), then the managers were asked to locate their SBU on 
the grid. The results were as follows: 
12 managers' estimates of their SBU's strategy agreed with 
the results of the questionnaire. In all these cases the managers 
had classified their SBUs as either Pure Efficiency (5), or Pure 
Differentiat ion (7) 
8 managers who estimated their SBUs were pursuing Pure 
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Categorising R e a l i s e d  Strategies 
Efficiency strategies turned out as Hybrid strategies from the 
questionnaire. 
* 5 managers estimated that their SBUs were pursuing Hybrid 
strategies. In all five cases the questionnaire located them in 
the Pure Differentiation category. 
* No managers estimated that their firms were in the 
Impoverished category; the questionnaire produced 3 managers in 
this category. All 3 managers had estimated Efficiency 
s t rategies.  
The results of this test indicate that where "Pure" strategies are 
being pursued the managers responses tend to concur with their 
estimates. Where Pure strategies were "wrongly" estimated, in 
all cases the questionnaires produced either a Hybrid location, or 
an Impoverished location. This would indicate that the Pure 
strategies are quite robust in their distinctiveness. The straying 
into the Hybrid/lmpoverished categories indicates more the 
strength of the orientation to either of the Pure strategies, 
rather than the existence of a difference in orientation. 
* The results of these two tests gave a degree of confidence 
in the questionnaire, and, in this revised and shortened form, it 
could be easily administered to large numbers of managers. 
The design of the questionnaire is such that it could be applied 
to any organization, not just business organizations. This was 
demonstrated with a mixed group of public and private sector 
managers. The public sector managers were able to relate to the 
majority of statements, and because of the nature of the rating 
scale, they were able to indicate which statements did NOT apply 
to their organization, as well as those that did. However, the 
instrument was designed specifically for firms; a different set 
o f  strategy statements would be appropriate to many public 
service organizations. 
To reduce problems that may arise where manaqers have 
- 
differing interpretations of "Efficiency" and "Differentiation", in 
all subsequent occasions where managers were exposed to their 
location on the two-dimensional plot, the presentation included 
the series of slides in Figure 3.3. In this way, the summarising 
terms used were linked to specific statements, thus reducing the 
problems of ambiguity. 
Two further planned tests, and one unplanned test of the validity 
of the questionnaire were conducted. 
The first planned test involved the application of the 
questionnaire to an SBU that, a priori, we would suppose would 
display high consensus about its strategic priorities. The SBU 
selected was a small strategic management consultancy, the 
respondents comprised the partners from the consultancy. 
Blau (1977) notes that the density of intragroup relations is an 
inverse function of group size, and Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) 
suggest that "smaller professional or functional groups or 
relatively small organizations will develop "thick" social 
understandings that are specific to the organization" (Wilkins 
and Ouchi 1983:472). They go on to argue that the "frequent 
contact on similar problems utilizing shared professional 
orientations is likely to reinforce a shared professional clan ... 
Clan control that can efficiently govern uncertain and complex 
transactions requires the development of shared knowledge in 
two areas: (1) a general paradigm that helps participants 
determine what is in the bets interest of the collective; and (2) 
the perception of goal congruence (the belief in a general or 
long-term equity)." (Wilkins and Ouchi 1983:475) 
Moreover, because of the nature of this SEU's work (offering 
consulting advice on strategy) it is likely that the partners have 
practiced what they preach, to the extent that the strategy of 
their business would have been explicitly discussed and 
developed, and that there would be not only a high degree of 
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shared understanding about the strategy, there is also likely to 
be a high degree of commitment to it (as they all have a large 
stake in the SBU's success). 
The application of the questionnaire to this SBU revealed a very 
high degree of consensus around the strategy of Differentiation. 
All the partners were located in the Differentiation quadrant 
(see Figure 3.4). 
The second further planned test involved the selection of an SBU 
that, a priori, we would expect to display very low consensus. It 
proved difficult to conceptualise the antecedent conditions that 
would lead to such a result, but poor performance, a fragmented 
structure, in-fighting and low morale, a lack of direction from 
the TMT would all probably contribute to low consensus. Actually 
finding such an SBU would be difficult, and the identification of 
many of these dimensions would be highly subjective unless an 
extensive study of possible SBUs was undertaken. However, the 
validity of the research instrument would be enhanced if a 
comparitor SBU to the strategy consultancy could be found. A 
surrogate SBU was eventually selected on a rather different set 
of assumptions from those proposed above. 
As the selection of an appropriatg low-consensus SBU was 
difficult on a priori reasoning an alternative approach was 
selected. Two SBUs from a large multinational corporation were 
selected, and newly recruited graduates were asked to complete 
the questionnaire. The graduates had been with their SBUs for 
between three and four months, and they had been assigned to 
work within a variety of functions at fairly low levels. The 
combination of relative newness to the SBU, a spread of 
functional experiences, and being located at low levels of the 
hierarchy would suggest that these trainee managers would not 
share the same perceptions of strategic priorities. The tests on 
these SBUs produced a wide dispersion across all four quadrants. 
The unplanned validation occurred when the results of the 
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questionnaire were being presented to the TMT of a retailing 
SBU. Not all the members of the TMT were present at the 
meeting, but they had all completed the questionnaire. Each 
member of the TMT was represented by a letter of the alphabet 
on the plot. Before each individual's position was identified on 
the plot, a member of the TMT remarked that "I'll bet that "G" is 
....." and he named a member of the TMT. "G" was positioned 
clearly in the "Efficiency" quadrant. This observation was 
supported by other members of the TMT, and it proved to be 
accurate. This suggests that the questionnaire was reflecting 
how other managers perceived one of their colleague's 
perceptions of strategic priorities. This would, again, increase 
confidence in the ability of the questionnaire to reflect 
managers' perceptions of strategic. priorities. 
Finally, it is worth noting that over the course of the study 1100 
managers have completed the questionnaire. Through discussions 
with mixed groups of managers on management development 
programmes, and through debates where the questionnaire has 
been used in strategy development processes, it is clear that 
managers are comfortable with the questionnaire. They find it 
straightforward to complete, and are able to relate with some 
ease to the interpretation of the analysis. 
The final version of the questionnaire can be found in 
Appendix A at the end of the thesis. 
3.5 INFERRING REALISED STRATEGY FROM THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
The managers' responses to the strategic priorities 
questionnaire form the basis of the approach to the 
classification of realised strategies. For each SBU the following 
procedure was adopted: 
1) the individual factor scores for each respondent on each of 
the factors (Efficiency, Differentiation, and Change) were 
calculated in accordance with the following formula: 
where a,i is the factor score coefficient for strategic priority 
j (;=I ,......, 21) on factor i (i=1,2,3), and zj is the manager's 
scoring of strategic priority j. The rotated loadings, and factor 
score coefficients used in the classification of SBUs can be 
found in Table 3.1. 
2) a mean factor score for the SBU was calculated for each of 
the three factors (summing all the managers' factor scores, and 
dividing by the number of managers). The standard deviation 
about this mean was also calculated 
3) the SBU was classified as being in one of four categories 
of realised strategy as follows: 
I 
a) In order to exclude SBUs where the managers did not 
display consensus about either cost leadership, or 
differentiation, the mean factor score for each SBU was tested 
for significance: 
Mean Factor Score > 1 .O*S.D./Root(n) 
where SD = the standard deviation, and n = the number of 
respondents from the SBU 
This test takes into account the number of responses from an 
SBU (the more respondents, the more confidence we would have 
that the mean was greater than zero). 
Table 3.1 ROTATED LOADINGS 
S t a t e m e n t  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
V(1) Operating Costs 0.71 5 
V(13) Monitor Costs 0.639 
V(15) Price Sensitive 0.670 
V(6) Low Cost Supply 0.629 
V(5) Cut Overheads 0.61 6 
V(21)Competitive Prices 0.588 
V(19) Lowest Cost 0.545 
V(11) Emphasize Prices 0.528 
V(8) Capacity Util 0.528 
V(14) Different Ops. 0.087 
V(16) Changed Structure 0.102 
V(20) Same Operations -0.002 
V(2) Changed Strategy 0.065 
V(4) Little Org. Change -0.083 
V(9) Unique Products -0.066 
V(7) Regular NPD 0.059 
V(10) NPD Priority 0.1 38 
V(3) Distinctive Prducts 0.167 
V(18) Superior Products 0.240 
V(12) No Product Change 0.142 
V(17) Sales Inform -0.1 16 
Percentage Of Variance 
Explained 17.1 13.49 12.18 
(Table 3.1 continued) 
Interpretation of Rotated Factors: 
Factor 1 "Cost Leadership" 
Factor 2 "Change" 
Factor 3 "Differentiation" 
Factor  Score  Coef f ic ien ts  
S t a t e m e n t  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
V(1) Operating Costs 0.207 
V(13) Monitor Costs 0.1 99 
V(15) Price Sensitive 0.1 81 
V(6) Low Cost Supply 0.182 
V(5) Cut Overheads 0.1 81 
V(21) Competitive Prices 0.1 68 
V(19) Lowest Cost 0.1 54 
V(11) Emphasize Prices 0.146 
V(8) Capacity Utiliz 0.149 
V(14) Different Ops -0.01 2 
V(16) Changed Struct -0.007 
V(20) Same Operations 0.035 
V(2) Changed Strategy -0.01 2 
V(4) Little Org. Change 0.006 
V(9) Unique Products -0.048 
V(7) Regular NPD -0.01 8 
V(10) NPD Priority 0.006 
V(3) Distinctve Products 0.023 
V(18) Superior Products 0.042 
V(12) No Product Change 0.071 
V(17) Sales Inform -0.043 
This is a similar approach to that of Boeker (1989), who uses the 
one standard deviation cut point as a means of categorising 
SBUs. 
b) if the mean score on a factor (either Differentiation, or 
Efficiency) was positive, and significant, then the SBU was 
classified as pursuing this orientation. 
c) if the mean score on both factors was negative, and 
significant, then the SBU was classified as "Impoverished". In 
this case the SBU demonstrates agreement that the SBU was 
pursuing neither strategic orientation. 
d) if the mean scores for both factors were not significant, 
the SBU was categorised as "Unclassified". 
3) Thus for each SBU five possible classifications were 
possible: 
Unclassified (mean scores on 
both factors not significant) 
* Impover ished (mean scores 
on both Efficiency and Differentiation were negative, and 
s ign  if i can  t) 
* Di f fe rent ia t ion  (mean score 
on Differentiation positive, and significant; mean score on 
Efficiency not significant, or negative and significant) 
Eff iciency (mean score on 
Efficiency positive, and significant; mean score on 
Differentiation not significant, or negative and significant) 
' Hybrid (mean score for both 
Efficiency and Differentiation positive, and significant) 
Thus each SBU could be classified exclusively into one of these 
groups. This permitted the testing of hypotheses about realised 
strategy and performance (eg do Hybrid SBUs perform best?), 
hypotheses about realised strategy and consensus (eg is an 
efficiency strategy associated with high consensus?), and 
realised strategy and change (eg efficiency is associated with 
low organizational change). 
For the purposes of testing hypotheses about realised strategies 
and performance, the "unclassified" SBUs are grouped with the 
Impoverished SBUs. This group of SBUs can be regarded as 
pursuing neither of the two strategic orientations (Efficiency or 
Differentiation) with vigour. Thus, the efficacy of the strategic 
orientations can be tested by comparing Differentiation, or 
Efficiency SBUs with this combined "Unclassified/lmpoverished" 
group. 
The methods used to test the specific hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 2 are explained at the end of this chapter. 
We now turn to the development of methodologies to explore the 
other dimensions of the research: consensus, performance, and 
change. 
3.6 MEASURING CONSENSUS 
The most popular method of measuring consensus or agreement 
is the summation of standard deviations (Dess 1987; Bourgeois 
1980; Hrebiniak and Snow 1982; Priem 1989). This measure has 
face validity, as a standard deviation measures the "dispersion" 
(or differences in ratings) among the individual respondents. One 
problem with the measure is that it needs to subtracted from a 
constant number to give the numerical values a positive 
relationship to other variables (like performance). (see Dess 
1987:268). A second problem is that the measure is a relative 
one, its magnitude is determined by the rating scales being used. 
This makes comparison across studies of consensus difficult. 
There are other problems with using mean standard deviations. 
One group of managers may systematically use the extremes of 
the rating scales, whilst a comparitor group opted for more 
middling scores; the mean standard deviation would fail to 
detect these differences. This measure also copes inadequately 
with positive disagreement between groups of managers (see 
Bowman and Miller 1990). 
Other methodologies include that used by Stagner (1969). He 
studied 52 pairs of respondents from within the same firms for 
similarities in their patterns of responses on goals and means. 
He used correlation coefficients to measure the extent of 
agreement between two managers. Hambrick (1981) used "the 
absolute value value of the difference between the external 
measure of realised strategy (converted to a 7-point scale) and 
an executive's perception of strategy (on the same 7-point 
scale)" (Hambrick 1981:268). Wooldridge and Floyd (1990) use a 
more complex definition of consensus which incorporates 
"understanding" and "commitment'. Consequently, their consensus 
measure is a product of two other measures (Wooldridge and 
Floyd 1990:235). 
In this study the correlation approach used by Stagner is 
developed to provide the measure of consensus. • Consensus across 
all the respondents from an SBU is calculated by first computing 
the correlation coefficients for all pairs of managers. These 
coefficients are then averaged to yield an average correlation 
for the SBU. This measure falls within the a range -1 to + I .  A 
consensus "score" near to +I would indicate strong agreement 
within the sample. Scores near to zero would suggest a lack of 
agreement. Negative scores would indicate positive 
disagreement. 
The average correlation measure of consensus can also used to 
measure other forms of consensus: 
Consensus within the TMT 
Consensus between the TMT and FMT 
Consensus within the FMT 
These other measures of consensus can be derived from the 
correlation matrix produced for the overall consensus score. In 
the present study, however, only the overall measure of SBU 
consensus is used for the purpose of testing hypotheses. 
This measure of consensus has the advantages of face validity, 
and it can be readily interpreted by those familiar with the 
concepts of correlation. It also provides a standardised measure 
of consensus which could be used in other studies, even where 
different rating scales are employed. Hence it facilitates the 
comparison of research findings. 
3.7 MEASURING PERFORMANCE 
Two important issues need to be considered in the selection of 
appropriate measures of SBU performance. The first concerns 
what should be measured, the second how performance should be 
measured. 
Citing Hofer and Schendel (1978), Dess and 0:iger (1987) argue 
that 
"measures of organizational performance should include 
indicators of efficiency (eg profitability) and effectiveness (eg 
sales growth), since both are needed in strategic management 
research" (Dess and Origer 1987:328). Boeker suggests that sales 
may be a better indicator of performance than profits especially 
-. 
where firms are pursuing a market share building strategy. Dess 
and Davis (1984) used sales growth and average after tax returns 
on total assets. 
Bourgeois (1980) derives a composite measure of "economic 
performance as the criterion of effectiveness" (Bourgeois 
1980:235) which included return on invested capital, growth in 
capital, growth in net earnings, growth in earnings per share, and 
return on sales. 
With regard to how to measure performance there are basically 
two options: using"objective" data, or using "subjective" data. 
Objective data would appear to offer advantages in terms of 
reliability. However, these measures are necessarily historical, 
and they may not be strictly comparable between SBUs (different 
accounting procedures, year ends etc). 
Moreover, profitability, being a marginal calculation (revenue 
less costs) is likely to fluctuate considerably with only small 
changes in either revenues or costs. As such it may prove to be a 
poor indicator of SBU performance. Boeker (1989) suggests that 
sales growth may be a better indicator of performance than 
profits especially where firms are pursuing a market share 
building strategy. 
Similarly, relying on published accounts for sales performance 
may be unhelpful as these sources do not include performance in 
terms of market share. Hence sales could show a steady 
increase, but market share may be falling, indicating that the 
SBU is being less effective in serving its target market. This 
again, then, raises the issue of the impact of industry structure 
on firm performance. Beard and Dess (1981) provide evidence 
that the profitability of the industry within which a firm 
competes is a significant predictor of firm profitability. This 
finding is supported conceptually by Porter (1 980). 
Lastly, in order to use objective measures the researcher needs 
access to accounting data for each SBU. Increasingly, however, 
SBU level data is becoming difficult to obtain, largely due to the 
acquisitive behaviour of a large number of corporations. The 
concentration of capital has made research into SBU performance 
problematic. In addition to the trend towards conglomerate 
acquisition, many SBUs are private companies who are not 
obliged to publish detailed accounts. 
Market share data is also difficult to acquire. Such information 
is collected in a patchy fashion, with some industries (most 
notably those serving the final consumer) being well served with 
market share data, and others in which no such information is 
collected on a routine basis. In order to calculate shares one 
must have a definition of the boundaries of an industry. This 
again provides an opportunity for differing perceptions of 
industry definition between researchers and managers. 
These problems with objective measures of performance, and 
problems resulting from the impact of industry structure on firm 
performance have led researchers into the exploration of 
subjective measures of SBU performance. Govindarajan reports a 
study in which SBU general managers were asked to rate their 
SBU's performance relative to "corporate standards" 
(Govindarajan 1 988:851). Bourgeois (1 980) required managers to 
compare their SBU's performance relative to that of competitors. 
Dess (1987) reports that "all TMT members were asked to 
respond to three items. these items asked the respondent to 
compare his firm to "firms of similar sales volume in your 
industry and region". Miller (1988) asked CEOs to compare 
profitability of their firms to that of their major competitors. 
In some of these studies there was an attempt to validate the 
subjective, or "self-reported" performance measures by 
comparing them statistically with objective measures. In all 
cases where this was done the researchers report significant 
positive relationships (Dess 1987; Bourgeois 1980; Dess and 
Robinson 1984; Wooldridge and Floyd 1990). However, if 
managers were asked to report performance relative to 
competitors, then it makes little sense to compare these ratings 
with past absolute SBU performance. 
In this study subjective measures of performance are used. The 
main reason for adopting this approach is the need to compare 
CURRENT perceptions of strategy with CURRENT performance. 
Historic accounting data (even if it were available) refers to a 
strategic situation at least one year prior to ;he surveying of 
managers perceptions of strategic priorities. If growth in sales 
and profits were the relevant measures of performance, then we 
would need to look to performance three or four years ago for 
this information, widening the gap between the managers' 
current perceptions and past performance. Therefore, in order to 
compare like with like it is necessary to find a measure of the 
current performance of the SBU. 
The performance measure also needs to take into account the 
industry environment facing the SBU. For these reasons, a 
subjective measure of performance was obtained which rates the 
SBUs relative performance in terms of sales growth, and 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  . 
To reduce the possibility of CEO bias in reporting, all members 
of the TMT are asked to rate their SBU's performance. These 
ratings are then averaged to produce one measure for each SBU of 
relative sales growth, and relative profitability. The 
respondents are given no guidance on which competitors they 
should be comparing their SBU with, and there is a possibility 
that different TMT managers within the same SBU will be using 
different reference points. However, because the sample is 
drawn from a variety of industries, by asking the TMT to rate the 
RELATIVE performance of their SBU, the impact of industry 
context on performance is taken into account. 
Because the 
based on a s 
the Top Man 
classification of the SBU's realised strategy is 
;ample of ALL the managers from the SBU (not just 
agement Team), the possibility of a systematic bias 
between the rating of the SBU's performance, and the 
classification of SBU strategies is greatly reduced. Moreover. 
the performance statements are contained on a separate 
questionnaire, to further reduce the risk of TMT managers 
~ormance statements scoring the strategy statements and the per; 
in a systematically biased manner. The performance of the SBU 
is rated by a few managers (just the Top Management Team); the 
classification of the SBU into a strategy type is based on a much 
larger sample of managers in each case. 
In line with previous similar studies that have used subjective 
measures, the subjective measures were compared with 
objective data for a sample of firms from the regional 
newspaper industry. By selecting firms from the same industry 
the effects of industry conditions could, to some extent, be 
controlled for. However, this is a fragmented industry, and local 
competitive conditions are likely to vary. By selecting firms 
from broadly the same industry we are able to compare 
profitability ratios, as individual SBUs are likely to have the 
same underlying cost and revenue structures. 
Objective and subjective performance data was available for 
eleven regional newspaper SBUs. Each SBU was asked to provide 
the most recent available information on profits, and sales. From 
this information an objective profitability ratio was calculated 
(pre-tax profits/turnover). This ratio was compared with the 
TMT's mean subjective profitability rating. The results of the 
regression analysis indicate a significant, positive relationship 
between the two measures ( R ~  = 0.627; p = 0.004). This result 
would suggest that the subjective measures could be used with 
some confidence as indicators of SBU performance. 
For the purposes of testing performance related hypotheses the 
sales and profit measures are treated, firstly, as continuous 
variables in the regression equations (eg testing the relationship 
between sales growth and consensus). Some prior studies have 
categorised SBUs into, for example, above average, or below 
average performers (Miller 1988). Boeker (1 989) classifies good 
and poor performers in his sample by selecting firms that lie 
beyond one standard deviation from the mean. Bourgeois (1980) 
employs a similar classification device. By grouping firms in 
this way hypotheses can be tested by comparing the means 
across groups of high and low performers. This grouping approach 
is also employed in this study to test hypotheses about realised 
strategy and performance. 
3.8 MEASURING CHANGE 
Change in the SBU was measured using the change statements in 
the questionnaire. These statements are concerned with four 
dimensions of organization change: 
* changes in structure and processes 
* changes in strategic direction 
* changes in business operations 
changes in products 
These dimensions correspond with the Miles and Snow (1978) 
typology: 
* structure and processes = the administrative problem 
* strategic direction, and product changes = the 
entrepreneurial problem 
business operations = the engineering problem 
This permits subsequent analyses of this data base to explore 
the Miles and Snow typology, particularly to test out whether the 
SBUs in this sample cluster into the Miles and Snow categories 
of Defender, Analyser, Reactor, and Prospector. This opportunity 
for further research will be explored in Chapter 7. 
The change statements, some referring to little change, others 
to considerable change, loaded cleanly on the "Change" factor. 
The mean factor scores were used to test hypotheses using 
regression analysis. In this way hypotheses about consensus and 
change could be tested. 
3.9 HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
In previous studies of this nature two basic approaches to 
hypothesis testing have been used. ANOVA has been used to test 
differences between two groups (eg high and low performance; 
high and low consensus) (Bourgeois 1980). The other approach 
uses correlation or regression analysis to test the significance, 
and the direction of relationships between variables. (Miller 
1988; Dess 1987). 
In this study both of these approaches are used in testing 
hypotheses. However, because of the exploratory nature of the 
research design, it was not possible to specify a priori the 
number of SBUs that would be classified as Differentiators, 
Hybrid, Cost Leaders or Impoverished. This restricted the use of 
conventional tests of significance because of small sample 
sizes. 
In order to conduct statistical tests, a sample size of greater 
than 30 SBUs was identified as the minimum acceptable 
(Terpstra 1981). Three levels of significance will be used in the 
tests: p=0.1, p=0.05 and p=.001. 
The specific tests to be used for each hypothesis are explained 
below. 
H I  Cost leadership will not be a commonly perceived 
competi t ive strategy 
A statement has been included in the questionnaire that refers 
specifically to Porter's cost leadership strategy. It is: 
"We aim to be the lowest cost producer in our industry" 
To test this hypothesis the mean score on this statement (for all 
the respondents in the database) will be compared to the mean 
scores for all other strategy related statements in the 
questionnaire. If the mean for the cost leadership statement is 
significantly lower than the mean scores for all other strategy 
statements then the hypothesis should not be rejected. 
H2: The hybrid strategy will not be a commonly 
perceived strategy. 
Porter suggests that few firms would be ab!e to pursue cost 
leadership and differentiation simultaneously. I f  the realised 
strategies of the sample of SBUs were disiributed evenly 
between the four types (Impoverished, Efficiency (Cost 
Leadership), Differentiation, Hybrid) we would expect 250i0 of 
them to be  in the hybrid category. This would imply that the 
Hybrid strategy was as common as, for example, a 
differentiation strategy. To test this hypothesis, i f  the 
percentage of Hybrid SBUs is significantly below 25% (at the 
95% level), then the hypothesis should not be rejected. With 38 
SBUs in the sample, this means that the percentage would have 
to be below 11.2%. 
H3: Firms perceived to be pursuing cost  leadership will 
be above average performers in their industries. 
This hypothesis tests the Porter argument that cost leadership 
leads to above average performance. Because the performance 
measures used require managers to rate their SBUs against other 
firms in their industry it is possible to test performance related 
hypotheses across firms in different indusxies. In this way the 
efficacy of particular realised strategies can be tested and 
compared. Porter argues that the cost leader would outperform, 
in profit terms, firms that were average performers, firms that 
are pursuing neither cost leadership nor differentiation. Hence, 
this hypothesis can be tested by comparing the mean profit 
performance of the cost leadership SBUs with the lmpoverished 
SBUs (those SBUs in which the managers do not perceive a 
strategy of cost leadership or differentiation being pursued). I f  
the mean score for the cost leadership SBUs is statistically 
significantly greater than that for the lmpoverished SBUs then 
the hypothesis should not be rejected. However, because there 
may be too few SBUs in either category for statistical testing, 
the hypothesis may be commented on by just comparing mean 
scores. 
H4: Firms perceived to be pursuing differentiation 
strategies will be above average performers in their 
i n d u s t r i e s  
This hypothesis can be tested in the same way as H3. In this case 
the Differentiation SBUs mean profit performance is compared 
with the lmpoverished group's mean profit performance. Again, if 
sample sizes are too small. non-statistical inferences can be 
drawn from comparing the means, but the hypothesis cannot be 
rejected or accepted on a statistical basis. 
H5: Firms perceived to be pursuing neither cost 
leadership nor differentiation will be average or below 
average performers in their industries 
This hypothesis is based on Porter's average performers, those 
SBUs that are "stuck-in-the-middle" (Porter 1980:41). To test 
this hypothesis the mean profit performance for the 
lmpoverished SBUs is compared with the mean score for the 
SBUs that are pursuing either Efficiency (Cost Leadership), 
Differentiation, or Hybrid strategies. If the mean score for the 
lmpoverished SBUs is significantly lower than that for the SBUs 
pursuing either of the generic strategies (or both) then the 
hypothesis should not be rejected. 
H6: Firms perceived to be pursuing hybrid strategies 
will be exceptional performers in their industries 
To test this hypothesis the mean profit performance for the 
Hybrid SBUs is compared with the mean scores for other SBUs 
groups (Impoverished, Efficiency, and Differentiation groups). 
The hypothesis should not be rejected if the Hybrid group 
perform significantly better than all of the other three groups. 
Again, if there are problems with sample sizes a less rigorous 
comparison of means may be appropriate. 
H7: Firms perceived to be pursuing cost leadership 
strategies will experience low organizational change 
This hypothesis will be tested by comparing the mean score for 
the cost leadership SBUs on the "Change" factor, with the mean 
score for all other SBUs. If the cost leadership SBU group's mean 
is significantly lower than the mean for all other SBUs then the 
hypothesis should not be rejected. Again. in the event of there 
being a small sample of cost leadership SBUs a non-statistical 
comparison of means will be used. 
H8: Consensus on strategic priorities is positively 
related to SBU performance 
Consensus is measured using the average correlation method 
explained above. SBU performance in terms of relative 
profitability, and relative sales, is regressed against the 
consensus measure. The hypothesis should not be rejected if the 
regressions reveal positive, significant relationships. 
H9: Consensus on strategic priorities is negatively 
related to organizational change 
To test this hypothesis the mean scores for each SBU on the 
"Change1' factor are regressed with the consensus measure. The 
hypothesis should not be rejected i f  the relationship is negative, 
and significant. 
H10: Where managers perceive their SBUs to be pursuing 
a strategy of cost leadership there will be a high degree 
of consensus about all dimensions of strategy 
To test this hypothesis the mean consensus score for the cost 
leadership SBUs is compared with the mean consensus score for 
all other SBUs. If the cost leadership SBUs mean is significantly 
higher than that for the other SBUs, then the hypothesis should 
not be rejected. Again, in the event of there being a small sample 
of cost leadership SBUs a non-statistical comparison of means 
would be acceptable. 
H I  1: Managers perceive of competitive strategy in line 
with Porter's Generic Strategy concepts. 
As explained earlier, because the research design is based on 
Porter's typology this hypothesis should be tested using a 
different methodology. The exploration of this hypothesis forms 
the basis of Chapter 5, and the approach used is explained there. 
3.10 SUMMARY 
This chapter has addressed the following methodological isszes: 
questionnaire design, and pilot testing 
the classification of SBU realised strategies 
the measurement of SBU performance 
* the measurement of consensus 
* the measurement of change 
* hypothesis testing 
The methodologies explained and developed in this chapter can 
now be used to test the hypotheses. The testing of the 
hypotheses and the interpretation of the results is the subject of 
Chapter 4. 
CHAPTER 4 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 are tested 
using the methodology explained in Chapter 3. As each 
hypotheses is tested the implications of the results are 
discussed. At the end of the chapter general conclusions are 
presented concerning the broad findings of the research. These 
conclusions then form a bridge between the hypotheses based 
essentially on arguments derived from academic contributions 
(the basis of Chapter 2 and 3), and the outcomes of the research, 
that may shed some light on managerial perspectives of 
competitive strategy. These possibilities are explored in Chapter 
5. 
First, the two main databases used in the study are explained. 
4.2 THE "SBU DATABASE" 
As explained in Chapter 3 it was not possible to determine, a 
priori, the sample sizes of the four different realised 
competitive strategy groups. In total, 38 SBUs have been 
included in the "SBU database". The SBUs are classified, 
according to the criteria explained in Chapter 3, into the four 
realised strategy categories, and the "Unclassified" category, as 
fo l lows:  
Unclassified 11 SBUs 
Impoverished 4 SBUs 
Efficiency (Cost Leadership) 13 SBUs 
Differentiation 6 SBUs 
Hybrid 4 SBUs 
TOTAL 38 SBUs 
The SBUs were sampled from three industry groupings: 
Services 15 SBUs 
Engineering 13 SBUs 
Regional Newspapers 10 SBUs 
TOTAL 38 SBUs 
Within the services and engineering groupings the intention was 
to gather a varied sample of SBUs. In this way the 
generalizability of the research would be enhanced. Accordingly, 
the database includes SBUs of differing size (turnover, number of 
employees), and business activity. 
The SBUs range in turnover from £541,000 to over £ 1 billion, and 
the number of employees ranges from 10 to over 14,000. 
Turnover: mean f 15.308rn, standard deviation f 15.920m 
Employees: mean 1 148; standard deviation 3326 
Due mainly to problems of confidentiality, turnover and, 
particularly, profit information could not be collected for some 
SBUs in the sample. For those SBUs for which information was 
obtained the descriptive statistics are: Profit (pre-tax): mean 
f 1 7.372m, standard deviation f 59.969m 
Changes in turnover from the last year's figures to the current 
year for those SBUs for which data was available (17) ranged 
from a drop of 11% to an increase of 300%. Out of these 17 SBUs, 
12 reported increases in turnover over the previous year. 
With regard to pre-tax profits changes over the previous year 
ranged from a 38% drop in profits to an increase of 3750% 
(which reflects the volatility of gross profit as a performance 
measure). 
Pre-tax profit as a percentage of turnover varied from a loss 
representing 6% of turnover, to a profit representing 71% of 
turnover. (the mean was 19.1 %; standard deviation 16.9%). 
Change in pre-tax profitlturnover ranges from a fall of 37% from 
the previous year, to an increase of 1250%. The mean change was 
205%, standard deviation 309%, but these statistics are 
distorted by a huge change in performance experienced by a 
young, rapidly expanding SBU. 
These descriptive statistics suggest that the sample of SBUs 
from within the three industry groupings is diverse. Therefore, if 
hypothesised relationships are supported across this mixed 
sample we can conclude, with some confidence, that the findings 
could be generalized to other SBUs. 
The number of managers surveyed in the SBUs ranged from 5 to 
63, with a mean of 15.8 and a standard deviation of 12.1. This 
range reflects, firstly, the differences in size of the SBUs 
surveyed. The 5 respondents from one SBU represented the entire 
management team of the business. Secondly, in some surveys the 
TMT wished to have a large number of managers surveyed in 
order that the results could be used for internal strategy 
development purposes. 
The SBU database includes, for each SBU: 
* the mean factor scores, and standard deviation (required 
for classifying the realised strategy, and for testing hypotheses 
about organizational change) 
* a consensus measure (using the average correlation 
measure) 
* measures of relative profit performance and relative sales 
performance 
4.3 THE "MANAGER DATABASE" 
The 38 SBUs surveyed generated 600 questionnaires. These 600 
were combined with questionnaire responses from 509 other 
managers to form the "manager database". The 509 responses 
were collected from managers from a wide variety of SBUs, 
representing many levels of their organization's hierarchies. In 
this way the total "manager database" of 1109 reflects the 
perceptions of a very large and diverse sample of managers. 
The management database, when factor analysed specifying the 
three factor solution produces three "clean" factors that 
correspond to the two generic strategies (Cost leadership and 
differentiation) and to organizational change (See Table 4.1). (As 
explained in Chapter 3, the factor score coefficients from this 
database are used to derive the factor scores for each 
respondent. These responses are then averaged to produce mean 
factor scores for each SBU.) 
Table 4.1 ROTATED LOADINGS 
S t a t e m e n t  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
(Cost) (Change) (Differentiation) 
V(1) Operating Costs 0.71 5 
V(13) Monitor Costs 0.639 
V(15) Price Sensitive 0.670 
V(6) Low Cost Supply 0.629 
V(5) Cut Overheads 0.61 6 
V(21)Competitive Prices 0.588 
V(19) Lowest Cost 0.545 
V(11) Emphasize Prices 0.528 
V(8) Capacity Util 0.528 
V(14) Different Ops. 0.087 
V(16) Changed Structure 0.102 
V(20) Same Operations -0.002 
V(2) Changed Strategy 0.065 
V(4) Little Org. Change -0.083 
V(9) Unique Products -0.066 
V(7) Regular NPD 0.059 
V(10) NPD Priority 0.1 38 
V(3)  Distinctive Prducts 0.1 67 
V(18) Superior Products 0.240 
V(12) No Product Change 0.142 
V(17) Sales Inform -0.1 16 
Percentage Of Variance 
Explained 17.1 
4.4 HYPOTHESES CONCERNED WITH COMPETITIVE 
STRATEGY 
In this section hypotheses 1 to 6 are tested and explored. 
HI: Cost Leadership will not be a commonly perceived 
competi t ive strategy 
Statement 19 "We aim to be the lowest cost producer in our 
industry" forms the basis for testing this hypothesis. The 1109 
managers in the manager database produced a mean rating for 
this statement of 2.479 (Standard deviation 1.339). This is the 
lowest mean score of all the strategy-related statements and i: 
is significantly lower than all the other mean statement ratings 
(at the p=0.01 level). Thus the hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
This result would suggest that cost leadership, per se, is not 
perceived to be strategic priority by the majority of managers in 
the survey. The mean score for Statement 19 can be contrasted 
with the mean score for Statement 1 ("We place considerable 
emphasis on the control of operating costs"): 
Statement 19 (Lowest cost) Mean 2.479 
Statement 1 1 (Operating costs) Mean 4.1 21 
The difference between the two means is considerable (and 
statistically significant), and raises some important issues. 
Porter (and others who have interpreted the generic strategy 
concepts) would strongly link the control of operating costs with 
a drive to be the lowest cost producer in the industry. Indeed. it 
is difficult to see how an SBU could achieve cost leadership 
without tight control of operating costs. However, the large 
difference between these two means suggests that most 
managers in the survey see the control of operating costs as a 
strategic priority in their SBU, but this is not linked, in their 
perceptions, with an aim to be the cost leader in the industry. 
There are a number of possible reasons why Statement 19 has 
been rated so low by the majority of managers. First, and most 
obviously, by definition, only one firm can be the lowest cost 
producer in an industry. Secondly, the rationale behind Porter's 
Cost Leadership strategy is that only THE lowest cost producer 
in an industry can successfully achieve the benefits of superior 
profitability. He  cites the experience curve, and battles for 
market share conducting through price cutting as reasons why 
only the lowest cost player will gain advantage (Porter 1980: 
37-38). The commitment of organizational resources required by 
this strategy, and the risks associated with it, might suggest 
that it would not be a popular competitive strategy. 
A third explanation might be that managers do not see the cost 
leadership strategy as being one that can be easily 
operationalised. In order to drive an SBU to achieve the lowest 
costs in the industry, management would need to have a clear 
view of their industry (ie who their competitors are), and they 
would need to have a good idea about the cost levels of these 
competitors. Without this information the drive to cost 
leadership becomes merely a drive to control costs. In this way, 
managers may perceive cost control as a strong priority, without 
it being linked to a goal of cost leadership. 
A fourth possibility stems from a confusion that some managers 
may have between "lowest cost" and "lowest price". It is possible 
that, despite the extensive efforts to test the questionnaire 
explained in Chapter 3, managers are misinterpreting Statement 
19. The questionnaire uses "costs" and "competitive prices" 
separately in eight of the preceeding statements in the 
questionnaire. So, by the time the manager reaches Statement 19 
he or she should be familiar with the distinctions being made 
between costs, and prices. Furthermore, it is not likely that, 
given the very wide sample of managers in the manager database, 
they would all systematically misinterpret this one statement. 
However, in order to investigate the possibility that the cost 
leadership statement was being misinterpreted, discussions 
were held with managers from a variety of SBUs (a total of 34 
managers). The majority of them interpreted the statement as 
intended. However, 11 of the managers interpreted the statement 
to mean lowest PRICE producer (ie lowest cost to the customer). 
This finding would suggest that the statement is ambiguous, and 
therefore, that great care must be taken in drawing inferences 
from these results. 
This confusion of cost leadership with lowest price is not 
confined to the managers in this survey. Porter himself uses 
firms to exemplify cost leadership that are, in fact, competing 
on price (eg Hyundai in the "auto industry": European Management 
Journal 1987). Moreover, price cutting is a recognised part of a 
strategy to achieve cost leadership (Porter refers to "aggressive 
pricing" 3980: 36). Miller (1 988) connects cost leadership and 
low prices to satisfy price sensitive customers, McNamee and 
McHugh (1989) refer to "low price" strategies rather than cost 
leadership, and Karnani (1984) infers that, for cost leadership to 
be attained the firm must compete on price. 
This indication that there may be a strong, identifiable cost 
control orientation is explored in more depth below and in the 
following chapter. However, there would appear to be a 
contradiction between the results from the analysis of the 
manager database (on which H I  was tested), and the strategy 
classifications used in the SBU database. As noted above, 13 of 
the 38 SBUs are classified as pursuing "Cost Leadership" 
strategies. This apparently contradictory finding is explored in 
the discussion of H3 below. 
H2: The hybrid strategy will not be a commonly 
perceived strategy 
Using the classification criteria explained in Chapter 3, 4 of the 
38 SBUs are perceived to be pursuing the Hybrid strategy. Thus 
10.5°/0 of the sample are perceived to be pursuing the combined 
Differentiation and "Cost Leadership" strategy. This proportion is 
significantly below 25% (at the 95% level). Thus the hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. 
Porter's argument for suggesting that the Hybrid combination 
would not be commonly found rests largely on the different 
organizational requirements of the two generic strategies 
(Porter 1980, 1985; Miller 1988). The connections between 
competitive strategy and structure, and the concept of coherent 
"gestaltst', or "configurations" is also supported by other 
research (Miles and Snow 1978; Miller, Droge and Toulouse 1988: 
Miller and Friesen 1984; Mintzberg 1979). There is a strong 
theme in the strategic management literature, based on the 
concept of "fit" or matching between strategy and structure 
(Chandler 1962; Channon 1973; Rumelt 1974), that would also 
support the contention that the pursuit of differentiation and 
cost leadership simultaneously would be difficult, which may 
lead to a compromise organizational form that serves neither 
orientation effectively. 
Miller (1988) makes the useful distinction between marketing - 
differentiation, and innovative differentiation. It was suggested 
in Chapter 2 that marketing differentiation may not require the 
kind of decentralized, organic structure appropriate to a 
strategy of innovative differentiation; that the basis of 
differentiation maybe image or brand related, or it could be to do 
with channels of distribution, or customer service. None of these 
bases of differentiation would be necessarily incompatible with 
an organization structure appropriate to a strategy of cost 
leadership, or to a strong cost control orientation. Hence, it may 
be that the few SBUs in the sample that are pursuing Hybrid 
strategies are not seeking to differentiate through 
productlservice innovation. This possible explanation of the 
result of HZ is explored further in Chapter 5. 
H3: Firms perceived to be pursuing cost leadership will 
be  above average performers in their industry 
To test this hypothesis the mean profit performance of the cost 
leadership SBUs is compared with the mean performance of the 
"Unclassified/lmpoverished" SBUs (see Table 4 .2). The mean 
profit performance of the Cost leadership SBUs is higher than 
that of the "Unclassified/lmpoverished" SBUs (p=0.042). The 
mean sales performance of the cost leadership SBUs is also 
greater than that for the "Unclassified/l mpoverished" group 
(p=0.077). Thus the hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Again, as with the interpretation of H2, the results of H I  
indicate that a degree of caution should be used in interpreting 
results associated with "Cost Leadership" SBUs. The 
questionnaire was based upon, and was designed to explore inter 
aha, Porter's Generic Strategy concepts. However, the results of 
H I  show that, in general, managers do not tend to perceive their 
SBUs to be pursuing a strategy of cost leadership. 
The question that now arises is: do the "Cost Leadership" SBUs 
rate Statement 19 ("We aim to be the lowest cost producer in 
our industry") highly ? The mean rating for the "Cost Leadership" 
SBUs on Statement 19 is 2.663 (SD 0.462). This is only 
marginally higher than the mean for the manager database as a 
whole (2.479). This would suggest that this group of SBUs should 
be properly referred to as "Cost Control" SBUs rather than Cost 
Leadership SBUs, as they nevertheless rate cost control 
statements very highly. This finding confirms the view that cost 
leadership is not a widely perceived strategy, and it reinforces 
the suggestion made in the discussion of H I  that managers 
perceive "Cost Control" as a coherent strategy. 
So now the hypotheses established to test the Cost Leadership 
strategy now must be reinterpreted. Hence, H3 indicates that a 
strategy of cost control leads to superior profit performance. 
The relationship between cost control and performance is 
explored further in Chapter 5. 
Table 4.2 Comparing Performance of "Cost Leadership" 
SBUs with "lmpoverishedlUnclassified" SBUs 
P r o f i t a b i l i t v  
Group No. Mean SD T DF P 
Impoverished1 
Unclassif ied 1 5  2.922 1 . I 79  2.127 2 8  0.042 
Eff ic iency 1 5  3.816 1 . I 2 3  
S a l e s  
Impoverished1 
2.983 0.971 1.835 2 8  0.077 Unclassif ied 1 5 
Eff ic iency 1 5  3.591 0.841 
H4: Firms 
strategies 
i n d u s t r i e s  
perceived to be pursuing differentiation 
will be above average performers in their 
This hypothesis can be tested in the same way as H3. The 
comparison of the mean profit performance of the 
Differentiation SBUs and the "Unclassified/lmpoverished" SBUs 
can be found in Table 4.3. The mean profit performance for the 
Differentiation SBUs (3.948) is greater than that for the 
Irnpoverished/Unclassified SBUs (2.922). The difference between 
the means is significant (p=0.051). The Differentiation SBUs also 
perform better than the "Unciassified/lmpoverished" SBUs in 
terms of sales (p=0.090). Thus the hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The Statements that the Differentiation SBU managers have 
rated highly include the following: 
Statement 9: "We try to offer unique products/services enabling 
us to charge premium pricest' 
Statement 7: "We regularly develop new products/services, or 
significantly change the line of products/services we offer" 
Statement 10: "We give new product/service development top 
p r i o r i t y "  
Statement 3: "We emphasise our distinctive products or image in 
our marketing communications" 
Statement 18: "We aim to offer superior products/services to 
those of our competitors" 
Thus the Differentiation factor embraces Miller's innovative 
differentiation (Statements 7 and l o ) ,  and his marketing 
differentiation (Statement 3). It also includes, via Statement 9,  
a specific reference to premium pricing. Porter emphasises that, 
in order for a strategy of Differentiation to lead to above 
Table 4.3 Comparing Performance of Differentiation 
SBus with "lmpoverishedlUnclassified" SBUs 
P r o f i t a b i l i t v  
Group No. Mean SD T DF P 
Impoverished1 15 2.922 1 . I  79 2.064 22 0.051 " 
Unclassi f ied 
D i f fe ren t ia t ion  9 3.948 1 . I  78 
S a l e s  
2.983 0.971 1.771 22 0.090 * Impoverished1 1 5  
Unclassi f ied 
D i f fe ren t ia t ion  9 
average profitability, the firm must be able to premium price 
(and to combine this with "average costs"). Therefore, the 
differentiation factor is broadly framed, and it is in line with 
Porter's intentions. 
However, because of the broad conception of this strategy it is 
not possible to identify, from the factor scores for each SBU, 
whether, for example, a strategy of innovative differentiation 
leads to better performance than one of marketing 
differentiation. This is because the classification of SBUs has 
been done on the basis of mean factor scores (which aggregate 
and weight the individual differentiation-related statements). 
The disaggregation of "Differentiation" as a strategy is 
addressed in Chapter 5. 
H5: Firms perceived to be pursuing neither cost 
leadership nor differentiation will be average, or below 
average performers in their industries 
To test this Hypothesis the Impoverished/Unclassified SBU 
group's performance is compared to all the other SBUs (who are 
positively pursuing either cost leadership (cost control), or 
differentiation, or both (Hybrid SBUs)). The mean profit 
performance of the Impoverished SBUs is compared with that of 
the other SBUs in Table 4.4. 
The difference between the means is considerable (2.922 vs 
3.731 ) and significant (p=0.046). In addition, the 
ImpoverishedlUnclassified SBUs perform poorly in terms of 
relative sales (p = 0.067). Thus the hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. 
This result supports the view that SBUs should have a positive, 
shared sense of direction. The result of H5 can be interpreted as 
support for advocates of "intended" or deliberate strategy. 
Table 4.4 Comparing Performance of 
lmpoverishedlUnclassified with Other SBUs 
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  
Group No. Mean SD T DF 
Impover ishedl  
Unclassif ied 1 5 2.922 1 . I 79  2.075 3 4  
Other 2 1 3.731 1 . I35  
S a l e s  
Impoverished/ 
2.983 0.971 1.889 3 4  0.067 Unclassif ied 15 
Other 21 3.576 0.899 
The result can also be explained through the organizational 
processes that might have led to managers not perceiving a 
coherent set of strategic priorities to be extant in their SBU. 
This could be the result of poor communication across the SBU, 
and up or down the hierarchy. This lack of communication could 
lead to problems in identifying, and meeting customer 
requirements, and to organizational inefficiencies that increase 
relative costs. In these ways the lack of a shared sense of 
strategic direction could be a symptom of a more gerleral 
organizational malaise. 
Another, process-related, explanation of the connection between 
managers perceiving few strategic priorities and poor 
performance concerns management morale. Without a sense of 
direction managers may well experience frustration, 
aimlessness, and feelings of insecurity. Without strongly 
perceived priorities management decision making becomes more 
difficult, and, as a consequence, some managers may feel that 
their authority has become undermined. These effects of a lack 
of strongly perceived priorities are, again, likely to lead to low 
morale, and probably to poor organizational performance as the 
morale problems cascade down the structure (Slatter:I 984; 
Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan 1988) 
Unlike the Unclassified SBUs, SBUs that are categorised as 
lmpoverished do not demonstrate low consensus. On the contrary, 
there is consensus, or agreement amongst the managers tha! few 
of the strategic priority statements apply to their SBU. This 
could be because the statements themselves are not applicable 
to the SBU. If this were the case, then the SBU should not be 
classified as lmpoverished: there may well be a set of strategic 
priorities perceived to be being pursued by the managers of the 
SBU, but these are not encompassed by the questionnaire. This is 
a possible explanation, but not a likely one. The statements in 
the questionnaire have been thoroughly tested on a wide variety 
of SBUs. In no case did managers indicate that the statements 
could not apply to their SBU. Thus, when a manager rates a 
statement low it should not be interpreted that the statement 
could not be  relevant to the SBU. It indicates that the manager 
does not perceive the statement to be a current strategic 
priority. Therefore, it is not likely that the managers in an 
Impoverished SBU do perceive a set of strategic priorities that 
lie outside the range of options encompassed by the statements 
in the questionnaire. 
H6: Firms perceived to be pursuing hybrid strategies 
will be exceptional performers in their industries 
Managers from Hybrid SBUs perceive that their businesses 
combine both cost leadership, and differentiation strategies. 
Only four of the 38 SBUs fall into this category, and performance 
data was not available for one of these SBUs. Nevertheless, the 
three SBUs for which performance data was available perform 
significantly better than all other SBUs in the sample with 
respect to relative profitability (Table 4.5; p = 0.032). 
Hybrid SBUs should achieve well above average performance 
through the combination of premium prices and lowest costs. 
Hybrid SBUs should not only outperform the "stuck-in-the- 
middle" SBUs, they should also perform better than those SBUs 
pursuing either cost leadership, or differentiation as single 
strategies. 
Using the reinterpreted "Hybrid" strategy discussed in H2 above 
(redefining "cost leadership" as a cost control orientation), this 
result suggests that the combination of differentiation with 
cost control is relatively successful. These results suggest that 
managers from Hybrid SBUs perceive that both differentiation 
and cost control priorities can be pursued simultaneously, and 
that this combination can lead to good performance. This might 
contradict the theories of "fit", or configuration discussed 
earlier. This result would indicate that the pursuit of cost 
Table 4.5 Comparing Profitability of Hybrid SBUs 
with Other SBUs 
Group 
Hybrid 
Other 
No. Mean SD T DF P 
3 4.807 0.172 2.236 3 4  0.032 * 
3 3 3.265 1.177 
control and differentiation need not place demands on the 
organizational structures and processes that would lead to poor 
performance. It suggests that the integration of these two broad 
strategic thrusts can be achieved, and it can be successful. 
4.5 HYPOTHESES ABOUT CHANGE AND CONSENSUS 
H7: Firms perceived to be pursuing cost leadership 
strategies will experience low organizational change 
To test this hypothesis the "organizational change" statements 
are used. These statements are combined into the "change" 
factor, and for each SBU a mean change factor score has been 
calculated. High factor scores indicate that managers perceive 
that their SBUs have experienced a high degree of change 
recently. The dimensions of change included are: changes in 
strategic direction, changes in operations, and changes in 
structures and processes. 
The mean score for the "Cost Leadership" SBUs on the "Change" 
factor is above the mean score for all SBUs (0.189 compared to 
0.008), but the difference is not significant (p = 0.298), hence H7 
should be rejected (see Table 4.6). 
In order to explore the relationships between perceive strategy 
and change further it is necessary to go back to the 
disaggregated data (prior to the factor analysis). 
In Table 4.7 the mean scores for each of the five change 
statements (Statements 2, 4, 14, 16, 20) for the cost control 
SBUs are compared with those for all the other SBUs. 
Only one of the differences between means is significant, 
Statement 4: "Our organisation, and the way things get done 
Table 4.6 Cost LeadershipICost Control SBUs 
Compared To Other SBUs on the "Change" Factor 
Factor 2 ("Chanae") 
Group No. Mean SO T DF P 
Cost Control 1 7  0.189 0.421 1.056 3 6  0.298 
Other 2 1 0.008 0.600 
Table 4.7 
v 2  
(Strategic 
Direction) 
Cost 3.51 5 
Other 3.445 
PROB 0.747 
Cost Control SBUs: "ChangeNStatements 
V4 V14 V16 V20 
(Little Org. (Change in (New Structure (Same 
Change) Operations) and Processes) Operat~ons) 
within it, have changed little in recent times". The cost control 
SBUs have scored this statement lower than all other SBUs.This 
would suggest that cost control SBUs have experienced more 
change within the organization, possibly as a result of attempts 
to cut costs. 
Extending this analysis to the other SBU categories reveals some 
further interesting results (Table 4.8). In contrast to the Cost 
Control SBUs, the lmpoverished1Unclassified SBUs have scored 
Statement 4 significantly higher than the other SBUs. This would 
indicate that, in SBUs that lack a clear perception of strategic 
direction, the modus operandi has not been changed. This could be 
because without a shared sense of direction there is little 
incentive or impetus to change, nor is their any widely 
understood framework to guide organizational change. 
The Differentiation SBUs scored Statement 14 significantly 
lower than other SBUs ("Currently, we are trying to operate this 
business in significantly different ways to those we have in the 
past"). This would suggest that the Differentiation SBUs have 
experienced a degree of stability in the way they operate their 
businesses. This could be because, in order to achieve 
differentiation, an SBU needs to decide on its route to achieve 
product differentiation, and to stick with it. A degree of 
stability enables the organization to refine and improve its ways 
of delivering valued products/services to its customers. Hybrid 
SBUs also score Statement 14 significantly lower than other 
SBUs. 
The results of Hypotheses 4 and 6 indicated that SBUs pursuing 
Differentiation strategies, and SBUs pursuing Hybrid strategies 
performed better than those pursuing neither of these 
orientations. As both SBU groups also score Statement 14 lower 
than other SBUs, it might suggest a relationship between 
stability and performance. 
To investigate this further, the mean scores for all SBUs on 
Table 4.8 Change Statements by SBU Categories 
SBU Category mean statement ratings; "Other SBU" means in 
brackets 
Statement Impov/Uncl Cost Control Differentiation Hybrid 
V(2) Change 
Strategic 
Direction 
V(4) Little 2.703 
Organization (2.288) 
Change p=0.007 
V(14)  Different 
Business 
Operations 
Statement 14 were regressed with relative profitability. The 
relationship was negative, and significant (p = 0.053): the higher 
the SBU rating on Statement 14, the lower the profit 
performance. This finding would support the view that some 
degree of stability in business operations is desirable. Porter 
argues that firms that "flip back and forth over time among the 
generic strategies" will perform poorly (Porter 1980:42). This 
result would seem to support this contention. 
It could also indicate that poor profitability has prompted 
management to change business operations. The first response to 
deteriorating performance could be to "tighten the nuts", to cut 
operating costs, for example (Grinyer and Spender 1979), rather 
than to try to change strategic direction. 
H8: Consensus o n  strategic pr ior i t ies i s  pos i t ive ly  
re la ted t o  SBU performance 
To test this hypothesis, consensus within an SBU, measured by 
the "average correlation" method explained in Chapter 3, is 
regressed with the two performance measures, relative 
profitability, and relative sales growth. The results of these 
regressions can be found in Table 4.9. 
Neither of the relationships is significant. Because the 
consensus measure used differs from the standard deviation 
measure used by other researchers (Dess 1987; Bourgeois 1980), 
H8 is also tested using aggregate standard deviations as the 
consensus measure. 
The standard deviation measure is derived from the factor 
scores of the individual managers. For each SBU the standard 
deviations for all managers about the mean factor score (for the 
SBU) are summed. Then the sum of standard deviations for each 
factor are added together to give a "total standard deviation" 
measure for the SBU ("Total SD"). If this "Total SD" measure is 
Table 4.9 Consensus and Performance 
Averaae Correlation Method 
Consensus  and Profitabilitv 
N R R~ Std Error Std Coeff P (2 Tail) 
3 6 0.164 0.027 1.208 0.7 64 0.340 
Consensus and Sales 
Total Standard Deviation Method 
Consensus and Profitability 
3 6 0.003 0.00 1.224 
Consensus and Sales 
0.146 .021 0.966 
high, this would indicate a lack of consensus; a low figure 
indicates agreement among the managers. 
The results of these tests can be found in Table 4.9. Again, none 
of the relationships are statistically significant. 
The arguments underpinning this hypothesis are centred upon the 
advantages accruing to the SBU if all the managers perceived the 
same strategic priorities. The unity of direction that would 
result should work through to superior performance. However, 
the evidence presented here does not support this contention. 
Agreement, or consensus, in general do9s not lead to good 
performance. However, agreement about particular strategies is 
positively associated with performance, as the results of the 
earlier hypotheses indicate (H3, H4, H5, H6) 
So, consensus per se is not enough; managers need to agree about 
positive strategies (either cost control or differentiation, or 
both). Managers within an SBU may agree that their SBU is not 
pursuing any positive strategy, so there may be a high degree of 
consensus that the SBU is moribund (eg. the "lmpoverished" 
SBUs). 
To explore this further, the "lmpoverished/Unclassified" 
grouping of SBUs was disaggregated to isolate those SBUs where 
consensus about a lack of strategic priorities obtained (the 
"lmpoverished" SBUs). Four SBUs fell into this category. 
Comparing the profit performance of this group with all other 
SBUs reveals a mean rating for the lmpoverished SBUs 
significantly lower than that for the rest (Impoverished: 2.458; 
Others: 3.51 1 ; p = 0.10). 
When the "Impoverished" SBUs are excluded. (along with four 
"outliers" that belong to the "Unclassified" group of SBUs) a 
positive and significant relationship exists between consensus 
and sales performance (R' =0.225; p = 0.012). This would support 
the view that consensus is related to performance, but only if 
there is consensus about a positive strategy (either cost control, 
differentiation or both). 
However, despite this qualified support for H8 these results do 
not provide overwhelming evidence for the benefits of consensus. 
There are arguments that can be advanced in support of both a 
positive and a negative relationship between consensus and 
performance (see Chapter 2). These results would suggest that 
there may be important variables that moderate the consensus- 
performance relationship, and that there may be particular 
situational factors in which consensus reduces performance. 
Thus further research into the consensus-performance link is 
required that explores these issues. 
H9: Consensus on strategic priorities is  negatively 
related to organizational change 
To test this hypothesis the consensus ratings for each SBU were 
regressed against the SBU mean Change factor scores. The 
results of this regression indicate that the hypothesis should be 
rejected. ( ~ ~ = 0 . 0 2 9 ;  p= 0.307; std coeff: 0.170). There are 
plausible explanations for this relationship to be positive, and 
for it to be negative (see Chapter 2). However, this result 
indicates no significant relationship. 
To explore this result the links between consensus and the mean 
scores for each of the statements which together make up the 
"change" factor can be investigated. 
Table 4.10 presents the results of regressions of consensus 
against the five change statements. Statement 4 is negatively 
related to consensus, and is statistically significant (p=O.015). 
This suggests that where managers perceive little change in the 
organisation there is low consensus. This finding could be linked 
to the argument introduced in the discussion of H 7 above. Where 
managers perceive there to be either little sense of strategic 
Table 4.10 Consensus and the Change Statements 
Change Statement R *  
V(2) New Strategic Dirct 0.00 
V(4) No Organizat. Change 0.1 55 
V(14) Change in Operations 0.004 
V(16) New Structures 0.002 
V(20) Same Operations 0.099 
P Std Coeff 
0.960 0.008 
0.015 * *  -0 .393  
0.705 -0 .064 
0.769 0.049 
0.055 * -0 .314 
direction, or there is a lack of agreement about strategic 
direction (the "Impoverished" and "Unclassified" SBUs 
respectively), there is little encouragement to change the 
organization. 
One other relationship is significant, consensus and Statement 
20 "We try to operate this business in much the same way today 
as we have in the past" (p = 0.055). In line with the relationship 
with Statement 4, this is negative. Thus, these two findings 
suggest that low perceived change in the running of the business 
is associated with low consensus. 
SBUs that experience little change in the day-to-day running of 
the business may well exhibit low consensus as the strategic 
direction of the business has not recently been explicitly 
addressed (Hambrick 1981). There could be a high degree of 
"taken for grantedness" in the organization, with strategy change 
rarely appearing on the agenda. In these circumstances low 
awareness of strategic priorities would lead through to a lack of 
shared understanding of where the business is heading. 
H10: Where managers perceive their SBUs to be 
pursuing a strategy of cost leadership there will be a 
high degree of consensus about all dimensions of 
competit ive strategy 
Comparing the mean consensus rating for the Cost Control SBUs 
with that for all other SBUs reveals no significant difference 
between them. Thus the hypothesis should be rejected. 
The arguments supporting this hypothesis centred upon the 
essentially stable nature of organizations pursuing low cost 
strategies. The investment in capital equipment, and in 
developing efficient routines and procedures requires a high 
degree of stability to obtain in the organization's environment to 
justify these commitments. This external stability is matched 
by internal structures and processes that lead to organizational 
stability. These stabilising influences are likely to lead to a high 
degree of shared understanding about the strategic priorities of 
the SBU. This tendency to consensus should be reinforced by the 
straightforward nature of the cost control strategy. It is one 
which is easily understood, there are well tried routines and 
disciplines associated with its implementation, and it lends 
itself to measurement and control. 
However, this result suggests that SBUs in which managers 
perceive their organization to be pursuing cost control 
priorities, do not display a higher level of shared understanding 
about strategic priorities. This could be explained by the results 
of H7. This hypothesis, which related cost leadership strategies 
with organizational change, was rejected as the cost orientated 
SBUs had a higher than average perception of change. When the 
individual change statements were examined, the cost orientated 
SBUs had above average means for the strategic change 
statement, and the structure and process change statement. 
Perceived changes in strategic direction, and changes in 
organizational structures and processes, would indicate that the 
SBU is experiencing a period of instability. This period of 
instability may be characterised by a lack of strategic direction. 
This may represent a state of flux, or a transitional stage 
between the old strategy, and a new, as yet unclear, strategic 
direction. Hence, the change dimension moderates the links 
between cost leadership and consensus; although the SBU 
managers share an understanding of cost control priorities 
(otherwise they would not be categorised as "Cost ControllCost 
leadership" SBUs), there is no consensus about other strategic 
p r i o r i t i es .  
These results would suggest that there is a difference between a 
deliberate strategy of Cost Leadership, and a realised strategy 
that is 
strongly orientated towards cost control priorities. Whilst the 
former strategy requires close attention to cost control 
activities, these priorities form part of a clearly articulated, 
coherent strategy to become the lowest cost producer in the 
industry. In this case, there should be consensus not only about 
what the SBU IS doing (cost control), but there should also be 
shared understanding about what the SBU is NOT doing 
(innovation, differentiation). 
The SBUs that have been classified as having "cost control" 
realised strategies would include the "deliberate" cost leaders, 
and SBUs who are pursuing cost control priorities, but not as 
part of an overall cost leadership strategy. This latter group 
would include SBUs who stress cost control priorities as short 
term responses to declining performance. In these cases it is 
unlikely that a high degree of consensus would obtain around 
priorities that are not to do with cost control. 
4.6 SUMMARY 
H I :  Cost Leadership will not be a commonly perceived 
com pet  i t ive strategy 
The hypothesis cannot be rejected, but it is possible that some 
managers have misinterpreted the "Cost Leadership" statement. 
H2: The hybrid strategy will not be a commonly 
perceived strategy 
The hypothesis can not be rejected. 
H3: Firms perceived to be pursuing cost leadership wi l l  
be above average performers in their industry 
The hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
H4: Firms perceived to  be pursuing differentiation 
strategies wi l l  be above average performers in their 
i n d u s t r i e s  
The hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
H5: Firms perceived to be pursuing neither cost 
leadership nor differentiation wil l be average, or below 
average performers in  their industries 
The hypothesis cannot be rejected 
H6: Firms perceived to be pursuing hybrid strategies 
wi l l  be exceptional performers in their industries 
The hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
H7: Firms perceived to be pursuing cost leadership 
strategies wi l l  experience low organizational change 
The hypothesis should be rejected. 
H8: Consensus on strategic priorities is positively 
related to  SBU performance 
This hypothesis should be rejected. 
H9: Consensus on strategic priorities is negatively 
related to  organizational change 
The hypothesis should be rejected. 
H10: Where managers perceive their SBUs to be 
pursuing a strategy of cost leadership there will be a 
high degree of consensus about all dimensions of 
compet i t ive  strategy 
The hypothesis should be rejected. 
Thus, the results concerning competitive strategies and 
performance appear to confirm the theory-based relationships 
presented in Chapter 2. Generally, SBUs with a positive strategic 
direction (whether it be towards cost control, or differentiation, 
or a combination of the two) outperform those without it. 
However, the hypotheses concerned with consensus and change 
were not supported. In particular, predicted relationships 
between consensus and performance, "Cost Leadership" 
strategies and consensus, and change were not supported. 
In the next chapter we explore the assumptions about 
competitive strategy that underpin the hypotheses tested above. 
In particular, the assumption that managers perceive 
competitive strategies in line with Porter's Generic Strategies 
is examined using the "manager database". 
CHAPTER FIVE 
REALISED STRATEGIES AND GENERIC STRATEGIES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter begins with a critical appraisal of Porter's Generic 
Strategy concepts. This appraisal includes a review of the 
attempts to test out these concepts empirically. This opening 
section concludes with a summary of the main issues raised by 
the discussion. 
Then the "manager database" is revisited to explore whether 
managers perceive the strategies of their SBUs in Porter terms. 
Here the constraints of grouping the statements into two generic 
strategy factors (required for the analysis in Chapter 4) are 
relaxed. The underlying structure of the "manager database" 
reveals four, nct two strategic thrusts. These thrusts are then 
interpreted, and the performance implications for SBUs pursuing 
these thrusts are explored. 
The final part of the chapter outlines a "managerial" theory of 
competitive strategy derived from the analysis of the database. 
Three propositions that emerge from this managerial theory are 
set out, and tested. 
5.2 ASSESSING THE GENERIC STRATEGY CONCEPTS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE LITERATURE 
Although Porter's generic strategy concepts underpin the 
construction of the Perceptions of Strategic Priorities 
questionnaire, one of the aims of the research was to evaluate 
the generic strategies in the light of managerial perceptions. 
To recap, Porter (1980;1985) suggests that there are three 
"Generic Strategies": Cost Leadership, Differentiation and Focus. 
The Focus strategy requires the firm to apply one or other (or 
both) of the other strategies to a narrow segment of the market, 
to gain advantage. Firms that do not pursue these strategies, or 
who flip unsuccessfully between them, run the risk of being 
"stuck-in-the-middle" and performing at or below the industry 
average. 
Taken together empirical investigations into the generic 
strategies have been inconclusive (Dess and Davis 1982,i 984; 
Hambrick 1983a, 1983b; Miller and Friesen 1986a, 1986b; 
Phillips, Chang and Buzzell 1983; White 1986). But some of the 
problems in researching these concepts result from the 
inconsistent way in which the strategies are interpreted. 
5.2.1. COST LEADERSHIP 
With respect to Porter's Cost Leadership strategy, it is evident 
from the literature that there are very important differences in 
the way in which researchers have interpreted this competitive 
strategy. 
Porter argues that, for cost leadership to yield superior profits. 
the firm must combine lowest costs with average prices. 
However, successful cost leaders that he chooses to exemplify 
his theory could be regarded as competing on price (eg Hyundai: 
European Management Journal 1987; La Quinta: Harvard 1988; and 
Harnischfeger: Porter 1980:37). Or, by coincidence, the examples 
could merely be selected from price sensitive segments. 
If this was the case, then Hyundai would be charging average 
prices for this particular segment (which might include Proton 
and Lada as direct competitors). The question would then be: are 
Hyundai the lowest cost of the car producers serving this 
segment? It is not clear from Porter's use of this example that 
this is the inference he is making. In the context of his 
exposition, he is arguing that Hyundai is a low price car  
producer, who is targeting a price sensitive segment of the 
market. 
The means to achieving the lowest cost position (eg a 
"conveyorized assembly line", Porter 1 980:37) often require a 
high degree of stability, and standardization in the product or 
service being offered. Again, these may well be requirements of 
particular segments who find a "standard, no frills product" 
acceptable (Porter 1985:13). Skivington and Daft (1 991 ) suggest 
that :  
"Low cost strategic decisions are often found in markets 
where commodity-like products and price sensitive buyers 
collectively pressure firms to engage in price competition" 
(Skivington and Daft 1991 5 0 )  
And Miller (1988) makes a strong connection between the cost 
leadership strategy and low prices to satisfy price sensitive 
customers: 
"User's of the [cost leadership] strategy are likely to confront 
the least environmental unpredictability and change. They seek 
out customers who care more about price than about image or 
novelty. ." (Miller 1988:284-5) 
If the low cost position is translated into, say, lower prices, 
then the firm should increase its market share, but it may well 
not improve the firm's relative profitability. For now, the cost 
leader is no longer charging average prices, and, therefore there 
is no guarantee that its low cost position would lead to above 
average profits. 
The connection between cost leadership, serving price sensitive 
customers and competing on price is made in a number of studies 
into the generic strategy concepts. In Dess and Davis' (1984) 
study statements associated with the three generic strategies 
(cost leadership, differentiation and focus) were tested with 
two different groups: managers and "experts" in strategic 
management. The experts were required to read Porter (1980: 
Chapter 2) and then to rate a list of 21 statements of 
"competitive methods" according to its importance for each 
generic strategy. The experts rated "Competitive Pricing" as 
being strongly associated with cost leadership (a mean rating of 
4.86, with 5 as the maximum). 
McNamee and McHugh's (1989) attempt to test out Porter's 
concepts in the clothing industry refers to "low price" strategies 
rather than cost leadership. Karnani (1984) infers that, for cost 
leadership to be attained the firm must compete on price. And 
Govindarajan (1 986), citing Porter (1 985), maintains that: 
"a strategy of low cost signifies an attempt to sell an 
essentially undifferentiated product at lower-than-average 
market price." (Govindarajan 1986:848) 
Throughout Govindarajan's article he refers to Porter's "low 
cost" strategy. This illustrates a lack of precision in the 
interpretation of Porter that contributes to the confusion 
surrounding the generic strategy concepts. 
In Miller and Friesen's empirical investigation of the generic 
strategies (1 986a: 1986b) they refer to cost leaders offering 
lower prices, and pricing "aggressively" to build market share. 
This study also illustrates some other difficulties of definition 
encountered in researching the generic strategies. They list a 
number of "strategic choice variablest' extracted from the PlMS 
database, that they believe are associated with the generic 
strategies. For cost leadership these variables are as follows: 
* Price Difference 
Vertical integration 
* Newness of plant and equipment 
* Capacity utilization 
* Relative direct costs 
* Process R&D/Value added 
None of these variables, taken singly or in combination would 
necessarily lead to an SBU becoming a "cost leader" in its 
industry. Nevertheless, this does not prevent Miller and Friesen 
(1986a) from drawing conclusions about "cost leadershiptt SBUs, 
or indeed identifying "Differentiators" that are also "cost 
leadersW(Miller and Friesen 1986a:49). These interpretations are 
all the more surprising given that their study found a number of 
"cost leaders" within the same industry (consumer durables). In a 
similar vein, Dess and Davis (1984) are prepared to conclude that 
a cluster of four firms in the same industry are "cost leaders". 
These are not trivial points. They illustrate a lack of rigour that 
seems to be endemic to empirical studies of the generic 
strategies. It would be more appropriate if Miller and Friesen 
referred to SBUs that score highly on these variables as "cost 
controlt' SBUs, as there is no evidence that they have achieved 
THE lowest cost position in their industries, or that they were 
striving to achieve this position. 
TO conclude, there appears to be some confusion surrounding the 
strategy of cost leadership. It is not clear whether cost 
Ieadership is necessarily associated with competing on price, 
and there is evidence that some investigators are using the term 
loosely to imply a "cost control" orientation. Finally, a strong 
connection is made in the literature (by Porter and others) 
between cost Ieadership and serving price sensitive, commodity- 
like market segments. Thus the choice of generic competitive 
strategy is being confused with the selection of a target market 
segment. 
5.2.2 DIFFERENTIATION 
Similarly to cost Ieadership, Differentiation has been variously 
interpreted. Porter argues that differentiators achieve superior 
profits through their ability to premium price (1980:38). He 
states that: 
"The ultimate test of differentiation is: do you command a 
premium price?" (European Management Journal 1987:6) 
However, Hill (1988) suggests that an aim of differentiation is 
"to capture more of the market at the same price"; Hill does not, 
then, automatically associate differentiation with premium 
pricing. 
Porter himself relaxes the connection between a differentiation 
strategy and premium pricing in his video case examples 
(Harvard 1988). Citing American Airlines as his example of a 
broad scope differentiator, he suggests that their superior 
performance results not from the ability to premium price, but 
from their ability to increase market share. 
Hill (1 988) considers the connections between differentiation 
and demand: 
"1 nvestment expenditure aimed at differentiating a product 
has two effects upon demand. The first is to create brand 
loyalty, decreasing the price elasticity of demand for the firm's 
product. The second is to broaden the appeal of a product, 
enabling the firm to capture more of the market at a given price 
and to increase the volume sold .... The immediate effect of 
differentiation will be to increase unit costs. However, if costs 
fall with increasing volume, the long-run effect may be to 
reduce unit costs. Three sources of declining costs can be 
identified: learning effects, economies of scale, and economies 
of scope....Whether differentiation is consistent with 
establishing an overall low-cost position depends on the extent 
to which costs decline with increasing volume." (Hill 
1988:402/3)  
Thus, for Hill differentiation need not necessarily be associated 
with premium pricing (see also Bamberger 1989:80), nor does he 
perceive particular problems in pursuing both differentiation and 
cost leadership simultaneously. 
He goes on to argue that "..efficiency is not so much a strategy as 
a function of the skill with which a firm manages the process of 
converting inputs into outputs." (1988:410). This leads us into 
the next contentious area: whether firms that try to achieve both 
sources of advantage run the risk of being "stuck-in-the-middle". 
5.2.3 "STUCK-IN-THE-MIDDLE" 
Porter maintains that: 
"a firm that engages in each generic strategy but fails to 
achieve any of them is "stuck in the middle". It possesses no 
competitive advantage ..... Becoming stuck in the middle is often a 
manifestation of a firm's unwillingness to make choices about 
how to compete. It tries for competitive advantage through every 
means and achieves none, because achieving different types of 
competitive advantage usually requires inconsistent actions" 
(Porter 1985:16-17) 
In addressing the issue of achieving both sources of advantage 
Murray (1988) argues that: 
"...the exogenous preconditions for a viable cost leadership 
strategy stem principally from the industry's structural 
characteristics [vertical integration confers benefits, process 
innovations can still be realised, learning effects can still be 
realised, optimal scale exceeds 50% of market]. The 
preconditions for product differentiation stem primarily from 
customer tastes. Because these two sets of exogenous factors 
are independent, the possibility of a firm pursuing cost 
leadership and product differentiation simultaneously is not 
precluded." (Murray 1988:395) 
Karnani (1984) argues that "a firm cannot afford to emphasise 
one dimension at the cost of neglecting the other. Moreover, the 
relative contribution to successfuI performance of the two ways 
of gaining competitive advantage depends on certain 
characteristics of the specific industry one is considering" 
(1 984:379) 
Cronshaw, Davis and Kay (1990) point out some of the differing 
interpretations of the "stuck-in-the-middle" concept. It has been 
used, as in the discussion above, to refer to not making a choice 
between the two generic strategies. It has, however, also been 
used (by Porter and others) to refer to market positioning (opting 
for a "middle market" position), and to a general lack of clarity 
in strategy. 
The link between industry, or segment situation and the choice 
of generic strategy explored by Murray (1988) is shared by 
Hambrick (1 983a): 
' I t  is simply not accurate to say that all generic strategies 
are equally viable within an industry....any broadly 'generic' 
strategy is really a composite of numerous variations. not all of 
which are equally suited to a given situation." (Hambrick 
1983a:702) 
Porter's (1985) concepts of "parity" and "proximity" are relevant 
to this discussion: 
"a cost leader must achieve parity or proximity in the bases 
of differentiation relative to its competitors to be an above 
average performer.." (Porter 1985:13), and "a differentiator 
.... aims at cost parity or proximity relative to its competitors ..." 
(Porter 1985:14) 
Murray (1988) concludes from this that: 
"This implies that a cost leader that competes against a 
product differentiator must also be a product differentiator, and 
vice versa." (Murray 1988:396) 
5.3 ACHIEVING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Perhaps the most important question that must be asked of the 
generic strategies is "do they lead to competitive advantage?" 
Related to this basic question is the (usually implied) 
assumption that competitive advantage leads through to superior 
profitability. We shall now explore these two issues. 
In Porter's "Competitive Advantage" (1 985) the axes of his Three 
Generic Strategies diagram are labelled "Competitive Advantage" 
and "Competitive Scope" (see Figure 5.1). It is reasonable, then, 
to ask whether these generic strategies do in fact lead to 
competitive advantage. 
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988) suggests that "competitive strategy is primarily 
with the positioning of the firm's outputs (or 
not of inputs" (Mathur 1988:30). As far as the 
customer is concerned the cost leadership strategy is invisible; 
the cost leader may offer average quality products at average 
prices, there is no discernible advantage accruing to the 
customer from purchasing from the cost leader. ln this sense. 
then, it is difficult to see how cost leadership, by itself, can 
convey any competitive advantage. 
However, the consequences of being the lowest cost producer 
could enable the firm to pursue competitive advantages: 
* Low cost enables the firm to compete with lower prices 
* Low cost enables the firm to offer superior quality for the 
same (industry average) price 
But, cost leadership per se does not confer a competitive 
advantage. 
Does differentiation confer competitive advantage? Central to 
Porter's theoretical schema is the concept of the "industry". 
Indeed, the generic strategies are derived, and their advantages 
are explained in the context of a discernible industry structure 
(Porter 1980). However, there are problems in defining the 
boundaries of an industry. 
For instance, Murray (1988) cites Southlands 7-11 stores as 
exemplifying product differentiation based on convenience, 
"but this is only when they are compared with food retailers 
targeting other market segments (eg supermarkets). When they 
are compared with other firms competing in their own niche (ie 
other convenience stores), it becomes clear that 7-1 1 stores 
strive for cost leadership." (Murray 1988: 391). 
So, as more than one firm in an industry can pursue 
differentiation, we may see several firms, all serving similar 
- 
customers, all "premium pricing". But how does a firm achieve 
superior performance if all its rivals are "premium pricing" to 
the same extent? Indeed, over whom are these firms charging 
premium prices? 
Problems of industry definition and segmentation occur 
frequently in discussions of the generic strategy concepts. The 
definition of the industry (ie who are the firm's competitors) is 
clearly a key issue. 
Day and Wensley (1 988) distinguish between customer-focussed 
and competitor-centred approaches to competitive position. They 
conclude that: 
"The appropriate unit of analysis to reveal [competitive] 
advantage is a market segment characterized by a distinct 
profile of benefits" (Day and Wensley 1988:16). 
Dickson and Ginter (1987) define market segmentation as a 
"state of demand heterogeneity such that the total market 
demand can be disaggregated into segments with distinct demand 
functions" (Dickson and Ginter 1987:5). 
This problem has been acknowledged by Porter and others with 
the development of the the Strategic Groups concept (Porter 
1985; McGee and Thomas 1986; Mascarenhas and Aaker 1989). 
Although, developing Day and Wensley's (1988) point, arranging 
firms into "strategic groups" may be neither a customer- 
focussed, nor a competitor-centred approach; the grouping could 
be imposed on an industry by an interested academic. 
In an article based on a transcript of a TV programme (European 
Management Journal 1987) Porter explains the generic strategies 
with reference to the "autot' industry. He uses examples from the 
industry to illustrate each of the four cells of the generic 
- 
strategy diagram (Figure 5.1). For the broad target cost leader he 
cites Toyota; for the broad target differentiator he suggests 
General Motors in the US; his narrow target cost focusser is 
- 
Hyundai; Mercedes and BMW represent Differentiation focussers. 
(Interestingly in "Competitive Strategy" (1 980:43) he cites 
General Motors as an example of a cost leader). 
Clearly, Porter is using a broad definition of the auto industry to 
make his points, but this example illustrates very well the 
problems with the generic strategy concept. Over whom have 
Mercedes (the successful focusssed differentiators) gained a 
competitive advantage? It obviously is not, say Hyundai, or even 
Toyota, as it would be difficult to argue that these firms were 
targetting the same customers as Mercedes. In this sense, it is 
not particularly useful to regard Mercedes and Hyundai as being 
in the same "industry", if an industry is defined as firms in 
competition with each other; they would clearly not belong to 
the same "strategic group". 
To see whether Mercedes have gained a competitive advantage 
we would need to take the consumer's perspective, and compare 
the consumer's perceptions of the alternatives that are 
available. It is very likely that the consumer would be comparing 
Mercedes with similarly priced cars, with similar specifications 
(eg Jaguar, BMW). To judge Mercedes competitive position we 
would need to know whether an increasing, or decreasing number 
of consumers in this target segment were buying Mercedes cars. 
So Porter's test of the successfuI differentiation strategy 
(whether the firm can command a premium price: European 
Management Journal 1987) may not apply when the "industry" is 
defined from the customer's perspective, rather than from the 
firm's. 
To take this argument further, if we take the view that the 
customer is interested not in the product or service per se, but 
the extent to which the product can sa:ssfy his or her needs, then 
quite different industry definitions emerge. Take, for example, 
the Isle of Wight Zoo. A producVservice based industry 
definition would pitch the zoo against all other zoos in the UK. A 
customer needs-based definition would have to start from an 
understanding of the needs of the existing and potential 
customers of the zoo. 
For some segments the zoo would indeed be perceived to be in 
competition with other mainland zoos (the keen student of 
animal behaviour); but for most customers the competing 
suppliers of their needs would include theme parks. a waxwork 
museum, a craft centre. Here the needs of the customers are to 
pleasantly pass an afternoon when it is too cold to go to the 
beach. Taking these customer based definitions of the industry 
can result in radically different perceptions of the competition, 
and they also require a rethinking of the "Substitute" threat in 
Porter's Structural Analysis of Industries (Porter 1980). 
To conclude this section, the confusion between competitive 
strategy and the targetting of different market segments is well 
exemplified in a discussion between Porter and David Sainsbury 
(European Management Journal 1987). It is worth examining in 
detail the exchanges between Porter and Sainsbury as they 
illustrate some of the difficulties with the generic strategy 
concepts. 
Sainsbury:  "The.. bit I don't agree with is the idea that if you 
are stuck in the middle, that's some great disadvantage, because 
it seems to me that you do have customers who are only 
interested in price. At the other end, you've got some people who 
are interested only in quality and will pay anything to get it. But 
the great majority of people are interested in both quality and 
price, which is summed up in the phrase "value for money". I 
think you can have a strategy which is focused, as we are, 
absolutely on that middle range." 
Por ter :  "David said we're not interested in the part of the 
market that's only price sensitive. That part of the market is the 
province of cost. This would be typified by a company that was 
adopting a very stripped-down, warehouse operation, orienting 
on prices and sales. That's a focus strategy. David also said he 
was not interested in the sort of premium wnich I might pay if 
anything was the most exotic, individual, stylish, etc. 
Sainsbury : "We're not a delicatessen." 
Por ter :  "You're not a delicatessen. But what about the 
differentiation approach that would go after that completely 
price insensitive customer, giving him all kinds of service and 
handholding?" 
Here Porter is arguing that serving the very price sensitive 
segment is the province of a cost focusser, and serving the price 
insensitive consumer is the province of the differentiator. But it 
is not at all clear that the selection of either segment to target 
necessarily confers any competitive advantage. It would be 
entirely consistent with Porter's theory (Porter 1980) for a firm 
to pursue a cost leadership strategy in either of these segments. 
With respect to the price-insensitive segment, this would 
involve selling at average prices for firms serving that segment, 
but having the lowest costs (of firms serving that segment). 
Similarly, it is conceivable that a firm could target the price 
sensitive segment and pursue a differentiation strategy: here the 
firm would be able to price marginally above the average prices 
of firms serving this segment. 
But to be a "true" focussed cost leader serving the price 
sensitive segment would require the firm to charge average 
prices and achieve the lowest cost position of the firms serving 
this segment. And, again, to be a "true" focussed differentiator 
serving the delicatessen segment, the firm would have to 
premium price above other delicatessens. Figure 5.2 summarises 
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this argument, using two segments of a market. In each case, the 
above average player in the segment outperforms its rivals 
serving this segment (the "average" players). 
Thus comparing firms within a broad definition of the "grocery" 
industry, as Porter does in his discussion with Sainsbury, 
involves comparing firms who are not perceived, from the 
vantage point of an individual consumer, to be in competition 
with each other (whether the consumer is in the price sensitive 
segment, the price insensitive segment, or middle ground). 
To summarise this review of the literature, a number of issues 
concerning the generic strategies have emerged: 
* Is cost leadership associated with competing on price? If 
i t  I S ,  then it is not clear that the combination of a low priceilow 
cost strategy will lead to superior profit performance. 
Do differentiators premium price? Or can they achieve 
superior performance by increasing market share? 
How is competition to be defined? Over whom do the firm 
premium price, or achieve lowest costs? Indeed, is the selection 
of one of Porter's generic strategies more a decision about 
where to compete than about how to compete? 
Can firms pursue cost leadership and differentiation 
s imul taneously? 
Do either of the generic strategies lead to competitive 
advantage defined in "output" terms (ie. increasing market 
share)? 
To conclude this discussion it is useful to trace the origins of 
Porter's approach. The Generic Strategy concepts were derived 
from an economics perspective. Fundamental to Porter's theory 
is the concept of the industry (Porter 1980:1), and its 
"underlying economic structure" (Porter 1980:3). The industry is 
conceived of in "product" terms, and competition is defined by 
firms that offer products that are "close substitutes for each 
other" (Porter 1980:5). The generic strategies are presented as 
ways of "coping with the five competitive forces" (Porter 
1980:35), and they are essentially tautologies (the lowest cost 
producer that charges average prices must, by definition, have 
above average profits; similarly, the differentiator that 
combines premium prices with average costs, must have above 
average profits). Porter supports his theory with numerous 
anecdotal examples of firms supposedly pursuing one or other of 
the generic strategies. 
In order to answer some of the questions listed above, therofore. 
it may be appropriate to adopt a non-economics based 
perspective. The intention is to draw on the perceptions of 
practising managers to inform our understanding of competitive 
strategy (previous studies adopting this approach include Dess 
and Davis (1 984) and Aaker (1 989)). In this way a "managerial 
theory" of competitive strategy can be constructed which 
addresses the ambiguities and inconsistencies in Porter's 
concepts. 
5.4 MANAGERIAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENERIC 
STRATEGIES 
Porter's generic strategy concepts underpin the design of the 
"Perceptions of Strategic Priorities" questionnaire, for the 
reasons outlined in Chapter 3. The development and pilot testing 
of the questionnaire indicated that managers could relate to the 
statements derived from the two generic strategies, cost 
leadership and differentiation. The "three factor solution" to the 
overall database (the 11 09 managers) produced three factors 
that were easily interpretable as: 
Factor 1 Cost Leadership 
Factor 2 Change 
Factor 3 Differentiation 
The three factor solution explains 42.76% of the variance in the 
data. 
By inspecting the Eigenvalues it appears that five factors have 
eigenvalues > 1 .O. This indicates that each of the five factors 
explains more of the variance in the data than an individual 
variable. This rule of thumb is frequently used when interpreting 
the underlying structure of a set of data (Dess and Davis:1984). 
This suggests that a five factor solution may well reflect the 
structure of the data more appropriately than the three factor 
solut ion. 
Hence a five factor analysis was conducted on the database, the 
results are summarised in Table 5.1. This solution explains 
55.22% of the variance. This is an improvement on the three 
factor solution, but adding more factor necessarily increases the 
percentage of variance explained. 
The five factors have the following variables loading on them 
(loadings > 0.5): 
Factor 1 : v l ,  v13, v5, v8, v6: 
Factor 2 : v14, v2, v16, (v20), (v4): 
Factor 3: v7, (v12), v10, v9 : 
Factor 4: v21, v l  I, v19, v15 : 
Factor 5: v18, v17, v3, v9 : 
(Variables in brackets indicate negative loadings) 
Table 5.1 Five Factor Solution: Rotated Loadings 
Factor 1 2 3 4 
V ( l )  Operating Costs 0.81 8 
V(13) Monitor Costs 0.797 
V(5) Cut Overheads 0.681 
V(8) Capacity Utilization 0.558 
V(6) Low Cost Supply 0.538 
V(14) Different Operations 0.005 
V(2) Changed Strategy 0.009 
V(16) Changed Structure 0.01 3 
V(20) Same Operations -0.018 
V(4) Little Org. Change -0.175 
V(7) Regular NPD -0.01 0 
V(12) No Product Change 0.01 7 
V(1O) NPD Priority 0.041 
V(9) Unique Products 0.046 
V(21) Competitive Prices 0.142 
V ( l  1 ) Emphasize Prices 0.101 
V(19) Lowest Cost 0.234 
V(15) Price Sensitive 0.426 
V(18) Superior Products 0.146 
V(17) Sales Information -0.261 
V(3) Distinctive Products 0.147 
Percentage of Total Variance 
Explained 13.25 13.05 9.73 10.51 
5.4.1 DESCRIBING THE FIVE FACTOR SOLUTION 
Factor 1: Cost Control 
This factor is easily interpretable as "cost control". The 
statements that load on it are about monitoring and controlling 
operating costs ( v l  , v13), cutting overheads (v5), maintaining 
capacity utilization (v8), securing low cost supply (v6). 
Interestingly, V19 ("We aim to be the lowest cost producer in our 
industry") does not load strongly on this factor (a loading of only 
0.234). 
Factor 2: Change 
This is the "Change" factor. Statements about changing 
operations (v14, v20), changing strategic direction (v2) and 
changing organizational structures and processes (v16) all load 
onto this factor. However, the statements about product change, 
and new product development do not load on this factor (v7, v12, 
v10). This suggests that managers do not perceive organizational 
change and product change as necessarily related. 
Factor 3: New Product Development 
The product change statements load on this factor (v7, v12, v10). 
But, in addition v9 ("We try to offer unique products/services 
enabling us to charge premium prices") also has a loading greater 
than 0.5 (0.508). This would suggest that new product 
development is linked to the achievement of uniqueness, and to 
premium pricing. 
Factor 4: Compete on Price 
This factor embraces the statements to do with competing on 
price ( v l  I ) ,  offering similar products/services to the 
competition (v21), and having price sensitive customers (v15). 
Statement 19 ("We aim to be the lowest cost producer in our 
industry") also loads on this factor (0.616). This would support 
the suggestion that some managers have interpreted this 
statement as aiming to be the lowest PRICED producer. However, 
we cannot exclude the explanation that other managers perceive 
that, to compete on price, an SBU needs to be very low cost. 
Factor 5: Superior Products 
This factor has statements about offering superior, and unique 
products (v18, v9), emphasizing distinctive products in 
marketing communications (v3). Sales performance information 
is considered to be more important than cost control information 
(v17). Factor 5, then is about offering superior 
products/services, and being sales, not cost orientated. 
The four strategy-orientated factors (F I ,  F3, F4, F5) can be 
summarised as follows: 
F1 Cost control 
F3 New product development 
F4 Compete on price 
F5 Superior products 
5.4.2 INTERPRETING FACTOR 1 : "COST CONTROL" 
Factor 1 includes all the cost control statements that were in 
the original "Cost Leadership" factor. However, those statements 
that were concerned with price competitiveness that previously 
loaded on the Cost Leadership factor, now load on Factor 4. Thus, 
the cost control factor (Factor 1) is focussed exclusively 
internally on priorities associated with cost reduction and 
efficiency. 
Factor 1 (cost control) pursued alone by an SBU would not confer 
competitive advantage. Cost control per se is invisible to 
consumers. Cost advantages can be translated into either lower 
prices, or higher perceived value (by adding product features 
whilst not raising the price) which w o u l d  confer competitive 
advantage. Cost control activities that were not converted into 
either of these forms of competitive advantage would lead to 
superior profits i f  the firm was able to achieve a lower than 
average cost level as a result. However, the risk of pursuing just 
cost control are that the firm may be out manoeuvered by a 
competitor. The profit advantages may prove to be short term if  
competitors move to cut price, and/or add perceived value. 
5.4.3 INTERPRETING FACTOR 4: COMPETE ON PRICE 
Factor 4 (Compete on price) includes the need to be the lowest 
cost producer. Firms may proactively opt for this strategy (to 
squeeze out competitors, for example), or firms may find 
themselves left with this as the only option. Miller and Friesen's 
(1986a) Cluster 3 and 4 SBUs could be regarded as pursuing a 
proactive price competitive strategy. These SBUs support their 
competitive prices with efforts to reduce costs. 
However, if there has been little effort put into improving the 
perceived value of  the products, a firm may find itself falling 
behind its competitors. Faced with falling market share the 
management may cut prices. However, unless the firm has a very 
low (relative) cost base the squeeze on margins that may result 
from price cutting could be crippling. 
Unfortunately, i f  the firm has fallen behind the competition with 
respect to perceived value, it may well be lacking in a positive 
drive to control costs. In short, the firm may generally lack 
strategic direction. The absence of strategic purpose that led to 
the the problem with relative perceived value may not be 
compensated by a strong sustained drive to cut costs. So we may 
find a poorly managed firm being forced to compete on price, 
recognising that they have to be lowest cost, but without the 
emphasis on cost control that would be required to achieve the 
lowest cost position (ie Factor 3 not combined with a strong 
Factor 1 thrust). 
Miller and Friesen's empirical study (1986a;1986b) revealed four 
"failure" clusters of SBUs. In explaining some of these clusters 
they surmise a vicious circle of failure: "...poor product quality 
can erode market share, requiring a subsequent reduction in 
prices." (Miller and Friesen 1986b:258). 
Thus we would expect that a strong cost control orientation 
would be associated with superior profit performance, provided 
that the firm was not reactively cutting price. A cost control 
orientation per se would not affect sales performance. 
5.4.4 INTERPRETING FACTOR 3: "NEW PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT" 
Factor 3 can be interpreted as: 
"New product development/uniqueness/premiu m price" 
This would suggest that managers who perceive their SBU's to be 
stressing new product development, are also aiming for 
uniqueness and the ability to premium price. 
New product development may be undertaken for a variety of 
reasons, including the following: 
it is a feature of the industry (new product development is 
one of the "rules of the game": Miller 1988:284) 
it is to help achieve a superior competitive position in an 
industry that has not, traditionally, competed via product 
innovation 
new product development meets management aspirations 
New product development may be a continual priority where the 
industry "rules of the game" dictate this. A failure to innovate 
would lead to competitive disadvantage. Alternatively, where 
product innovation is used aggressively to gain a competitive 
advantage it would be linked to the pursuit of 
superiorlunique/distinctive products or services. 
As explained in Chapter 2, Miller (1986) suggests a subdivision 
of Porter's Differentiation strategy into innovative 
differentiation, and marketing differentiation. He suggests that 
this distinction is necessary largely due to the different 
organizational requirements of these routes to competitive 
advantage. Innovative differentiation requires the firm to 
continually develop new products or services, whereas in the 
case of marketing differentiation the products or services may 
remain substantially unaltered, the differentiation effort is 
concentrated in marketing activities designed primarily to alter 
consumers' perceptions of the products. Innovative 
differentiation would require a flexible, decentralised structure, 
whereas marketing differentiation may be sustainable with or 
much more mechanistic organizational form (a machine 
bureaucracy: Mintzberg 1979). Only the marketing activity would 
require organic, adhocratic forms of structure; and in some 
cases this activity would be sub-contracted. 
There are connections, therefore, between these forms of 
differentiation and the five factor solution presented here. 
Factor 3 could be interpreted as Miller's innovative 
differentiation. New product development, and uniqueness 
leading to premium pricing load on this factor. 
In Miller and Friesen's study (1986a;1986b) Cluster 7 could be 
interpreted as a New Product Development cluster. These SBUs 
rate significantly above average on price premium, relative 
direct costs, product R&D/Value Added. They are also the only 
cluster to have a positive rating on "percentage of new products". 
5.4.5 INTERPRETING FACTOR 5:  "SUPERIOR PRODUCTS" 
Miller's "marketing differentiation" (1 986) would correspond to 
Factor 5. Here new product development is not stressed as a 
means towards achieving uniqueness; distinctive products, or 
image conveyed through marketing communications loads 
strongly on to this factor. 
Offering superior products or services to the competition should 
improve market share. Increases in share can lead through to 
improved profit performance if the firm takes advantage of, for 
example scale economies (eg spreading overheads), andlor 
experience curve benefits. Thus Factor 5 should be linked to 
relative sales performance (market share), and it may be linked 
to relative profit performance. 
Miller and Friesen's (1986a) Cluster 1 and 2 SBUs correspond to 
the "Superior Products" strategy. Here the SBUs do not pursue 
product innovation, but they do emphasize product quality and 
the promotion of perceived product quality (through advertising 
and promotional expenditure). 
5.5 COMPARING THE FIVE FACTOR SOLUTION WITH DESS 
AND DAVIS (1984) 
Dess and Davis' (1984) study is directly comparable to the 
approach used here to investigate managerial perceptions of the 
generic strategies, therefore it is useful to compare their 
results with those presented here. Their factor analysis 
produced five factors with eigenvalues > 1 .  However, they chose 
to eliminate two of the factors, leaving three which they 
interpreted as supporting the generic strategies: a 
differentiation factor (which explained 32% of the variance); a 
"low cost" factor (10.7% of the variance); and a "focus" factor 
(8.6%). "Competitive methods" that loaded on these three factors, 
that had loadings greater than 0.50 were as follows: 
Factor 1 "Differentiation" 
Brand Identification: Innovation in marketing techniques and 
methods; Control of channels of distribution; Procurement of raw 
materials; Advertising; Forecasting market growth. 
Factor 2 "Low Cost" 
Operating efficiency; Product quality control; 
Experiencedltrained personnel; Developinglrefining existing 
products; Procurement of raw materials; Reputation within the 
industry; Forecasting market growth. 
Factor 3 "Focus" 
New product development; Capability to manufacture 
speciality products; Products in high price market segments. 
These results could be interpreted as confirming the "five 
factor" solution derived here. Dess and Davis' Factor 1 is 
equivalent to the "Superior Products" factor; their Factor 2 is 
equivalent to the "Cost control" factor; and their Factor 3 is 
equivalent to the "New Product Development" factor. Moreover, 
one of their "competitive methods" statements refers to 
"Competitive Pricing". This method does not load on either of the 
three selected factors. We must assume, therefore, that the 
statement loads on one or other of the discarded factors. This, 
then, would corroborate further the similarities between the 
two studies. 
In the second phase of their study, Dess and Davis compare the 
factors derived from the managers' responses with competitive 
methods identified by "experts" as pertaining to each of the 
generic strategies. The comparisons reveal a marked lack of 
agreement between the "experts" and the managers, although 
Dess and Davis do not interpret the results in this way. Of the 21 
competitive methods used, only four are rated by both groups as 
being important to a differentiation strategy; four are commonly 
rated as pertaining to "low cost"; and only one method is 
commonly rated as pertaining to "focus". Important differences 
between the experts and the managers include "competitive 
pricing" (rated by experts only as pertaining to cost leadership); 
and new product development (rated by experts as pertaining to 
differentiation, but not by managers). 
This would support the view that managers' perceptions of 
competitive strategy are different from those of "academics", 
and it reinforces the usefulness of the approach adopted in the 
present study. 
5.6 THE FIVE FACTOR SOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE 
Table 5.2 contains summary statistics for both the three and 
five-factor solutions. The factor scores for each SBU are 
averaged across all the respondents to produce a mean factor 
score for each SBU. These mean scores are then regressed 
against the two performance measures: relative profitability. 
and relative sales performance. 
The three factor solution produces two statistically significant 
relat ionships: 
Factor 3 ("Differentiation") and Relative Profitability (R* = 
Factor 3 ("Differentiation") and Relative Sales Performance 
( R ~ :  0.158; p = .016) 
These relationships would tend to support the Porter contention 
that a strategy of Differentiation will lead through to superior 
performance. 
These models assume a continuous rather than a categorical 
relationship between these variables. In other words, the more 
"aggressively" the strategy of differentiation is pursued 
(indicated by a higher mean Factor 3 score) the better the 
performance. 
As explained above, the five factor solution disaggregates the 
statements that loaded on the Differentiaticn factor. These 
statements are now divided between Factor 3 (new product 
development) and Factor 5 (Superior products). It can be seen 
from Table 5.2 that Factor 5 is associated with both 
performance measures, but that Factor 3 (New Product 
Development) is not associated with either performance 
Table 5.2 Comparing the Three and Five Factor 
Solutions and Performance 
PROFITABILITY SALES 
3 FACTOR STD R~ P STD 
COEFF COEFF 
Cost Leader 0.050 0.189 0.224 0.037 0 .262  0.192 
D i f fe rent ia t ion  0.1 75 0 . 0  1 1 * '  0.41 9 0.1 58 0.01 6'' 0.398 
5 FACTOR 
F1 Cost Control 0.086 0 .082 '  0.293 0.070 0 .120 0.264 
F3 Innovation 0.036 0.265 0.191 0.022 0.387 0.149 
F4 Price Compet. 0.000 0.938 0.000 0.968 
F5 Superior Prod0.178 0 . 0 1 0 * ' 0 . 4 2 2  0.180 0.010" 0.425 
measure. As explained above, this strategic thrust corresponds 
to Miller and Friesen's (1986a) Cluster 7, which proved to be a 
poor performing cluster of SBUs. 
The strongest relationship is between Factor 5 and Sales 
performance (R*  = 0.180; p = .010), but the profit relationship is 
also significant (R* = 0.178; p = .010). 
To recap, Factor 5 is about offering superior, unique, distinctive 
products and services, and being sales not cost orientated 
(Statement 17). This orientation is associated with good 
performance. According to these results, the new product 
development is not linked to performance. 
Factor 1 (Cost Control) is associated with relative profitability 
( ~ * = 0 . 0 8 6 ;  p = 0.082). But, it can be seen from Table 5.2 that the 
"Compete on Price" factor (Factor 4) does not correlate with 
either of the performance measures. 
5.7 A MANAGERIAL THEORY OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
The challenge presented by these findings is to see if they can be 
interpreted in such a way as to provide a coherent managerial 
perspective of competitive strategy, which avoids the 
ambiguities and inconsistencies of Porter's approach. 
Two of the factors are clearly associated with gaining 
competitive advantage: one rcute to advantage is through 
offering superior products or services (F5); the other is through 
competing on price (FA). 
These two competitive thrusts can be represented on the chart in 
Figure 5.3. The vertical axis represents perceived use value. This 
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is the value "in use" perceived by consumers; the tangible and 
intangible benefits perceived to accrue to the consumer through 
purchasing and consuming the products/services; to borrow a 
term from economics, this axis represents the perceived 
"utility" of the products/services on offer. The horizontal axis 
measures price. 
Dickson and Ginter (1987) stress the importance of consumer 
perceptions in establishing their definition of product 
d i f fe rent ia t ion :  
"product differentiation is where a product offering is 
perceived by the consumer to differ from its competition on 
any physical or nonphysical product characteristic including 
price" (Dickson and Ginter 1987:4) 
Day and Wensley (1988) take a similar line: 
"...though advantages reside in superior skills and resources, they 
are revea!ed in competitive product markets. A point of 
advantage can be exploited profitably only when it offers 
significant benefits that are perceived and valued by 
customers.. . . . " (Day and Wensley 1988:16) 
A position in the space defined by the two axes could be viewed 
as representing a particular "value for money" combination of 
perceived use value and price (European Management Journal 
1987:5). 
5.7.1 REPRESENTING THE CONSUMER ON THE CHART 
In order to represent the consumer in the diagram, in Figure 5.4 
three "indifference curves" are displayed representing three 
different segments of consumer demand. In order to explain the 
relevance of the curves, we will use the example used by Porter 
( I  987) to explore his generic strategy concepts: the "auto 
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FIGURE 5.4 THREE SEGMENTS IN THE CAR MARKET 
industry". 
Segment A are price sensitive consumers, and are only able, or 
are only prepared to pay up to £5,000 for a new car. Segment 8 
are less price sensitive, but their price range has an upper limit 
of £10,000. Segment C are prepared to pay up to £25,000 for a 
car that they perceive to offer high use value. Each indifference 
curve represents a set of combinations of price and perceived 
use-value that consumers view as equivalent: they are 
"indifferent" between these combinations. For each segment, the 
indifference curve represents the "boundary" of acceptable 
priceluse value combinations. For example, the Segment A 
consumer cannot afford, or is not prepared, to pay more than 
f 5,000. 
By plotting these three segments on the same chart we are 
assuming that all three segments value very similar attributes 
of cars, and, as such, the Segment A consumer can appreciate 
that a very expensive car could nevertheless represent "value- 
for-money" even though it is well outside his price range. We are 
assuming therefore, that adding perceived use-value means the 
same thing to all three segments. If this was not the case, then 
it would not be appropriate to draw all three segments on the 
same chart. So, for our example of the auto industry, we could 
assume that all three segments were interested in one class of 
cars, family saloons. 
If a consumer moves along his or her indifference curve they do 
not perceive any change in the "value for money" combination of 
perceived use value and price. However, nested within each of 
the "boundary" indifference curves, are curves that represent 
higher "value for money" combinations. If consumers can move to 
higher indifference curves, they perceive themselves to be 
better off. (See Figure 5.5) 
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5.7.2 LOCATING FIRMS ON THE CHART 
In the situation depicted in Figure 5.6 all firms are perceived to 
be offering very similar use values, and they all charge very 
similar prices. This approximates to a commodity industry, 
where there is no product differentiation. In our auto industry 
example, this would represent a situation where consumers were 
offered a standard type of car, for a fixed price. If this was the 
situation, then Segment A consumers would not be in the market 
at all, as the price of these standard cars is too high for them 
(about f 10,000). 
5.7.3 REPRESENTING PORTER'S GENERIC STRATEGIES ON 
THE CHART 
How might Porter's generic strategy options be represented on 
this chart? As we have argued earlier, Porter's Cost Leadership 
strategy, strictly interpreted, would mean that one of the 
cluster of firms has achieved the lowest cost position. As a 
result, that firm will be earning superior profits. But because, by 
definition, the cost leader offers average prices and average 
quality, in the eyes of the consumer the firm is identical to the 
others. In this case it is difficult to argue that the cost 
leadership strategy has enabled the firm to gain a competitive 
advantage over the other firms. This strategy, per se, would not 
affect relative market shares at all. The cost leader does, 
however, have the potential to behave in ways that would be 
perceived to be valuable to the consumer: its low cost position 
could enable it to cut price, or to add more perceived use value 
than the competition. In this sense, then, the cost leader has the 
potential capacity to gain market share through moving west 
(cutting price) or north (adding perceived use value), or doing 
both simultaneously (moving northwest). 
How, then would Porter's Differentiation strategy be represented 
on the chart? Porter argues that the successfuI differentiator 
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offers superior value, and can, as a result charge premium 
prices. This would move a firm away from the cluster of other 
firms towards the north east part of the chart (higher perceived 
use value, combined with higher prices, depicted in Figure 5.7). 
Note that this combination would not attract any Segment B 
consumers. The offerings of the differentiator are now outside 
their price range. However, the Segment C consumer would find 
this combination attractive, as it enables him or her to move to 
a higher indifference curve (Figure 5.7). 
Thus, Porter's differentiation strategy represents a competitive 
strategy that, for i t  to be viable, requires the existence of less 
price sensitive segments in the market place. Therefore Porter's 
differentiation is really to do with identifying and serving 
relatively price insensitive segments. It is, therefore, primarily 
about choosing the ground on which to compete. 
In order to explain the bases of the theory, we have assumed that 
all the firms were initially clustered together. This is clearly 
not the case in the auto industry cited by Porter. Porter suggests 
that, in the auto industry, Mercedes and BMW are successful 
differentiators. These firms offer products targeted at the 
relatively price insensitive consumer (our Segment C 
consumers). 
If a firm serving Segment B decided to become a "differentiator", 
it would, presumably increase the perceived use value it offered 
and increase the price of its cars. Would this firm gain 
competitive advantage? This begs the question: over whom would 
this firm be looking to gain competitive advantage? From our 
chart (Figure 5.7) the Segment B consumer would only tolerate a 
very marginal price increase (maybe 5% ?), even i f  the perceived 
use value associated with it were high. If the differentiator 
were looking to premium price above this level he would be 
moving away from one group of competitors, those who are 
staying to serve Segmen: B. 
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If the differentiator is moving to serve a different segment, then 
the relevant question is whether the firm has gained advantage 
over the existing servers of this different segment (those 
currently serving Segment C), rather than those left serving 
Segment B. Simply trying to move from Segment B to serving 
Segment C does not confer any competitive advantage. In the auto 
industry example, this would be a firm like Nissan (serving 
Segment B), moving up to compete with Mercedes and BMW (who 
are the incumbents serving Segment C). We could only judge 
whether Nissan had gained competitive advantage by comparing 
them to Mercedes and BMW, not Ford or Fiat. 
To conclude, plotting the generic strategies on this chart 
highlights that: 
cost leadership, per se, does not confer competitive 
advantage 
differentiation is essentially to do with choosing the 
ground on which tc compete, it is not about gaining competitive 
advantage 
5.7.4 REPRESENTING THE MANAGERIAL STRATEGIC 
THRUSTS ON THE CHART 
To recap, the factor analysis revealed four strategic thrusts: 
F1 Cost control 
F3 New product development 
F4 Compete on price 
F5 Superior product 
F4 Compete on Price 
We will examine, first, the F4 thrust which is about competing 
on price. 
The F4 thrust moves the firm to the west on the chart (Figure 
5.8): here the firm is offering the same perceived use value as 
the competition, but is charging lower prices. Note that this 
assumes that the consumers do not use price as an indicator of 
perceived use value. If some of them do, then the move west 
becomes a shift southwest: in the consumers eyes the firm is not 
offering equivalent use value to the compe"" , i  .Ion. 
If all the competitors remained where they were, this price cut 
would lead to a dramatic increase in market share, as the 
Segment B consumers could all now access a higher indifference 
curve by moving to the price cutter's products. Because of this it 
is inevitable that the other firms will be forced to cut prices to, 
at least, match those of the first mover. The net result would be 
a new, lower, average price ruling in the industry, and with 
shares probably remaining unchanged. The likelihood, therefore, 
that firms will imitate this competitive strategy is high, in the 
short term. 
There may be, however, frictions that may make it difficult or 
costly for consumers to immediately switch to the lower priced 
offering (tangible switching costs), or the product may be an 
infrequent purchase. These factors may reduce the need of the 
higher priced firms to immediately cut prices to match the first 
mover. 
In order to sustain competitive advantage from this thrust the 
firm would have to continually drive down prices. This could only 
be possible i f  the firm had lower costs than the competition (it 
might ultima!ely have to be t h e  lowest cos! producer), or if it 
were funded by other, profitable, parts of its parent corporation. 
The risks associated with this strategy are high: unless a firm 
can be confident that it can ultimateley benef: from price 
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cutting, the probability is that this manouevre merely reduces 
industry profitability. However, i f  a firm can achieve low prices 
and lowest costs (by, for instance, translating market share 
gains into experience, and scale, cost advantages) it may be abie 
to drive out higher cost competitors. Having achieved this, and 
having set up some additional entry barriers in the process, the 
firm may then begin to raise prices. 
In order to sustain this route to competitive advantage, 
therefore, the firm must be able to sustain lower prices for 
longer than the competition. This would suggest a need to be the 
lowest cost producer in the industry. Therefore, despite the 
reservations expressed about the interpretation of Statement 19 
("We aim to be the lowest cost producer in the industry"), its 
loading on Factor 4 (compete on price) may in fact reflect both 
interpretations: the firm needs to be lowest price, AND lowest 
cost i f  it is to successfully pursue this option 
F5 Superior Products 
The F5 thrust moves the firm North, away from the other 
competitors, by offering higher perceived value for the same 
price. The new offering combines higher perceived use value with 
the same prices as the competition, a combination that places 
consumers on a higher indifference curve (see Figure 5.9). In 
order to achieve this the firm must know what it is that 
customers value, and communicate to consumers that they can 
deliver this. It should be noted that a firm's efforts to add value 
may not be appreciated by customers (for example, the case of 
P&G "potato chips" cited by Aaker (1989:99)). In other words, the 
management may perceive that they have shifted their SBU north, 
but, in the eyes of consumers the firm may still be seen to be 
offering equivalent products/services to the competition. 
Moving north by adding perceived use value may offer more 
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opportunities to achieve sustainable advantages than the price 
cutting strategy (F4), particularly if the firm can add many 
dimensions of perceived use value. In addition, the source of 
higher perceived use value may be difficult for other firms to 
imitate: brand identity, physical location, proprietary expertise, 
patents. 
Both of these thrusts, F4 and F5, will lead to competitive 
advantage: the firm will increase its market share by either of 
these moves, and will sustain this advantage as long as no other 
firms follow suit and imitate the move; or until consumers 
change their preferences. The moves west (cutting price) would 
not appear to offer the same opportunities to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage as moves north. Price cuts 
can be quickly matched (indeed competitors may have no option 
but to follow the price cutter downwards). 
F3 New Product Development 
F3 (New Product Development) is linked with the pursuit of 
uniqueness and premium pricing (Statement 9). Firms pursuing 
this thrust would be moving northeast in Figure 5.10. This move 
could still be regarded as a competitive strategy as long as the 
price premium was not so great as to move the firm away from 
its existing segment. If the price premium is large enough to 
move the firm away from its existing customer base, then the 
chart should be redrawn. Now the firm should be positioned along 
with other firms who are perceived by this less price sensitive 
segment as offering competing products. 
Movements on the diagonal (Northeast, or Southwest) should 
properly be regardid, then, as movements to different segments 
of demand. For example, if a firm moved northeast it would 
clearly be offer~ng higher perceived value, and charging higher 
prices. To return to Porter's example of the "auto" industry, this 
would be moving "up market". The middle ground (serving 
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Segment B) would be occupied by Ford, Nissan and Fiat, the North 
East segment (Segment C) would be addressed by Mercedes and 
BMW. The appropriate analysis of Mercedes position would be to 
compare it to those firms whom their potential customers 
perceive as viable alternative suppliers of their needs. 
Similarly, a move "down market" from serving Segment B, would 
pitch the firm alongside Hyundai, Lada, Proton, and Skoda. Again, 
the chart should be redrawn. 
Thus for each segment of demand the consumers will perceive a 
set of possible suppliers of their needs. In addressing issues of 
competitive advantage, it is a firm's positioning relative to the 
consumers' perceptions of alternative suppliers that is 
important. Within each segment firms have to gain competitive 
advantage through either offering the same perceived use value 
at lower prices (the F4 thrust), or by offering higher perceived 
use value for the same (or only slightly higher) prices. 
5.7.5 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND PROFITABILITY: F1 
"Cost Control" 
On their own, neither the move north (achieved through adding 
perceived use value), nor the move west (by offering equivalent 
use value at a lower price) will improve firm profitability. 
Delivering higher perceived value may increase costs (added 
features, more brand advertising); and price cutting may merely 
lead to eroded margins. For either thrust to lead through to 
improved profitability the firm must control costs. Without 
close cost control margins will be eroded (by price cuts in the 
case of F4; or by cost increases in the case of F5). Hence, in 
order to translate the higher market shares potentially available 
through competitive strategies F4 and F5 into superior profits, 
the firm must address cost control (the F1 thrust). 
Clearly, efficient control of costs is essential for the F4 
(compete on price) thrust. It has been argued above that, for this 
strategy to succeed the firm may well need to be the lowest cost 
producer in the industry, to enable it to sustain lower prices 
longer than the competition. However, cost control is 
nevertheless important to the firm pursuing the F5 thrust 
(adding higher perceived use value). Without vigorous control of 
costs the firm may be unable to convert market share gains into 
p ro f i t s .  
We have argued that the F5 (superior products) thrust does not 
involve premium pricing. We have also pointed out that examples 
Porter uses of successfuI differentiators are really examples of 
firms competing for particular, less price sensitive consumers. 
So a firm has to decide, firstly, what ground it wishes to 
compete on: ie. what is the target segment (Aaker 1989:91)? 
Having determined this, the firm then needs to decide how to 
compete in serving this segment: to compete on price, or through 
adding higher perceived use value. Either of these strategic 
thrusts will lead to increased share of this segment's 
consumers. The increased shares could be translated (indeed, 
should be translated) into lower costs than the other firms 
serving this segment. Thus it is quite conceivable that firms 
pursuing the F5 (superior products) thrust could also be the 
lowest cost producer of the firms serving this segment (Hill 
1988). (Share gains should be translatable into scale and 
experience-based cost advantages). The connection between 
higher perceived use value and lower cost positions is supported 
by empirical research (Phillips, Chang and Buzzell 1983; Fine 
1983; Buzzell and Gale 1987). 
The combination of higher perceived use value and low costs 
would place the firm in a powerful competitive position, for, if 
the other firms were able to imitate their added perceived use 
value offerings, the first mover would be in a position to add yet 
more perceived use values, or, indeed, to cut prices. Either way, 
the competition would be placed at a competitive disadvantage. 
In order to achieve sustainable competitive advantage through 
the F5 (superior products) thrust the firm must maintain a 
positive gap between itself and its competitors (as perceived by 
the consumer). Moves north that can be readily imitated confer 
only temporary competitive advantages. Indeed, if competitors 
are able to imitate at lower cost than the innovator, the 
innovator may end up with a relatively lower profitability. Once 
the move north has been copied, it becomes the new "norm", or 
average perceived use-value, in the industry; the improvement in 
service or quality ceases to confer competitive advantage: 
"A skill that all competitors have will not be the basis for a 
sustainable competitive advantage." (Aaker 1989:98) 
To sustain the gap between its position and the positions of 
competitors, the firm must either delivered sources of 
perceived use value that are very difficult or costly to imitate 
(thus preserving a "static" gap), or the firm must continually add 
perceived use value to keep one jump ahead of the competition 
(preserving a "dynamic" gap). The pace and frequency of 
innovation will vary between industries (Miller 1988:284) But, 
clearly, if two or more firms are aggressively pursuing the F5 
strategy, then there is likely to be a continual "ratcheting" 
upwards of the average acceptable perceived use value in the 
industry, as each firm attempts to leap-frog its rivals. 
F1 (Cost Control) by itself would not lead to any perceived shift 
(from the consumers' perspective) in the firm's position in 
Figure 5.6. Firms in this position may achieve good profit 
performance so long as other firms locate around the same space 
(ie offer similar perceived use value, and charge similar prices). 
Firms pursuing cost control alone are vulnerable to competitors 
moving west (through price cuts), or north (through 
improvements in perceived use value). The cost control 
orientated firm may be better able to respond to price cuts than 
to value improvements. This could result from an excessively 
internally focussed management team, and through rigidities in 
the organization that have resulted from the development of a 
cost efficient structure (de-skilling, automation, 
proceduralisation, centralisation of decision making, elaborate 
hierarchies). 
Hence, it may well be the case that the pursuit of cost control to 
excess may detract from the firm's ability to add perceived use 
value. Thus, when a competitor moves north the cost control 
orientated firm may be unable to respond. As other competitors 
move north to match the superior perceived use value offerings 
of the innovator, the cost control firm is left behind. It is now 
offering lower perceived use value at the same prices as the 
competition. This is not a sustainable market position. If mobes 
north are too difficult, the firm may find itself cutting price 
just to stay in the market. This reactive price cutting strategy 
may be viable (if their is a segment, as yet unserved, that values 
this combination of lower than average value combined with 
lower prices). But the dangers are that this move merely 
temporarily postpones the decline of the firm (Miller and Friesen 
1986b). 
. 
5.8 DERIVING PROPOSITIONS FROM THE THEORY 
Three propositions are suggested by this approach: 
P I  Firms competing on price that are also controlling costs will 
perform better in terms of profitability than firms pursuing 
price competition alone (the F4+F1 combination outperforms F4 
alone) 
Although the combination of higher perceived use value (F5) and 
cost control (F1) should produce outstanding profit performance, 
it may be that the pursuit of these two thrusts simultaneously 
would lead to neither of them being achieved (due to conflicting 
demands on the organization, Porter 1985). This suggests the 
following proposition: 
P 2  Firms trying to provide higher perceived use value, whilst 
simultaneously trying to rigorously control costs, will perform 
less well than those firms concentrating exclusively on adding 
perceived use value. 
Firms that are combining both competitive thrusts (F4 and F5) 
would be moving "northwest" in Figure 5.11. This combination 
should lead to good relative sales performance, provided the 
firm's competitors are not doing the same. 
P 3  Firms competing by offering superior productslservices and 
lower prices will perform well in terms of relative sales 
5.8.1 EXPLORING THE PROPOSITIONS 
To properly investigate these propositions would require a 
dedicated study. However, from the SBU database it is possible 
to gain some insights into the strategy and performance 
relationships set out in the propositions. 
In order to investigate these propositions the SBUs were 
categorised thus: 
+ if the SBU had a mean factor score that was positive and it 
exceeded : 
1.96 ((Standard Deviation)/ (Square Root N)) 
(N = number of respondents from the SBU) 
the SBU was categorised as pursuing this orientation. 
+ SBUs were then grouped in appropriate combinations to test 
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each proposition. 
P I  Firms competing on price that are also controlling costs 
will perform better in terms of profitability than firms pursuing 
price competition alone (the F4+F1 combination outperforms F4 
alone). 
13 SBUs were grouped as competing on price (Factor 4). Of these 
six were also in the "cost control" (Factor 1) group. Comparing 
the mean profit performance of those SBUs that were, and those 
that were not emphasising cost control did not produce a 
statistically significant result (p=0.215). However, the mean 
profit performance for the cost control SBUs was 3.98, compared 
to those not emphasising cost control of 2.99. There would, then, 
appear to be some support for the proposition. 
P2 Firms trying to provide higher perceived use value, whilst 
simultaneously trying to rigorously control costs, will perform 
less well than those firms concentrating exclusively on adding 
perceived use value. 
The mean profit performance for the group of SBUs that were 
pursuing a strategy of offering superior products/services 
without emphasising cost control was higher than for those SBUs 
seeking to combine the two thrusts. (Factor 5 alone: 4.43; Factor 
5 and Factor 1 : 3.1 88; p = 0.06). Thus the proposition is 
supported. 
This would suggest that there are clear choices that have to be 
made in organizations. An SBU's competitive strategy can be 
compromised if there is an overemphasis on cost control. It 
seems that organizations cannot easily manage two strategic 
thrusts simultaneously if they have quite different orientations: 
the drive to control costs encourages managers to look inside the 
organization; trying to add perceived use value requires the 
management to focus their attention outside the organization, 
towards customers and competitors. 
Thus, one of justifications offered by Porter in support of the 
generic strategy concepts is supported here. Managers need to 
make a choice to avoid being "stuck-in-the-middle". But in 
Porter's approach the choice was between being the lowest cost 
producer, and being a premium priced differentiator. In the case 
being argued here the choice is between offering superior 
products or services (with the management having a strong 
market1 customer needs orientation), or trying to control costs 
(but not trying to be the lowest cost producer in the industry). 
Thus the strategic alternatives are not so obviously 
dichotomised. 
This would suggest that, from a managerial perspective, there 
are risks attached to a strategy that tries to combine a 
competitive strategy which is based on offering superior 
products with a strong cost control thrusts. It could be that cost 
control priorities "drive out" or override priorities concerned 
with providing superior products or services. Experience gained 
through conducting strategy workshops with TMTs for a variety 
of SBUs (explained more fully in Chapter 6) indicates that 
managers are much more comfortable with inward-looking, 
measurable, controllable cost orientated strategies, than they 
are with outward-orientated, customer focussed competitive 
strategies. If this is a general problem, a "dual" strategy that 
combines both orientations runs the risk of the cost orientation 
predominating. 
P3 Firms competing by offering superior products/services and 
lower prices will perform well in terms of relative sales. 
Only 2 SBUs combine Factor 5 with Factor 4 (see Figure 5.12). 
Hence this potentially successful (in relative sales terms) 
combination of strategic thrusts is not commonly realised in the 
sample of SBUs. SBUs tend to opt for either going "north" (adding 
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perceived use value), or going "west" (competing on price). This 
finding can be explained as follows: 
* by adding perceived use value, the firm does not need to cut 
price in order to maintain or improve its market position. 
as argued above, firms competing on price may not have 
proactively opted for this strategy. They may be forced to cut 
price because they are unable to compete by offering better 
perceived use value. Hence the organizational circumstances that 
have led to the need to compete on price are unlikely to coexist 
with perceived priorities to enhance the value of the 
products/services being offered. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the questionnaire was constructed around Porter's 
Generic Strategies, the exploration of the five factor "solutiont', 
based on the questionnaire data, has provided some useful 
developments in our understanding of competitive strategy. The 
five factor solution has been developed into a "managerial 
theory" of competitive strategy. I have used this approach with 
management groups instead of the Porter approach with a good 
deal of success. The framework can be developed to raise 
important issues about competitive strategy in discussions 
with management groups, in ways that managers find easy to 
relate to. In particular, the framework can encourage debates 
about: 
the attractiveness of competing on price, and how to 
sustain advantage through a price competitive strategy 
problems of adding perceived value, and the need to 
understand what i t  is that our target customers do value (and 
how these values may be changing) 
how moves "north" can be imitated, and the effects that 
this process has on ratcheting upwards consumers minimum 
acceptable quality standards 
how firms can sustain advantage by moving "north" (adding 
perceived use value), through multiple sources of difference, a 
tailored organization, and through product innovation 
issues about segmentation: deciding which ground to 
compete on before determining how to compete 
* the need to control costs regardless of the route to 
competitive advantage adopted 
the consequences of not moving north, or west 
* how to enter new markets and gain competitive advantage 
Thus this theoretical framework derived from managerial 
perceptions provides a valuable vehicle for strategy debate. 
However, the five factor solution emerged from the Porter based 
questionnaire. If managers were not constrained by these 
statements they may well reveal a different set of realised 
strategy types. This opportunity is discussed further in Chapter 
7. 
CHAPTER SIX 
ISSUES IN GROUP PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC 
PRIORITIES: FUNCTIONAL BIAS, INDUSTRY RECIPES, AND 
STRATEGY DEBATES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
It was argued in Chapter 1 that managers interpret stimuli 
through a perceptual process (see Figure 6.1). Stimuli emanating 
from within the organization, or from outside the organization, 
are classified and categorized to facilitate interpretation 
(Stubbart 1989; Hambrick and Mason 1984). It has been argued 
that the cognitive frameworks that managers use in this 
interpretive process are not purely individual phenomena (Beyer 
1981). The sets of beliefs and assumptions that comprise these 
organization-level frameworks have been variously referred to 
as "myths" (Hedberg and Jonsonn 1977), "paradigms" (Sheldon 
1980; Johnson 1987), and "cognitive systems" (Daft and Weick 
1 984). 
Huff (1982) argues that a manager's strategic concepts derive 
from experience, and that a manager is influenced by not only the 
organization but also by the particular industry context, and the 
general industry context in which he or she gathers experience. 
Huff argues that the industry provides a repertoire of possible 
strategic frameworks, providing models of outstanding success 
(or failure), or of mould-breaking strategic moves. But, more 
significantly she argues that the industry context provides a 
worldview which informs strategy making within the industry. 
These "meta-strategic" (Huff 1982:125), often implicit, 
assumptions are the shared beliefs which constrain strategic 
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thinking within the industry. 
Calori, Johnson and Sarnin (1991) develop this approach by 
adding two other sources of influence: the strategic group 
(within Huff's "industry group" 1982:124) and the country in 
which the firm is based. Thus there may be overlapping frames of 
reference that operate at the organizational, industry and 
country level. 
Most managers gather their experience from within a particular 
function. They may move between organizations within the same 
industry but remain in the same function. Indeed, it is possible 
for some managers to move between industries but to remain 
working in the same function (eg. accountants, sales managers). 
It is likely, therefore that the most stable source of influence in 
shaping managerial cognitions for some managers is the 
function, rather than the organization, the industry or the 
country context. Therefore an additional source of influence 
could be added to the extended Huff (1982) model (see Figure 
6.2). 
Studies that have sought to explore the existence and strength of 
the different sources of influence that shape managerial 
cognitive structures have tended to focus on cognitive maps or 
schemas (Huff 1990; Calori et al 1991). These maps are attempts 
to represent the set of constructs that are perceived by 
managers to be significant, and the links between these 
constructs. The emphasis is more on the understanding of 
cognitive processes. This present study focusses on managerial 
perceptions of a limited set of generic strategic, business level 
priorities. Thus the data refers more to the outcome of cognitive 
processes, rather than to the processes themselves. However, we 
have an opportunity to explore three sources of influence on 
managers using the manager database: 
the influence of the manager's present function 
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the influence of the industry 
the influence of the firm 
The firm level of influence has been addressed in Chapter 4. 
Where firms displayed a high level of consensus about a set of 
strategic priorities it could be argued that the firm level of 
influence is strong. In this chapter we examine a limited number 
of firms in some detail. Firms have been selected that either 
provide interesting examples of patterns of managerial 
perceptions, or are ones where the surfacing of managerial 
perceptions played a significant part in advancing the strategy 
debate within the top management team (Bowman and Johnson 
1991) .  
In order to explore function influence the manager database has 
been used to isolate groups of managers from the same function, 
but from different firms. The industry level of influence is 
addressed by grouping managers from within the Regional 
Newspaper industry. Function influence and industry influence 
are identified by comparing the perceptions of the function, or 
industry grouping with all other managers in the database. 
6.2 FUNCTIONAL BIAS IN PERCEPTION OF STRATEGIC 
PRIORITIES 
Structural differentiation (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), and 
horizontal specialisation (Mintzberg 1979) have been important 
aspects of research into organizations for many years (Miller 
1987). Highly differentiated structures are required to cope 
effectively with complex environments, but they require 
sophisticated integrating devices to coordinate activity across 
the organization (Mintzberg 1979; Galbraith 1973). In highly 
differentiated structures managers from different functions 
will develop particular priorities, and may work to differing 
time horizons (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Mintzberg explains 
that :  
"Functional structure ... encourages specialisation, for 
example, by establishing career paths for specialists within 
their own area of expertise, by enabling them to be supervised by 
one of their own, and by bringing them together to encourage 
social interaction" (Mintzberg 1983a:59) 
These processes and influences are likely to lead to managers 
from different functions within the organization perceiving 
different priorities. Mintzberg goes on to argue that: 
"The emphasis on narrow specialty detracts from attention to 
broader output. Individuals focus on their own means, not the 
organization's broader ends." (Mintzberg 1983a:59) 
Dearborn and Simon's (1 958) study into managerial perceptions 
concluded that "each executive will perceive those aspects of a 
situation that relate specifically to the activities and goals of 
his department" (Dearborn and Simon 1958342) and that "the 
criteria of selection [used by executives] have become 
internalized" (1 958:143). Newman (1 988) suggests that 
department managers tend to think in limited scope, and for a 
relatively short time span. 
Hambrick (1 987) points out the problems if  the Top Management 
Team share the same functional background: 
"The CEO .... concluded that his team of highly analytic, 
engineering educated managers (including himself) were at a 
loss in comprehending and anticipating a new environment 
unfolding around them .... The CEO complained, 'We're typical 
engineers. We wait for data to become clear, firm, and graphable. 
By the time that happens, today's competition has passed us by.'" 
(Hambrick 1987:95) 
A distinction has been made between horizontal specialisation 
and vertical specialisation (Mintzberg 1983:26-8). In addition to 
functional specialisation (horizontal), managers at different 
levels of the organization may have different perceptions of 
strategic priorities. For example, Ireland et al (1987) argue that 
the mental representations managers have of the world will 
probably be historical in nature, and the historical experiences 
on which they are based will vary across management levels 
(Ireland, Hitt, Bettis and de Porras 1987). 
Hambrick (1 981) has confirmed a decline in "strategic 
awareness" at descending levels of the managerial hierarchy; 
middle managers were less aware of their firm's strategy than 
were top managers. Therefore, the perceptions of a middle 
manager within a function are likely to be influenced by both his 
functional experience, and his position in the vertical hierarchy. 
(The influence of hierarchical level on perceptions of strategic 
priorities is not explored here, but it would add a further 
dimension of influence that could be the subject of future 
research). 
Managers are likely to pay more attention to more recent events, 
and the salience of information (Kiesler and Sproull 1982) will 
also influence the extent to which information becomes 
incorporated in the managers "schema". As a result, Ireland et al 
argue that "technical-level" managers will perceive different 
strength and weakness indicators from top level managers 
(Ireland et al 1987:473). 
Stevenson (1 976) concluded that "position in the organization, 
perceived role, and type of responsibility" influence the 
assessment of strengths and weaknesses (Stevenson 1976:55), 
an outcome supported by Ireland et al (1 987). Hambrick (1 981a) 
argues that the role of a function in coping with the 
organization's critical contingencies is positively related to 
power, hence, functional influence is likely to be differentially 
weighted according to the organization's circumstances. 
Walsh (1988), in his attempt to replicate and extend Dearborn 
and Simon's research, argues that exposure to a department's 
goals and activities is likely to shape a manager's conception of 
organizational success (Walsh 1988:875). And 
"Given that belief structures define individual's domains of 
attention and structure experience, manager's problem 
identification in an ill-structured decision situation should 
occur within the bounds of their belief structure's content ...[ he 
hypothesises that] In ill-structured decision situations, 
managers are only likely to identify problems that are from the 
same functional domain as the content of their belief structures" 
(Walsh 1988:876) 
Walsh (1988) tests this and other hypotheses using a similar 
methodology to that used by Dearborn and Simon (1958). 
However, his results only offer some "marginal support" for this 
hypothesis, and Walsh concludes that management scholars have 
too readily seized upon the "simple minded view of the simple 
minded manager", and that the managers in his study did not 
"emerge as simple minded information processors" (Walsh 
1988:891). He adds that: 
"The fact that Dearborn and Simon's evidence of selective 
perception is still so often cited reflects a good deal of concern 
about the effects of cognitive simplification on the practice of 
management" (Walsh 1988:891) 
In interpreting Walsh's findings it is important to take into 
account one important methodological weakness in his research 
that stems from the sample of managers used. These were 121 
managers who were attending a university-based executive 
masters degree program. Walsh's conclusion that "few managers 
viewed their organizational worlds along narrow functional 
criteria" (Walsh 1988:887) cannot be reasonably generalized to 
other groups of managers who are not in the special 
circumstances of his sample group. Indeed, it would be worrying 
and disappointing, if, after some time on such a development 
programme, these managers did not take a broader, non- 
functional perspective of the case they were asked to analyse 
(Walsh 1988:878). This would suggest that, a more 
representative sample of managers, that were not singled out by 
their organizations for special executive development (Walsh 
1988:890), may produce more generalizable results. 
Ireland et al (1987) suggest that research could usefully be 
conducted into the influence of managerial function on 
perceptions of strengths and weaknesses (Ireland et al 
1987:482). Strength and weakness analysis often forms part of 
the analytical phase of strategic planning. Strategic priorities, 
the focus of this current research, can be conceived of as 
outcomes of strategic analysis (or they may emerge from other 
processes, as explained in Chapter 1). 
It has been argued earlier (Chapters 1 and 3) that strategic 
priorities are a "super-functional" construct, associated not 
with the day-today concerns of particular functional managers, 
but with the overall thrust of SBU competitive strategy. In this 
way, it is conceivable that managers across a functionally 
structured SBU could perceive the same strategic priorities 
pertaining to the SBU as a whole, whilst, at the same time, they 
may perceive quite different functional priorities. The 
arguments advanced concerning the benefits of consensus 
(Chapter 2) centred on the advantages stemming from the 
alignment of managers from different levels and from different 
functions about a set of strategic level priorities. 
In their influential study, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) identified 
goal orientation as one of four dimensions of structural 
differentiation. They concluded that high performing 
organizations coped with environmental uncertainty through 
having highly differentiated structures combined with effective 
integrating mechanisms. Within functions the goal orientations 
were as they predicted (eg sales concerned with customers. 
competitors activities; production concerned with cost reduction 
and process efficiency). Integration was achieved across the 
differentiated functions through effective procedures, practices, 
and attitudes; confronting differences and conflicts between 
functions proved to be more effective than smoothing over them. 
These findings could be interpreted as arguments against 
consensus. That, for an SBU to be effective it is necessary for 
each function to pursue its own goals, without diluting or 
diverting effort by moderating these priorities. Integration 
devices and activities (Mintzberg 1983a) will ensure that the 
disparate concerns of functional specialists are coordinated to 
achieve SBU level goals. 
However, administrative scientists have long been "interested in 
understanding the kinds of work experiences that might preclude 
the development of the kind of functional area tunnel blindness 
observed by Dearborn and Simon" (Walsh 1989: l l ) .  And job 
rotation across the functional areas has been recommended as an 
antidote to "functional fixedness" (Katz 1982) and "strategic 
myopia" (Lorsch 1985:84). 
The results of the present investigation into consensus reveal 
support for the positive effects of consensus on SBU 
performance (Chapter 4 Hypothesis 8). Consensus about positive 
strategic priorities is related to SBU performance. 
In explaining this relationship it could be argued that agreement 
across functions about SBU level priorities acts as an 
integrating or coordinating process (Mintzberg 1989: lOl ) .  
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) refer to "integration" being effected 
through various coordinating mechanisms . Using Mintzberg's 
(1 989:101) terminology, these would be: mutual adjustment 
(integrating cornmittees/teams, informal communication 
channels), standardization of work processes (control and 
scheduling procedures), and direct supervision (the "chain of 
corn mand') . 
Subsequent to his major work on structure (Mintzberg 1979) 
which refers to five coordinating mechanisms, Mintzberg has 
added a sixth, standardization of norms (Mintzberg 1989:lOl).  
Here the intention is to integrate activity through everyone 
functioning according to the same set of beliefs. Walsh (1988) 
comments, in explaining his results (which appeared to 
contradict those of Dearborn and Simon 1958) that: 
"...there was a chief financial officer with a manufacturing 
belief structure, an assistant marketing manager with an 
accounting-finance belief structure, and a supervisory engineer 
with a marketing belief structure. Perhaps these managers are in 
the wrong jobs or work in companies with strong cultures 
that have supplanted the traditional functional 
orientations of their jobs." (Walsh 1988:888) 
Thus Walsh is suggesting that in these cases the organizational 
influence plays a stronger role in shaping belief structures than 
functional influence; functional biases may have been supplanted 
by the "standardization of norms" (Mintzberg 1989). 
The deliberate shaping of values and beliefs has become an 
increasingly explicit strategic management process (Peters 
1987:399): "visions". "missions" and statements of values are 
becoming an important part of the strategic management 
repertoire. A strongly articulated mission statement, reinforced 
by observable top management behaviour, can, it is argued 
influence management perceptions across the organization (see 
the case examples below). In this way, high level integration of 
activity across functions can be achieved within an SBU, without 
necessarily jeopardising the benefits of within-function goal 
specialisation. In order for this to be achieved it would indicate 
that the values and priorities signalled by the "mission" must 
have cross-functional relevance, whilst at the same time, be 
interpretable through within-function activity. Priorities to do 
with cost control, and customer service, could, for example, 
serve these dual purposes if they were perceived to be pertinent 
across the SBU. Cost control can be interpreted within each 
function, and actions can be taken in line with this priority. The 
shared priority of cost control should also help to coordinate 
interactions between functions. The same reasoning can be 
applied to customer service. 
From this discussion two issues are raised which can be 
investigated through the analysis of the management database. 
1) Do functional managers from different SBUs perceive 
similar priorities? 
2) If there are systematic biases in perceptions within 
functional groupings across SBUs, are these biases of strategic 
level priorities linked to functional concerns? 
6.3 TESTING FOR FUNCTIONAL BIAS IN PERCEPTIONS OF 
STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
To explore these questions the managerial database was 
investigated to identify three groups of functional managers: 
managers in a finance, or an accounting position; those from 
production or operations; and those from sales and marketing 
positions. The selection of these functional groups is in line 
with Dearborn and Simon (1958), and they represent Miles and 
Snow's (1978) "output" functions (marketing and sales), 
"throughput" functions (production), and Hayes and Abernathy's 
peripheral functions (financelaccounting) (Hayes and Abernathy 
1 980). 
[The few company secretaries in the database were included 
with the financelaccounting group, as it was conceivable that 
the a priori explanations of bias amongst accountants (their 
training, their position in the organization) may also apply to 
company secretaries.] 
In contrast to the sample used by Walsh (1988) these managers 
were not on an executive masters degree programme. The 
managers generally completed the questionnaires prior to their 
involvement in any management or strategy development 
programme. And most of the subset of managers that comprised 
the SBU database (600 of the 1109 managers) were not involved 
in any management or strategy development programme either 
before or after completing the questionnaire. Thus the sample 
would appear to be more representative of the population of 
managers than that used by Walsh (1988). Hence it would be 
reasonable to suggest that the results of analyses based on this 
sample would be more generalizable to the wider management 
population. 
The managers are classified according to the functional position 
that they held at the time of completing the questionnaire. 
Although there is a strong likelihood that the managers would 
have spent some years in the function, it cannot be ruled out that 
some managers may have only recently gained any experience in 
the particular function. 
6.3.1 FINANCEIACCOUNTING MANAGERS 
In order to identify managers for the financelaccounting group 
the manager database was examined. Where a manager identified 
his function as solely either finance, accounting or company 
secretarial he or she was allocated to this group. This excludes 
those managers that identified their roles as combining one of 
these functions with, for example, personnel, or administration. 
For each group the mean ratings for the 21 statements in the 
questionnaire were compared with all other managers in the 
database. The differences between means were tested for 
signif icance. 
The mean ratings for this group (numbering 62 out of the 
database of 1109) were compared to the "non-accountant group" 
(1 047). The means for the accountants group were significantly 
different (at the p = 0.05 level) from the other managers on 
seven of the 21 statements: 
Statements Rated Significantly Lower By Accounts/Finance 
managers: 
2. The strategic direction we are now pursuing represents a 
significant change from that pursued in the past 
14. Currently, we are trying to operate this business in 
significantly different ways to those we have in the past 
16. The organizational structure and/or processes we are 
now using represent a noticeable change from our recent past 
7. We regularly develop new products/services, or 
significantly change the line of products/services we offer 
9. We try to offer unique products/services enabling us to 
charge premium prices 
15. As our customers are very price sensitive, we devote 
considerable 
time and effort into improving efficiency 
18. We aim to offer superior products/services to those of 
our competitors 
The following statement was rated Significantly Higher by 
Accounts/Finance Managers: 
20. We try to operate this business in much the same way 
today as we have in the past 
In general, then, compared to other managers, the 
accounts/finance managers perceive that their SBUs are 
experiencing less change (in strategic direction, business 
processes, new product development, structures and processes). 
They also perceive, compared to other managers, in terms of the 
the statements supplied to them in the questionnaire, that their 
SBUs are not striving for product/service superiority, nor are 
they in pursuit of efficiency. 
These findings would suggest that the particular experiences of 
the accountsifinance managers have resulted in them forming 
different perceptions of their organizations to those of other 
managers. The accounts/finance managers perceive both 
differentiation and cost statements lower than their colleagues. 
On all but one of the strategy related statements the 
accountants had lower mean scores (the exception was 
Statement 13: "We carefully monitor operations to keep our 
costs under control"). 
In seeking to explain these results, it could be argued that 
finance and accounts managers, and company secretaries, are 
somewhat remote from the operational imperatives of the 
business. Hence, their low rating of statements concerned with 
competitive strategy may reflect their true perceptions of the 
organization's strategic activity. It may be that their relative 
isolation from the day-to-day concerns of their colleagues in, 
say, production, or sales result in their not perceiving strong 
priorities, other than the monitoring of operating costs (for 
which the "accountants" have a slightly higher than average mean 
score). 
This explanation is supported by this group's above average 
perception of organizational stability. The "accountants" rate 
Statement 2 (Change in strategic direction), Statement 7 
(regular new product development), Statement 14 (Change in 
business operations), and Statement 16 (Change in structures 
and processes) all significantly lower than the other managers in 
the database (at the p=0.05 level). Furthermore, Statement 20 
("We try to operate this business in much the same way today as 
we have in the past") is scored significantly higher than the 
other managers by the "accountants" (at the p=0.05 level). 
The perception of lower levels of change (compared to other 
managers) may support the suggestion that the "accountants" are 
somewhat removed from the centre of the business. Managers 
from other functions are perceiving change, but change is not 
impacting to the same extent upon the accountants' perceptions. 
These results indicate that there is evidence of functional bias 
across a mixed group of SBUs (of different size, and industry). 
The direction of bias may be explained by the particular roles 
accounts/finance managers play in most SBUs. They are usually 
occupying "staff" positions (they may be "support staff" or 
members of the "technostructure" (Mintzberg 1983a)), which 
distinguishes them from "line" managers ( for  example, 
production or sales managers). Both technostructure activities, 
and support staff activities are removed from the "operating 
work flow" (Mintzberg 1983a:15). Hence the experiences of 
managers who advance their careers in these non-line functions 
are likely to be different from those from the line (those from 
the "operating core", the "middle line" and the "strategic apex" 
Mintzberg 1983a). 
We shall now explore the perceptions of the first of the two 
groupings of "line" managers: the production and operations 
managers. 
6.3.2 PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGERS 
Managers from production functions were identified, and a 
similar comparison of means to those for the accounts managers, 
was undertaken. Managers who described their positions as 
either production directorlmanager, works directorlmanager, or 
manufacturing directorlmanager were identified in the database, 
and grouped. 
Of the strategy related statements the production managers had 
ten means that were higher than the non-production group, and 
five that were lower. Six of the ten higher means were 
statistically significant (at the p=0.05 level), and they all relate 
to cost control, and price competition (statements 1, 5, 6, 11, 
19, 21). 
An instrument has been developed assist in the interpretation of 
these results: the "Strategy Fingerprint". This device reflects the 
"managerial theory" of competitive strategy developed in Chapter 
5. This "Strategy Fingerprint" groups the statements according to 
the Five Factor solution explained in Chapter 5 (ie Cost control, 
Compete on price, Superior products, New product development, 
and Change). For each statement the mean is plotted, and the 
standard deviation for each statement is also recorded. In this 
way agreement about particular statements can be noted (ie a 
low standard deviation, a rule of thumb would be less than 1 .O, 
indicates that most managers rated the statement close to the 
mean). 
The scales used to plot the SBU means on the fingerprint have 
been adjusted to locate the mean from the whole management 
database at the middle line. In this way the interpretation of 
statements that were rated generally high, or  low, in the 
management database (eg Statement 1, and Statement 19) is 
facilitated. The Production Managers have been plotted on a 
Strategy Fingerprint, and their means can be compared with the 
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means for all the other managers in the database (See Figure 
6.3). 
These results would suggest that production managers' 
perceptions of SBU level strategic priorities strongly reflect 
their functional concerns. These managers perceive strong 
priorities to control costs, and they also perceive that, compared 
to other managers, their customers are price sensitive. 
Production activities generally lend themselves to direct 
measurement and control of costs. Similarly, measures of 
output, productivity, capacity utilization tend to well developed 
in most manufacturing SBUs. Indeed, one of the major 
responsibilities of the technostructure is to devise ways to 
monitor and control production activities (Mintzberg 1983a:15). 
Non-line functions like R & D, or training, are not likely to be 
subjected to the same perpetual cost scrutiny as production, 
firstly because these non-line functions are not likely to form a 
substantial component of a typical manufacturing SBU's costs, 
and secondly, because systems for measuring productivity in 
these areas are not well developed. 
For these reasons, production managers are more likely to 
experience cost pressures than non-production managers, which 
would in turn, influence their perceptions of SBU strategic 
p r io r i t i es .  
6.3.3 SALES AND MARKETING MANAGERS 
A third group of managers, those from sales and marketing 
functions, was also identified, and the means compared with all 
other managers. It could be argued that, if managers perceive 
strategic priorities that are in line with functional goals, then 
statements concerned with superior products, and uniqueness 
would be emphasised by sales and marketing managers. 
The "sales" manager group (170 managers) had only two means 
that were significantly different (at the p = 0.05 level) from all 
other managers: these were Statement 17 ("Information about 
sales performance is considered to be more important than cost 
control information"), and Statement 18 ("We aim to offer 
superior products/services to those of our competitors"). In both 
cases the "sales" managers had means that were higher than the 
other managers (significant at the p=0.01 level). 
The result for Statement 17 (Sales performance information) 
would be expected. These managers are more likely to feel the 
pressure to meet sales performance targets, than cost control 
targets (cf the production managers). The higher mean for 
Statement 18 would support a view that sales managers perhaps 
believe that the products/services being offered by their SBUs 
are superior; without some conviction they may well perform 
poorly, and be unable to lead their sales teams effectively. 
These possible links between functional responsibilities and 
experience, and perceptions of strategic priorities suggest areas 
for further study. In particular, whether bias in perceptions 
helps or hinders the implementation of SBU strategy. As 
explained earlier, the position argued in Chapter 2 in support of 
the benefits of "consensus" (ie no significant functional bias) 
involved the supposed advantages of all managers, from all 
functions, perceiving the same broad strategic direction. This 
consensus, it was argued would, inter alia, help to reduce inter- 
functional conflicts, and misunderstandings, and thus facilitate 
the integration of efforts across the SBU. 
However, the tentative findings from these tests would suggest 
that perceptions influenced by functional background may 
nevertheless be resistant to attempts to unify perceptions of 
SBU priorities (if, indeed, these attempts had been made). The 
day-to-day imperatives stemming from the subset of the 
organizational task allotted to a function may have more 
significance to managers than broader, SBU level exhortations. 
Furthermore, in the absence of any coherent SBU strategy. 
parochial, functional concerns may loom largest in the 
perceptions of managers. 
(One of the firms selected for more detailed exploration in the 
last part of the chapter (Case "C") is an example of functional 
bias wi th in an SBU) 
6.4 INDUSTRY INFLUENCES ON PERCEPTIONS OF 
STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
In this section we explore the concept of industry bias in 
perceptions of strategic priorities. The section opens with a 
brief discussion of industry bias, including some suggestions 
about how shared perceptions may emerge in an industry, and 
some of the consequences of strong shared perceptions. Then the 
SBUs from the Regional Newspaper industry are analysed to test 
for evidence of industry bias. 
6.4.1 INDUSTRY "RECIPES" 
As explained at the beginning of the chapter, the industry in 
which the manager gains his or her experience may be influential 
in the formation of cognitive structures used to interpret the 
world. Huff (1 982) and Calori et al (1991) recognise the 
potential importance of industry context on shaping managers' 
perceptions. 
Industry-wide patterns of belief have been referred to as 
"recipes" (Grinyer and Spender 1979). The "recipe" acts as "a 
powerful orienting framework, filtering the buzzing, blooming 
confusion of the world to admit only that believed relevant" 
(1979:117). The existence of a recipe could lead to strategies, at 
the business level, whose "fundamental rationality is shared 
within the industry" (1979:118). 
Schwenk (1984) argues that managers use "heuristics" as 
cognitive simplification mechanisms, which are derived from, in 
part, industry experience. And Mazzolini (1 981) suggests that 
the search for alternative solutions in strategic decision making 
is constrained by routines, guidelines and standard operating 
procedures. These "guidelines" may be shared across firms in the 
same industry. 
Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989) suggest that decision 
makers: 
"construct a mental model of the competitive environment 
which consists minimally of two types of beliefs: beliefs about 
the identity of the firm, its competitors, suppliers and 
customers, and causal beliefs about what it takes to compete 
successfully within the environment which has been identified" 
(Porac et al 1989:399) 
They go on to argue that because of indirect and direct imitative 
tendencies over time, the mental models of competing 
strategists become similar, thereby creating "group level" 
beliefs about the market place (Porac et al 1989:400). Indirect 
imitation occurs because strategists from different firms face 
similar technicallmaterial problems with a finite number of 
solutions. Direct imitation occurs because of both formal and 
informal communications among the set of competitors. The 
result of imitation is that "the strategic choices of individual 
firms take place within the context of many shared beliefs about 
how and with whom to engage in transactions in the 
marketplacet' (Porac et a1,1989:400). 
In explaining the processes of recipe formation Nisbett and Ross 
(1 980) have suggested that decision makers are especially 
susceptible to one or a very few vividly described cases. These 
cases can play the role of exemplars or "prototypes" (Stubbart 
1989). These descriptions may be far more influential in shaping 
beliefs about how to compete in an industry than objective 
statistical data. Simplistic analogies, and rules of thumb, can 
have profound effects in shaping shared beliefs across an 
industry (Duhaime and Schwenk 1985). 
For example, the TMT of an office equipment company (used as 
one of the cases in the final part of this chapter, Case C) 
reported a shared belief within the industry that there was a 
strong correlation between the number of salesmen a firm 
employed and market share. This relationship was summarised as 
the "feet on the street" effect. However, although there was no 
reliable statistical evidence to support the relationship, it 
seemed to be highly influential in shaping the competitive 
strategy of the firm (they hired more sales staff, and reduced 
staff in the service departments). 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) in their empirical 
study of strategic decisions, point out that, as a first course of 
action, decision makers search within their memories for 
solutions. Their memories are likely to contain examples of 
actions taken by themselves, their organizations or their 
competitors that are exemplars of what to do (and what not to 
do) to achieve success in their industry. And Alexander (1979) 
refers to "intuitively perceived and non-formalized constraints" 
which are applied before any alternatives (to the preferred 
option) are thoroughly explored (Alexander 1979:397; and also 
Mason and Mitroff 1981). Thus the limited search for 
alternatives, and the constraints of memory are likely to lead to 
decisions and actions that are in line with the industry recipe, 
and which then serve to reinforce the recipe. 
In order for recipes to emerge there must be communication 
across firms in the industry. This can take a number of forms: 
trade associations; informal contacts between executives; 
frequent movement of managers between firms in the industry. 
Huff (1982) suggests that industry groups and other industry- 
wide organizations provide organized sense-making forums. 
Gronhaug and Falkenberg (1 989) explain that information about 
competitors is obtained by scanning business magazines and 
newspapers, through marketing intelligence, and through gossip. 
Newman (1988) argues that functional specialists engage in sub- 
sets of the external environment. These "boundary spanning" 
activities include exploring the industry, markets and resources, 
learning about plans of rivals, and building informal industry 
networks (see also Mintzberg 1973, the "monitoring" role of the 
CEO). Newman (1 988) suggests that: 
"as functional activities become professionalized, 
departmental personnel may feel more congenial with people 
doing similar work in other companies than they do with peers in 
different departments of their own company . . . .  many 
[departmental managers] will take their values from the outside 
industry norms" (Newman 1988:6) 
Thus formal and informal linkages established and maintained at 
the functional level across the industry can provide a conduit to 
enable industry norms and beliefs to be introduced, reinforced 
and changed. Mintzberg (1983) points out that, to those engaged 
in "professional" work: 
"the organization is almost incidental, a convenient place to 
practice their skills. They are loyal to their profession, not the 
place they happen to practice it." (Mintzberg 1983:208) 
Shared beliefs about, inter alia, how to compete in an industry 
can be developed and reinforced through many levels of 
"organizational functioning" (Neilsen and Rao 1987). The beliefs 
and assumptions can be incorporated in explicit plans and 
mission statements, they can be incorporated in informal 
discussions of intentions and actions, and they can take the form 
of unspoken (but conscious) prejudices and assumptions. Lastly, 
they may be buried deep, beyond the organization member's 
awareness. Clearly, the more explicit the shared assumptions the 
more open they are likely to be to challenge and discussion. 
Johnson (1 987,1990) refers to the importance of surfacing these 
beliefs in advancing strategy debates (see also Mason and Mitroff 
1981). (This theme is taken up later in this chapter.) 
Industry recipes are likely to emerge in stable industry 
environments, that are probably mature, and that may be 
regulated to some degree (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987). The 
objective conditions in the industry may, in any event, severely 
constrain the strategy maker's ability to exercise choice 
(Aldrich 1979). Furthermore, perceived "configurations" of 
strategy, environment and structure variables (Miller, Droge, and 
Toulouse 1988) may further serve limit the range of perceived 
options available to the firm (Miles and Snow 1978). And 
strategy prescriptions (like Porter's Generic Strategies) may 
lead to most competitors within the same industry coming to the 
same conclusions about intended strategy (eg "our's is a 
commodity business; we must therefore strive to be the lowest 
cost producer in the industry"). 
6.4.2 PROBLEMS WITH RECIPES 
Strong industry recipes can pose problems for incumbents in an 
industry. Stubbart (1 989) suggests that "informational 
asymmetries can offer competitive advantage, because "real" 
competitors may be able to escape attention i f  they lie outside 
others' definition" (1989:334). And Smircich and Stubbart (1985) 
point out that 
"what everyone knows about an industry translates into an 
opportunity for those who do not know. Macy, i f  not most, really 
novel and exciting new strategies that invade an industry, are 
perpetrated by outsiders who do not know the rules." (Smircich 
and Stubbart 1985:729) 
These "rules" or assumptions, if unexamined, can cause 
persistent problems in strategic decision making. As Tversky and 
Kahneman (1 974) note: "heuristics are quite useful, but 
sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors" (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974:1125). 
Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989) explain how membership 
of a "primary competitive group" (a collection of firms who 
define each other as rivals) constrains the possible strategies 
for differentiating one firm from others within the group (an 
example of Neilsen and Rao's "reciprocal typification" 1987:528). 
Porac et al's research reveals the recipe for competing in the 
Scottish Knitwear industry as follows: 
"purchase yarn from local spinners, sell sweaters that will 
appeal to classically-minded high-income consumers, create a 
flexible production system that can manufacture garments in 
small lots, hire exclusive agents around the world to market 
these products, and temper the aggressiveness of one's approach 
to pricing." (Porac et al 1989:414) 
The belief of many managers is that, within this recipe, there 
are possibilities for differentiating based on subtle differences 
in design (but still within the "classic" theme). 
Gron haug and Falkenberg (1 989) observed that firms "select" 
competitors based on their reality construction, and that only a 
fraction of the potential "objectively" defined competitors may 
be included in the firm's evoked set of competitors. These 
restrictive perceptions of the competition may be shared by 
other firms (a "primary competitive group"), but they may result 
in unanticipated attacks on the group's markets from firms 
outside this "industry" definition. 
Schwenk (1984) explains that recipes can be functional if they 
help to provide stability in organizational strategy. 
Simplification, arising from shared assumptions, may increase 
the chances of successful implementation by increasing decision 
makers' confidence in a strategy and their commitment to it 
(Schwenk 1984:124). The recipe can provide a strong internal 
ideology providing normative control that reduces political 
behaviour, and that reduces the need for top management to 
exercise authority (Mintzberg 1984:211). 
If the recipe is no longer appropriate (because of, for example, 
changing consumer preferences) the adherence to it may still be 
an attractive option. Grinyer and Spender (1979) argue that: 
"although the performance of the company continues to 
deteriorate, it does so along with others, and management can 
appeal to comparatively good results in an industry suffering 
from adverse conditions beyond its control. Launching into a 
completely new recipe is, in contrast, a hazardous nd lonely step 
that may lead to even greater disaster" (Grinyer and Spender 
1979:123). 
6.4.3 TESTING FOR INDUSTRY RECIPES 
There have been few attempts to explore empirically the concept 
of and industry recipe. Grinyer and Spender called for cross 
sectional research into patterns of management beliefs and 
judgements within an industry, and Stubbart and Ramaprasad 
(1990) set out a wide ranging research agenda into managerial 
cognition, which includes the study of industry recipes 
(1 990:285). 
As reported earlier, Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1 989) have 
attempted such a study of the Scottish Knitwear industry. They 
used semi-structured interviews to explore, inter alia, whether 
there were shared beliefs and assumptions about competitors, 
and strategies across the sample of firms selected. Their 
approach enabled them to reveal quite specific recipe dimensions 
that were likely to be peculiar to that industry (eg "purchase 
yarn from local spinners"). However, other dimensions of the 
recipe were more generic in character, eg, the target market 
definition: "We're top end. We are in the market where customers 
simply want the best", and the belief that this segment is not 
price sensitive (Porac et al 1989406). 
The "Perceptions of Strategic Priorities" questionnaire 
developed in this study contains statements of a generic nature 
concerned with competitive strategy. Thus this instrument 
cannot reveal industry specific strategy dimensions. What it can 
reveal is whether managers in an industry stress certain generic 
business-level priorities when compared to a broad sample of 
managers from other industries. 
Defining the boundaries of an industry is difficult (see the 
discussion in Chapter 5). Although an attempt was made in the 
present study to proactively gather data on an industry basis (by 
sampling firms from the retail industry, and approaching them 
for assistance), this effort did not yield enough SBUs to permit a 
meaningful study of industry recipes. 
However, the SBU database does contain 11 SBUs from within the 
regional newspaper industry. The industry is fragmented (Dess 
1987; Porter 1980), and although all the SBUs are part of a large 
corporation there has been little attempt to date to address the 
strategic management of the SBUs from a corporate perspective. 
The group has grown through acquisition (a common strategy in 
the industry), and some of the SBUs in the sample have only 
recently been added to the portfolio. 
The parent group confronts four other competing newspaper 
groups (and many more smaller players) across the UK. The SBUs 
within the group compete for local advertising, and local 
newspaper sales through offering combinations of paid-for 
evening, and weekly newspapers, and weekly free newspapers. 
All firms employ a common technology in producing, printing and 
distributing newspapers. The editorial, sales and production 
management attend industry-wide conferences; and there is a 
monthly journal devoted specifically to the regional newspaper 
industry. The editorial staff, in particular, appear to this 
observer, to regard themselves as belonging to a professional 
group. And, apart from accounting and systems specialists, the 
Top Management teams of these newspaper SBUs have generally 
spent their entire careers in the industry. 
Within the industry it is common for editorial, production and 
sales staff to move between competitors. Managers have 
reported there to be few differences in the way different 
newspaper groups approach the business of printing and 
publishing regional newspapers. Within the group that forms the 
sample, staff have been moved from SBU to SBU. However, the 
group structure is such that each SBU is required to meet 
financial targets, but the strategy of the SBU is left to the SBU 
managers. Within the group, managers from different newspaper 
SBUs perceived that other SBUs in the group were potential 
competitors. The relative autonomy of the SBUs is justified on 
the basis of the fragmented nature of the industry, and the need 
for each SBU to determine its strategy to meet the local 
competitive conditions. The "standardizing" influence of the 
group HQ is weak for other reasons: 
* the group has grown through acquisition 
the group lacks a strong corporate staff 
Therefore, although the regional newspaper SBUs belong under 
the same corporate umbrella, there is little evidence of 
corporate activity to standardise strategy across the group. 
However, because the SBUs do, nevertheless belong to the same 
corporation, it would be more appropriate to argue that although 
the a priori conditions would suggest that the firms are 
effectively autonomous entities, i f  evidence of shared 
perceptions of strategic priorities is observed across this 
grouping, we can only infer that this is evidence of an industry 
recipe. We must acknowledge that there may be a corporate level 
of influence operating as well. 
To explore whether a "recipe" exists in this industry the 191 
managers from the industry were grouped, and their means for 
each statement were compared to all other managers in the 
database (918 managers). On 10 of the 21 statements the 
newspaper group have significantly different means (at the 
p=0.01 level). The results are represented in the Strategy 
Fingerprint in Figure 6.4. 
The newspaper group were significantly higher (at the p=0.01 
level) than the other managers on all four of the statements that 
load onto the "price Competition" factor (Statements 11, 15, 19, 
21). The group was also higher than the rest on four of the five 
statements that load on to the cost control factor (Statements 
1, 6, 8, 13). The other two statements that were significantly 
higher were Statements 17 and 18 ("sales information" and 
"superior products"). This would suggest that: 
there is evidence of an industry "recipe" 
* that the recipe is about firms competing on price, and 
placing considerable emphasis on controlling costs. 
As Grinyer and McKiernan (1990) point out, an industry recipe 
may evolve through competitive manoeuvres that are imitated. 
And, as technology or markets change there are likely to be 
pressures on firms to rethink their ways of competing, which 
may lead to a change in recipe. The evidence provided here from 
the regional newspaper industry may represent a shared, 
industry-wide response to deteriorating market conditions. The 
regional newspaper industry relies heavily on trade advertising 
for its revenues (typically, sales of newspapers account for less 
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than 30% of revenues). In times of recession the three largest 
components of advertising revenue can fall dramatically 
(situations vacant; property; motors). The industry-wide concern 
for cost cutting, and competing on price may reflect a shared 
response to revenue decline: 
compete on price to preserve share, and to hang on to major 
accounts 
* cut costs to preserve profitability in the light of declining 
advertising revenues 
Our work with these and other newspaper SBUs in strategy 
workshops (see Appendix 6B) has surfaced that managers 
generally share a set of implicit, and largely unchallenged 
assumptions about, inter aha, what readers value in their 
products, what advertisers want, and what "quality" means. The 
industry recipe revealed here currently emphasises cost cutting 
and price competition. Therefore, one explanation for this finding 
might be that managers believe they understand what customers 
want, and that they are meeting their needs. Therefore, there is 
no point in seeking to change the products or services that they 
offer; the only other available response to difficult market 
conditions is, therefore, to cut price. And, in order to preserve 
profits, revenue declines must be matched by cost cutting. 
To conclude, there would appear to be evidence that managers 
from this group of newspaper SBUs share similar perceptions of 
strategic priorities. It has been argued here that, although these 
SBUs are from the same corporation, there is little evidence to 
support a view that the corporation has attempted, in the past, 
to encourage a corporate approach to SBU level strategy. As a 
consequence, these shared perceptions could be interpreted as 
evidence of an industry recipe. 
In order to further explore industry specific dimensions of 
business level strategy an adaptation of this approach could be 
used. For example, the interview approach adopted by Porac et a1 
(1989) to derive a set of industry specific statements. Then 
consensus within the industry around these statements could be 
measured and compared to consensus measures for other 
industries. 
In the final section of this chapter some case examples have 
been selected to illustrate organization influences on 
management perceptions of strategic priorities. In most cases 
the SBUs were involved in strategy development workshop 
activities where the surfacing of management perceptions of 
current strategic priorities formed part of the debate (Bowman 
and Johnson 1991). These workshop processes are briefly 
described in Appendix 6B below. Appendix 6A describes how the 
questionnaire has also been used in general management 
development programmes. 
6.5 ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES ON MANAGEMENT 
PERCEPTIONS: SOME CASE EXAMPLES 
Where the questionnaire has been used to assist management 
teams in strategy making workshops two visual presentations 
have been developed to present back to the managers the results 
of the analysis. The SBU Plot locates each respondent on a two 
dimensional graph. The vertical axis represents the respondent's 
"Differen tiation" Factor score (see Chapter 3), the horizontal 
axis represents the respondent's "Cost Efficiency" Factor score 
(see Figure 6.5). The SBU Plot provides an overall picture of: 
the extent of consensus within the management group 
and 
what there is consensus about (either Differentiation, Cost 
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Efficiency, both thrusts, or neither thrust). 
In addition to the SBU Plot the Strategy Fingerprint has been 
used in Case F to provide additional insights into the data. 
Seven cases have been selected. The cases illustrate the 
different ways in which the surfacing of managerial perceptions 
of strategic priorities has contributed to management thinking, 
and to strategy development. 
Case A: this explains how the surfacing of considerable 
differences in the perceptions of current strategy amongst board 
members assisted their strategic thinking 
Case B: here managerial assumptions about the commodity 
nature of their industry were revealed, which provided an 
opportunity for colleagues from other SBUs to challenge these 
assumptions 
Case C: differences in perceptions of competitive strategy 
between the TMT and functional level managers signalled to the 
TMT that their intended strategy had not been effectively 
communicated 
Case D: here the presentation of a widely scattered SBU Plot 
challenged TMT complacency 
Case E: tangible evidence of a lack of strategic direction 
confirmed managers concerns about the business 
Case F: evidence presented of a successful attempt to implant a 
strategy of focussed differentiation in the firm offered an 
opportunity to critique the strategy 
Case G: here evidence that the intended strategy of cost 
leadership had influenced management perceptions also provided 
an opportunity to challenge and criticise the strategy. 
6.5.1 CASE A 
Figure 6.6 represents the main board team of a major UK retail 
organization which had suffered some years of deteriorating 
performance. The board had been debating the need for strategic 
change for some months. The debate had proceeded as though 
members of the board had a common understanding of what the 
current strategy was and the broad direction in which it should 
be moving. To the outside observer, the espoused strategy 
seemed clear: the company had been acquired by a group, the 
chairman of which was associated strongly with the idea of 
"design excellence". As such, the stated strategy of the SBU was 
to gain competitive advantage by a merchandising and store 
design policy which emphasised the importance of customer 
orientated design. 
The questionnaire revealed considerable differences in the board 
members perceptions of current strategy (as can be seen from 
Figure 6.6). In Figure 6.6 the chief executive is A; he sees a push 
towards efficiency and low cost as the current strategy. 
However, whilst the personnel director (D) and finance director 
(C) have a similar understanding, the merchandise director (F), 
property director (E), and the development director (B) also 
believe the current strategy to be one of differentiation. 
Not only is there a difference between the views of the board 
and the espoused strategy, but the differences within the board 
are considerable, and were startling to them. It was a further 
shock for them to find that, when they looked at their senior 
management team by function (Figure 6.7) the spread of views 
was even wider. Although most of the senior managers in the 
store operations (V.W,X.Y,Z) and finance (S,T,U) functions 
coalesced around an efficiency strategy, the spread of managers 
in the merchandising function (I  to R) was initially seen as 
remarkable. However, in discussion, it emerged that it might be 
understood as a reflection of the historic role of the product 
group for which each buyer was responsible. N, a senior buyer for 
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a product range which had never been successful for the 
company, has a view of the company's strategy as 
"Impoverished". M is a senior buyer for a fashion range, with a 
view of strategy as to do with differentiation and nothing to do 
with cost or efficiency. And I is responsible for the range with 
the greatest profit contribution historically, and sees the 
company strategy as both differentiation and efficiency based. 
Differences were, then, surfaced between members of the board, 
between functions, and, in the crucial merchandising area, 
within a function. These results changed the nature of the 
strategy debate. Hitherto this had assumed a common 
understanding about the agenda for debate and the assumptions 
about strategic issues facing the SBU: it shifted towards 
unearthing and challenging fundamental assumptions about 
competitive positioning. 
6.5.2 CASE B 
This SBU produces insulation material for industrial, and 
domestic applications. It is part of a large multi-national 
corporation. The industry is highly competitive, there is excess 
capacity and fierce price competition. The managers generally 
perceive that they are in a true "commodity" industry, where 
there is no real scope to differentiate their products. 
The "realised strategy" was presented to a small group of 
managers, not including the MD, who were taking part in a 
corporate-wide executive development programme. The plot 
(Figure 6.8) surprised managers from other corporate SBUs, who 
were able to compare it to their, and other SBU plots. These had 
generally displayed a greater dispersion than the insulation SBU 
plot .  
f 
The plot did not surprise the SBU representatives on the 
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programme. They said that it merely confirmed the view that 
they were in a commodity industry. The "outlier" (A) was 
correctly identified by these managers as the Managing Director. 
He believes that the assumption that they are in a commodity 
business should be challenged, and that, through product and 
service development the SBU can find ways to avoid competing 
solely on price. The representatives on the programme then 
debated whether the MD's view was tenable. Managers from other 
SBUs put forward arguments that challenged the assumptions of 
the industry revealed through the plot (eg the core product maybe 
a commodity, but there are ways of differentiating the service 
surrounding the core product). 
The SBU managers began to concede in the discussions that it 
was possible for the accepted "rules of the game" in their 
industry to be challenged to good effect. 
6.5.3 CASE C 
The SBU is the UK subsidiary of a US based multi-national. The 
SBU markets and services a broad range of photocopiers, and 
other electronic office equipment. The questionnaire survey was 
conducted as part of a substantial initiative to improve the 
competitiveness of the business. 65 managers from the SBU were 
included in the survey representing: 
The Top Management Team (9 managers) 
* Sales (1 1 ) 
Service (1 1 ) 
Finance (1 0) 
Marketing (10) 
Human Resource Management (7) 
Overall, the survey revealed a degree of consensus around a 
strategy of differentiation. However, comparing the functional 
groups, and the TMT, with the rest of the managers in the survey 
revealed some important differences in perceptions of priorities. 
The TMT rated two statements significantly lower than the other 
managers: Statement 7 (Regular new product development; p = 
0.094) and Statement 18 (We aim to offer superior products or 
services to those of our competitors; p = 0.006). The results of a 
survey carried out for the company into managers' perceptions of 
the sources of their competitive advantage, revealed that the 
TMT rated the products fourth in importance (behind service, 
"total quality management", and staff commitment). Managers 
below the TMT rated products as the greatest source of 
competitive advantage. 
These results indicated to the TMT an important difference in 
perceptions about the company's competitive strategy which is 
now the subject of some debate. 
The sales managers rated Statement 9 significantly higher than 
the other managers (We try to offer unique products/services 
enabling us to charge premium prices; p = 0.008). This finding 
suggests that the intended strategy of the company (to be a 
"value added supplier") is reflected in the perceptions of the 
sales managers. However, the "premium price" element of the 
statement also reflects a concern of some sales managers that 
the company's products may be too high priced. 
The company offers a broad range of products, but it is 
competing against other firms who have concentrated on 
supplying narrower, more focussed product ranges. In 
discussions and interviews with managers, some sales managers 
believe that, particularly in the small volume copier market, 
they are becoming uncompetitive. There is a commonly held 
belief that their main rival in this segment "can manufacture at 
half our costs''. 
The sales managers rated Statement 13 significantly lower than 
the rest (We carefully monitor operations to help us keep costs 
under control; p = O.OOS).This appeared to reflect these 
managers' relative lack of awareness and concern for cost 
control. In the past the sales function had been protected from 
any cuts or redundancies, and salesmen are well rewarded 
through sales-linked commission payments. 
The service managers (responsible for servicing the products 
sold by the sales teams) rated three statements significantly 
differently from the rest. Whereas the sales managers rated 
Statement 9 higher than the rest, the service managers rated it 
lower (Unique products, premium prices; p = 0.002). This may 
suggest the differing experiences of these two groups of 
managers. The service managers have to deal with the installed 
products, and the customers who may be having problems with 
them. As a result of these experiences they may be less 
impressed with the "uniqueness" of the products than the sales 
managers. This view is reinforced by changes in the market 
brought about by recession. Customers are postponing the 
replacement of older machines, which are therefore requiring 
more servicing to keep them going. 
The service managers rated Statement 8 significantly higher 
than the other managers (We try hard to maintain the maximum 
feasible utilisation of our capacity/resources; p = 0.09), 
reflecting the pressure on these managers to improve the 
efficiency of their service engineers. These managers rated 
Statement 19 higher than than the rest (We aim to be the lowest 
cost producer in the industry; p = 0.051), but their mean was 
still low (2.909). Whereas the sales function have been protected 
from cuts in the past, the service function has not, which could 
explain the service managers perceptions about cost pressures. 
The financelaccounting managers rated Statement 18 higher than 
the other managers (We aim to offer superior productslservices 
to those of our competitors; p = 0.076). A suggested explanation 
for this was that theses managers, who were somewhat removed 
from the operational side of the business, nevertheless believed 
that the firm offered superior products (their mean was 4.90). 
The Human Resource managers rated four statements 
significantly higher than the other managers: 
Statement 1 (Control of operating costs; p = 0.081) 
Statement 6 (Low cost supply; p = 0.072) 
Statement 7 (Regular new product development; p = 0.099) 
Statement 10 (NPD top priority; p = 0.042) 
Hence, priorities about cost control, and product innovation were 
rated by the Human Resource managers higher than all the other 
managers in the survey. The Human Resource function is not 
highly rated by managers from other functions (and TMT 
members). It is regarded as a peripheral staff function, and its 
managers are viewed by some as being "out of touch" with the 
mainstream activity of the business. These differences of 
perception may be a consequence of this relative remoteness of 
managers from this function from the day-to-day concerns of the 
business. 
The tendency for managers from the Human Resource function to 
perceive different priorities is reinforced by the lack of 
movement of managers between this function and other 
functions. One result of Human Resource managers perceiving 
different strategic priorities could be that they would pursue 
recruitment, promotion and training policies that are not in line 
with the perceived priorities of other managers. 
6.5.4 CASE D 
This case of a regional newspaper group has been selected as an 
example as it was typical of the ten newspaper SBUs that were 
involved in a series of the strategy workshops led by the author 
(see Appendix 6B). This was a well established business, 
perceived by the very long serving and loyal staff as "part of the 
community". The group produces a mix of weekly paid-for titles, 
and some free newspapers to the local region. 
In the early phases of the workshop the management team 
approached the tasks of analysis with goodwill, but without 
urgency. There was a view shared by some that they had little to 
learn from the strategy workshop; that they understood their 
business very well (they had, after all, been running a newspaper 
business for many years); and that there was really little need to 
change. The most vociferous and eloquent proponent of these 
views was the senior editor. 
The early stages of the workshop involved the team in a 
structured analysis of the current, and future, competitive 
environment. This revealed a variety of trends that, to the 
facilitators, represented major threats or opportunities to the 
business. These included a substantial change in the industrial 
base of the region (from heavy woollen manufacturing to service 
industries); a growing immigrant population; increasing 
competition from other newspaper groups; threats by some 
major advertisers to produce their own advertising medium (eg 
estate agents, motor traders); lowering technical barriers to 
entry (desk-top publishing). 
Notwithstanding this set of major external issues, most 
members of the team remained of the opinion that there was 
little need to change. Indeed, they persisted in referring to their 
market as "the heavy woollen district", despite the fact that this 
definition would have no meaning to a newcomer to the region, 
the industry having long since gone into decline. 
The team were also very much wedded to the notion that they 
were a "newspaper business". The traditions and symbols 
reinforced this perception. The finance director revealed during 
the workshop, however, that less than of their revenue came 
from newspaper sales; the rest came from advertising. This 
came as a surprise to most of the management group. 
In trying to get the team to confront some of these "facts" the 
facilitators faced a significant attitudinal problem. The 
complacency in the team, and the satisfaction with the status 
quo only began to be shaken with the presentation of their 
"realised strategy" plot (see Figure 6.9). The spread of opinion 
revealed by the plot shocked several of the managers. Others 
looked for ways to justify the appropriateness of the dispersion. 
The net effect, however, was that the team approached the 
remainder of the workshop with far more urgency and 
commitment. One manager remarked, at the conclusion of the 
workshop, that "it was a pity we wasted the first day and a half". 
6.5.5 CASE E 
The SBU was formerly part of a large conglomerate, within 
which it suffered losses for 12 out of 14 years. Its core business 
was the supply of radio equipment; its prime customer being the 
UK Ministry of Defence. Three years ago it was the subject of a 
management buyout, financed by city institutions. 
A new MD was appointed 12 months ago, who proceeded to make 
substantial changes to the structure of the company. In 
particular, a large number of managers were dismissed, and the 
business was reorganised from a functional structure to a 
divisionalised structure. These changes had the effect of 
disorientating many of the managers who remained, accustomed 
as they were to stability and security. 
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The questionnaires were, again, used as part of a strategy 
workshop for the top managers in the business. This group 
comprised three "corporate" managers (responsible for 
marketing, finance, and business development) and the top 
managers from the two, newly formed divisions. 
The "RSD" division represented the past; this division retained 
the core, traditional activities associated with the development 
and assembly of naval radio systems. The "TD" division was 
comprised of three small SBUs engaged in various types of 
engineering development work, funded primarily by customers. 
The presentation of the "realised strategy" plot confirmed a view 
held by the facilitators that the group lacked a clear strategic 
direction (Figure 6.10). Eight of the fourteen managers appeared 
in the "Impoverished" quadrant indicating that they did not 
perceive many strategic priorities extant in the business. The 
low ratings also tended to reflect the low morale experienced by 
some managers. The fact that two of the three newly appointed 
corporate staff (A and B) shared the perceptions of a lack of 
strategic priorities tended to reinforce the concern of the MD 
and other managers that they faced a serious problem. 
The contribution of the plot to the debate was, then, to provide 
tangible evidence to support the feelings of concern and unease 
expressed by a number of managers. 
6.5.6 CASE F 
Three directors of this specialist nutrition company attended a 
general management development programme run by the author 
and a colleague. At this programme Porter's generic strategy 
concepts were presented, and the importance of choosing 
between generic strategies was discussed and advocated. 
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Eighteen months after the programme, I was approached by these 
directors to run a strategy workshop for their management team. 
As preparation for the event the managers were asked to 
complete the questionnaire. In preliminary discussions with the 
directors to determine the scope and content of the workshop, 
the directors remarked that they had been particularly impressed 
with the Porter framework, and had explored Porter's ideas 
further. They had decided that their strategy had to be that of a 
focussed differentiator, a strategy which seems appropriate 
given the specialist nature of their products (nutritional 
supplements for people with in-born, or disease-related 
intolerance to, for example, particular amino acids). 
Four months prior to the workshop, the firm was taken over by a 
Finnish company. The takeover was sought by the directors to 
free themselves of the residual involvement of the founding 
owners, and to avoid being taken over by one of two unwelcome 
suitors. Three Finns have now become members of the board. 
The plot, and the strategy fingerprint are unequivocal (see 
Figures 6.1 1 and 6.12). The managers all perceive the strategy to 
be about offering superior products, and developing new 
products. Cost efficiency, and price competition are not seen as 
part of the strategy. 
The only managers who appear to be slightly different from this 
strong consensus are two of the three Finns. They still perceive 
priorities to do with product superiority and innovation, but they 
also emphasize cost control. 
On this evidence it would appear that the efforts of the directors 
to implant a perceived strategy of focussed differentiation 
would seem to have been remarkably successful. In order to 
judge this, however, we would need to have a plot of the 
managers' perceptions prior to the efforts to implant the 
focussed differentiation strategy. 
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However, this particular example raises some interesting issues 
about strategic choice. Given the nature of this firm's products, 
and the markets it sells them into, is it likely that a different 
set of priorities would emerge (in the absence of deliberate 
attempts to shape managerial perceptions)? Could this type of 
firm conceivably pursue a strategy of cost control, and price 
competition? In other words, to what extent are the perceived 
priorities determined by the products and markets the firm 
happens to be competing in, rather than being determined by the 
management. 
These issues were raised at the strategy workshop. However, in 
place of the Porter generic strategy framework, competitive 
strategy was discussed using the "managerial theory" developed 
in Chapter 5. The group were presented with the two competitive 
thrusts (compete on price, and offer superior perceived use 
value), and the argument was put forward that, for profits to be 
made, each competitive thrust should be combined with cost 
control. I then advanced the view that 'ffocussed differentiation" 
was essentially to do with selecting the ground on which the 
firm chooses to compete; it does not explain how the firm is to 
outperform other firms perceived by customers to be offering 
close substitutes. 
Bearing in mind the strength of shared understanding within the 
UK managers about their "focussed differentiation strategy", the 
reactions to this challenge to their beliefs was interesting. One 
remarked that he had a feeling that the focussed differentiation 
strategy was rather too glib, and simplistic. One of the Finns 
remarked that he was surprised at the lack of concern for cost 
control in the firm, which was confirmed by the realised 
strategy plot. The finance director, who was one of the original 
proponents of the focussed differentiator strategy, indicated 
that he now understood why they were not making the kind of 
profits that their "niche" strategy should be delivering. 
The discussion then moved on to whether they could raise the 
concern for cost control from its present low level, without 
jeopardising their sources of uniqueness and innovation. The 
issue of "cost leadership" was raised in this context. The group 
felt that they could not, and should not try to be the lowest cost 
producer in the industry. But their reference point for this view 
was an industry definition that included manufacturers of baby 
foods. It was pointed out that it might not be relevant to 
compare their business with firms like Nestle; but they could 
become cost leaders in the small group of firms that they 
competed directly with in their specialist markets. 
The outcome of these discussions was a major revision of their 
Mission Statement and their competitive strategy. 
6.5.7 CASE G 
Subsequent to the main data collection phase of the research, an 
opportunity to conduct the research in a large multi-SBU 
corporation arose. The corporation is in glass making, and has 
manufacturing and sales organizations across the globe. This 
corporation had a "Mission Statement" which explicitly stated 
that the aim was cost leadership across all their markets (David 
1989). Thus, this provided an opportunity to explore two further 
issues: 
the extent to which an explicit statement of intent affects 
managers perceptions of strategic priorities 
the interpretation of the "cost leadership" statement 
(Statement 1 9) 
Managers from the Top Management Teams, and from functions 
beneath the TMT from 16 SBUs completed the questionnaire (a 
total of 81 managers). The means for this group were then 
compared with those for the (now expanded) management 
database (1 31 2 managers). 
Four cost related statements were rated significantly higher (at 
the p=0.01 level) by the glass corporation's managers. These 
were Statement 5 (pressure to cut overheads), Statement 8 
(maximum utilization of capacity), Statement 15 (efforts to 
improve efficiency) and Statement 19 (we aim to be the lowest 
cost producer in our industry). The corporation's managers had a 
mean for this statement of 3.605 (compared to 2.479 for the 
other managers). 
Only two other statements were rated significantly differently 
by the corporation's managers. These were to do with new 
product development: Statement 7 (regular new product 
development) rated lower by the corporation; and Statement 12 
(line of products seldom change) rated higher by the corporation. 
These findings might suggest that the efforts by the corporate 
HQ management to promulgate a cost leadership strategy have 
succeeded in affecting managerial perceptions of strategic 
priorities. However, this finding rests on the premise that, in the 
absence of a corporate mission statement the SBU managers 
would perceive strategic priorities in line with the "average" 
manager (revealed from the database). 
However, although the results cannot be used to confirm the 
effectiveness of the mission statement in changing perceptions, 
they do not run counter to this view. In order to properly explore 
this issue a longitudinal approach would be appropriate, 
sampling perceptions before and after the attempts to implant a 
shared mission. 
The results also indicate that these managers, at least, have 
interpreted Statement 19 (lowest cost) as intended. 
A group of managers representing ten SBUs from the corporation 
were presented with the "managerial theory" of competitive 
strategy developed in Chapter 5, as part of a general management 
development programme. This presentation allowed the managers 
to comment on, and critique the mission to be cost leaders in all 
markets. Managers expressed their doubts about the strategy, and 
for some, this was the first opportunity they had had to express 
these concerns openly. In particular, the problems of identifying 
competitors costs was raised as a problem. One manager 
reported that his SBU had a team of analysts trying to model 
competitors costs precisely for the purposes of implementing 
the mission. Despite the commitment of considerable amounts of 
time and resources, the team had failed to establish reliable 
indicators of competitors' costs. 
6.6 EVIDENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCE ON 
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
In some of the cases there is evidence of a high degree of 
consensus among the managers sampled from the SBU. This would 
indicate that organizational influences played a significant part 
in shaping managers' perceptions (eg. Case F: the "focussed 
differentiator"). In Case B (the insulation SBU) managers 
reported that there's was a commodity industry, which may 
suggest that their perceptions were strongly influenced by the 
industry "recipe". Cases A and D revealed a lack of consensus 
which may indicate that managers' perceptions were influenced 
by other experiences (eg. functional background). 
Functional influences were in evidence in Case C (the 
photocopier SBU), and corporate level influence seemed to be 
affecting perceptions in Case G (the glass manufacturer). Finally, 
it could be argued that the consensus about the lack of strategic 
direction in Case E (the MOD contractor) is evidence of a strong, 
but negative, organizational influence on perceptions. 
6.7 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In this chapter we have explored four important issues in 
strategic management using the "Perceptions of Strategic 
Priorities" questionnaire. First, the issue of functional bias, 
second the existence of industry recipes, third, the surfacing of 
realised strategy in discussions of SBU strategy, and fourth the 
influence of the organization on managers' perceptions of 
strategic priorities. 
In any given organizational circumstance a manager's 
perceptions of strategic priorities will be affected by a 
multiplicity of past and present influences. In this chapter we 
have explored three of these sources of influence: the functional 
position of the manager; the industry context; and the SBU 
context. Evidence has been presented that suggests that each of 
these sources of influence may play a predominant role in 
shaping managers' perceptions. In some circumstances the 
industry influence is strong (the regional newspaper SBUs; and 
Case B). Investigation of the manager database provides evidence 
of a generalised tendency for function position to influence 
perceptions, and Case C offers supporting evidence from an SBU. 
Cases F and G provide examples of successful attempts to 
influence perceptions, although in both cases there may be a 
strong industry effect which constrains strategic choice (to 
"differentiation" strategies in Case F; and to "low cost" 
strategies in Case G). 
Case E (the MOD contractor) would appear to provide an example 
of a lack of strategic direction emanating from the apex 
affecting managers' perceptions. 
A manager's perceptions of SBU strategic priorities emerge from 
a complex perceptual process (Hambrick and Mason 1984; and 
Figure 6.1). Although the evidence presented here would support 
the view that function, industry and organization influence 
perceptions, it is not at all clear how these influencing 
processes operate. For instance, why do functional influences 
appear to be more important in some circumstances? How do 
management perceptions evolve? How do they change? In what 
circumstances are organizational influences likely to 
predominate? Is functional background likely to be the "default" 
influence if there are weak organizational and industry 
influences? These interesting questions could form the basis for 
future research, which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
This chapter has demonstrated that, although the questionnaire 
is constructed around a set of generic strategy and change 
statements, it does, nevertheless, produce useful degrees of 
variance which can be fairly readily interpreted. However, the 
advantages of using this parsimonious and standardised 
instrument to investigate these diverse topics, need to weighed 
against its disadvantages. The shortcomings of the 
questionnaire, and the methodology used in this chapter are, 
again, discussed in the following, concluding chapter. 
APPENDIX 6 A  
USING THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMMES 
The questionnaire has been used in different ways in programmes 
of management development. With mixed groups of managers on 
general management programmes the questionnaire has been used 
to reflect back to the delegates their positioning on the two- 
dimensional (SBU type) plot, with "Differentiation" on the 
vertical axis, and "Efficiency1' on the horizontal. (As explained in 
Chapter 3, the manager's position on the graph is determined by 
his or her factor scores on the "Differentiation" and 
"EfficiencyICost Control" factors. Hence, if a manager appears in 
a corner of the graph, his factor score is substantially different 
from the mean score.) 
If there are two or three managers from the same firm attending 
the general management programme, then the presence or 
absence of consensus around these two axes (indicated by the 
grouping of the respondents on the graph) can be used as a basis 
for discussion. If consensus exists about, say, an "Efficiency" 
orientation, the discussion would address the appropriateness of 
this orientation, and the possible reasons for the managers 
perceiving a strong cost control orientation. These discussions 
often surfaced some interesting explanations for strong 
"Efficiency" orientations: 
ours is a "commodity" industry; there is no way to 
differentiate the productlservice 
our firm is performing badly, and there have been cuts in 
expenditure, and a tightening of budgets 
Where managers have been located in the "Impoverished" 
quadrant, discussion reveals a number of reasons for this: 
* the managers genuinely do not perceive their to be a strong 
orientation towards either efficiency, or differentiation in their 
SBU 
the managers are demotivated, and they reflect these 
negative feelings about the SBU by rating the strategy 
statements low 
Where managers are located in the "Hybrid" quadrant the 
discussion usually centres on the possible problems their SBU 
might be experiencing through the simultaneous pursuit of 
Differentiation, and Efficiency. Generally, the organizational 
difficulties and contradictions indicated by academics (Porter 
1980; Miller 1987; Mintzberg 1979) are not shared by the 
"Hybrid" respondents. This could be because they do not fully 
understand the points made by these writers (as conveyed by this 
author in the discussions, and in previous lectures to the group). 
It could be because they represent those few excellent SBUs that 
have successfully integrated these two strategic orientations. 
Or it could be that an artificial dichotomy is being made between 
the two strategic orientations, to which practising managers are 
unable to relate. 
APPENDIX 6B 
USING THE QUESTlONNAlRE IN STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 
WORKSHOPS 
The questionnaire has been effectively employed in strategy 
development workshops with a number of SBUs. These workshops 
typically involved the TMT from an SBU and key functional 
managers reporting to the TMT. All the workshops were held at a 
location away from the SBU. The aims of the workshop were to 
assist the team in developing a strategy for their business (an 
approach not dissimilar to that described by Eden and Huxham 
1988). The author (and a colleague) acted as facilitators in this 
process, providing frameworks and concepts to aid analysis and 
discussion of the strategic situation facing the SBU. Typically 
the workshops followed this sequence of activities: 
a structured analysis of the SBUs competitive environment 
a discussion of competitive strategy 
the formulation of a "mission statement" 
identifying the culture of the SBU, and blockages to change 
+ translating the mission into practical tasks 
+ establishing task ownership 
This sequence was adopted for two reasons. Firstly, it has a 
"logical" flow: analysis of the environment precedes the 
formulation of competitive strategy, which is then translated 
into implementation activities. Secondly, the sequence assists in 
the development of the strategy process itself. By starting the 
process with (relatively) safe and uncontroversial analysis of 
the environment, the team gain confidence in themselves, in the 
facilitators and in the process in which they are engaged. 
 everth he less, the early stages of environmental analysis often 
tended to reveal to the team a worrying lack of knowledge about 
their industry, and, particularly, their customers and their 
customers' needs. 
By the time issues of competitive strategy in general are raised 
the team are, usually, fully involved in the event, and 
comfortable with the process. The role of the perceptions of 
strategic priorities research has primarily been to reflect back 
to the team a view of the realised strategy of their SBU, and to 
do it in such a way that it acts as a strong stimulus to debate. 
As Walsh et al (1988) argue: 
"An awareness of the different assumptions and beliefs held 
by all the members of the decision making group is thought to 
contribute to more effective decision making." (Walsh, 
Henderson, and Deighton 1988:198). 
The typical approach would involve managers from the Top 
Management Team, and representatives from functions below the 
TMT completing the questionnaire prior to the strategy 
development workshop. The questionnaires would then be 
processed, and the results would be introduced at the workshop 
following the discussion of competitive strategy. 
The purpose was not just to supply information, but to provide 
feedback in such a way that it would assist in generating 
meaningful debate about SBU strategy. In this way the results of 
the survey often played a part in challenging complacency, and, 
most importantly, in surfacing the "taken for granted" 
assumptions shared by the TMT. 
To achieve these process aims the presentation of the results 
for the SBU was preceded by a discussion of competitive 
strategy using the framework introduced in Chapter 5. The TMT 
members were involved in identifying viable strategies, and in 
pointing out problems associated with different competitive 
strategies. 
Then, the TMT were exposed to several examples of the two- 
dimensional plots ("Differentiation" and "Efficiency") from other 
SBUs. The TMT members were invited to comment on, and 
interpret these selected examples. The purpose here was to 
prepare the TMT for the presentation of their plot. Having 
reached a point where the TMT were comfortable with the 
interpretation of these plots, their plot was presented to them. 
Raimond and Eden (1990) note from their work with management 
teams that: 
"Frequently ... planning proved to be a strongly emotional 
event ... We came to view the emotional responses of participants 
to the planning process as useful indicators of whether the plans 
were likely to be successfuIly implemented .... If the players are 
politely reserved and non-committal there is more work to be 
done" (Raimond and Eden 1990:102-3) 
The process of leading the management team through the plots of 
other SBUs was designed to help to provoke an emotional 
reaction to the presentation of their own plot. In this way the 
realised strategy would be reflected back to the team in a way 
that was more likely to trigger emotive as well as connative 
responses. This device was particularly valuable in disturbing a 
complacent group, especially if their plot revealed a marked lack 
of consensus. (see for example, Case A). 
If the plot revealed a degree of consensus around a particular 
orientation ("Differentiation", "Hybrid", "Efficiency", or 
"Impoverished") the implications of the strategy could be 
discussed. This debate tended to involve the comparison of the 
realised strategy with the group's emerging ideas about 
appropriate competitive strategies (resulting from the earlier 
discussions). 
If the plot revealed a lack of consensus the impact on some 
members of the group appeared to be quite significant. It would 
be used by some group members to support their view that there 
was a lack of strategic direction, and, faced with this "evidence" 
the more complacent members could be seen to be gradually 
changing their attitudes. By itself, however, the impact of the 
plot was probably not a critical trigger in causing some group 
members to begin to change attitudes. But, the cumulative effect 
of this and other process interventions throughout the workshop 
resulted in significant changes in the attitudes of some group 
members to the need to change the strategic direction of their 
SBU. 
The plots, therefore, assisted in surfacing the realised strategy 
of the SBU in a way that stimulated the strategy debate within 
the team. 
The Strategy Fingerprints helped to focus attention on particular 
statements, and on statements that were perceived by managers 
to relate to each other. A lack of consensus revealed by the SBU 
plot may conceal a high degree of agreement about particular 
statements, which the fingerprint could reveal. 
To help further in interpreting the fingerprints managers were 
exposed to other examples, and their significance was discussed, 
prior to the presentation of their SBU's fingerprint. 
The strategy fingerprints provided more detail about the realised 
strategy of the SBU than the two-dimensional plots. They 
revealed which of the four strategic thrusts the SBU was 
actively pursuing. Moreover, the realised strategy inferred from 
the fingerprint could be interpreted within the framework of the 
"Managerial" theory of competitive strategy. 
Not all the SBUs in the SBU database were involved in strategy 
workshops. In these non-workshop situations the data was 
generally presented back to the TMT in the form of a written 
report. As the techniques of analysis and interpretation were 
developed, and as the database was being built up , the content of 
these reports improved. Early forms contained just the two- 
dimensional plot, the consensus measure (for the whole SBU 
sample) and some limited interpretation. Later reports were able 
to incorporate the fingerprint, other consensus measures (eg 
cross TMT-FMT consensus), and, more usefully, interpretation 
informed by the developing database. 
Through the workshop experiences, where the results could be 
discussed with the management team, the interpretation of the 
results became more sophisticated. As a result, the written 
reports, and the feedback of the results in the workshops, 
became more assertive. In the workshop context, the ability to 
"read" into the results more penetrating insights into the reality 
of the SBU's situation increased the impact of the sessions. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
7.1 ACCESSING REALISED STRATEGY 
One of the main aims of the research was to establish a reliable 
method for accessing realised strategy. In Chapter 1 the 
distinctions between intended, emergent and realised strategy 
were explored, and a model of the processes linking managerial 
perceptions of strategic priorities and realised strategy was 
established (Figure 7.1). It was argued that realised strategy 
will be influenced by both intended and emergent processes. 
Arguments were advanced that would lead us to be wary of 
inferring realised strategy solely from the inspection of 
planning documents. Moreover, in many SBUs such explicit 
statements of intended strategy may not be available. It was 
suggested that the development of a reliable and easily 
administered instrument for surfacing realised strategy would 
enable the exploration of a number of important aspects of the 
strategic management of SBUs. 
The questionnaire developed to investigate managers' 
perceptions of strategic priorities can enable us to make 
inferences about the realised strategy of an SBU. The approach 
taken in the study produced: 
* SBUs where a high degree of consensus existed about 
particular strategic priorities 
SBUs which could be categorised into one of five strategy 
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FIGURE 7.1 PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
AND REALISED STRATEGY 
types ("Differentiation", "Cost leadership/Cost control", "Hybrid", 
"Impoverished", "Unclassified"). 
Therefore the approach enabled us to discriminate between SBUs 
on the basis of inferred realised strategy. The realised strategy 
categories could then be used to test theory-based hypotheses 
about SBU level strategies. 
The model (Figure 7.1) suggests that the perceptions that 
managers have of the strategic priorities of their SBU will 
influence their behaviour, and that the behaviour of managers 
then influences the realised strategy of the SBU. These linkages 
were moderated by managerial values and beliefs, and 
organizational circumstances. These linkages have not been 
investigated in this research. The inferred connection between 
management perceptions of strategic priorities and management 
behaviour is clearly a critical link in this model. This linkage 
could be investigated empirically in various ways: 
a manager's perceptions of strategic priorities could be 
compared with his or her subordinates' perceptions of the 
manager's (rather than the SBU's) priorities. If there was 
congruence between the manager's perceptions and the 
subordinates perceptions of the manager's "personal" priorities, 
this would indicate that the manager's behaviour is in line with 
his perceptions of strategic priorities. 
the behaviour of the manager could be recorded (through 
observation, diary keeping) and compared to his perceptions of 
SBU priorities (Mintzberg 1973). The time and energy committed 
to certain tasks and projects could be related to strategic level 
pr io r i t ies .  
These further studies would, therefore add to our understanding 
of the processes that influence the realised strategy of an SBU. 
7.2 STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
The research is based upon a questionnaire that includes 
statements about SBU strategic priorities (Wooldridge and Floyd 
1989). Strategic priorities have been advanced here as an 
intermediate level construct suitable for investigating realised 
strategy. It was argued in Chapters 1 and 3 that statements 
about, for example, cost control and new producVservice 
development are appropriate for developing insights i ~ t o  SBU 
level competitive strategy. And that such statements would not 
be so specific that managers would attribute them to functional 
level priorities, but, at the same time, the statements would not 
be so generalised that managers would be unable to relate to 
them. 
There is strong evidence from the large number of managers that 
have completed the questionnaire (to date, over 1450), that the 
statements included in the questionnaire fulfill these 
requirements. Managers have not expressed difficulties in 
applying the statements to their SBU's situation, and, with the 
exception of two statements (18 and 19), the statements have 
generated variance (which suggests that they are not universally 
perceived to be relevant, or irrelevant to SBU strategy). 
However, the statements were derived from Porter's generic 
strategy concepts, and, as argued in Chapter 5, this framework 
may be an overly restrictive conception of competitive strategy. 
An opportunity then presents itself to research other 
intermediate level constructs that are not necessarily 
constrained by the Porter paradigm. 
For example, statements derived from the "managerial theory" 
developed at the end of Chapter 5 could be tested (this is already 
being undertaken with a revised questionnaire). Alternatively, 
intermediate level statements could be generated that relate to 
the typical content of Mission Statements (David 1989): 
* Customer definition 
Technology 
Objectives 
Strengths 
* Social Responsibilities 
Key Values and Philosophy 
A research instrument could be developed that would be tailored 
to reflect the Mission Statement of a particular corporation, and 
consensus about these dimensions of the Mission could be 
measured. By repeating the measurement at intervals the 
management team would have a measure of the effectiveness of 
their efforts to implant the Mission Statement. 
But, more importantly, it is necessary to derive statements 
directly from the perceptions and cognitions of practicing 
managers (Stubbart 1989:33). This issue is explored further in 
the section on Consensus and Realised Strategy below. 
7.3 CONSENSUS 
Consensus is a major theme of this research. Consensus is 
important in this study because it helps us address two 
important questions: 
can we use consensus about strategic priorities to make 
inferences about realised strategy? 
does consensus about strategic priorities make a 
difference to performance? 
Consensus about particular strategic priorities forms the basis 
for the classification of SBUs into the five realised strategy 
categories ("differentiation", "cost controllcost leadership", 
"hybrid", "impoverished", "unclassified"; Chapter 3). If the 
managers in an SBU had a positive mean factor score (the factors 
being "differentiation" and "cost control/cost leadership") that 
was significant then their SBU was classified in the appropriate 
category. Here the consensus measure is based on the standard 
deviation about a mean factor score. 
To test the consensuslperformance hypothesis a different 
consensus measure was developed. This measure was derived 
from the correlation matrix of the managers in the SBU sample. 
As such, the measure is standardised, and can therefore be used 
to compare consensus across studies that employ different 
rating scales and numbers of statements. 
The consensus/performance relationships, and the categorization 
of SBUs into the different categories of realised strategy used 
all the managers sampled from each SBU. Thus the consensus 
measure included the TMT (Top Management Team) and FMT 
(Functional Management Team) groups together. As indicated in 
Chapter 3, because this study samples levels below the TMT, 
there is an opportunity to test out other forms of within-SBU 
consensus (Bowman and Miller 1990): 
* consensus within the TMT 
* consensus within the FMT 
consensus across TMTIFMT (see Figure 7.2) 
There are relevant issues in strategic management associated 
with each of these consensus measures. For example, TMT 
consensus would measure the extent to which the senior 
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FIGURE 7.2 ADDITIONAL FORMS OF CONSENSUS 
management shared the same perceptions of strategic priorities. 
An accepted norm in the prescriptive literature (cited in Chapter 
1) is that the TMT should unite behind an explicit, viable 
strategy. TMT measures of consensus about the relevant 
dimensions of such a strategy (which may well include 
statements of objectives, core values, target markets) would be 
crucial to successful implementation. 
Where firms face complex environments FMT consensus about 
SBU strategic priorities may not be appropriate (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967). It may be the case that successful firms in these 
environments combine TMT consensus about strategic priorities 
with FMT dissensus, allowing each differentiated function to 
pursue its own goals within super-functional constraints. 
TMTIFMT consensus tests out agreement across levels. Using the 
correlation matrix derived from comparing the ratings of all 
pairs of managers, TMTIFMT consensus would be the mean of the 
correlation coefficients in the shaded portion of Figure 7.2. This 
measure of consensus excludes both within-TMT, and within-FMT 
group consensus. Thus it measures the extent of agreement 
between all TMTIFMT pairs. This form of consensus focusses on 
the differences in perceptions between these two levels. 
Therefore, it would be particularly useful in exploring, for 
example, the extent to which TMT efforts to "get their message 
across" to lower level managers have been successful. The 
general measure of consensus used in this study includes these 
TMTIFMT pairings, but their significance is diluted by the 
inclusion of the within-group correlations. Therefore, isolating 
this fourth consensus measure should prove to be helpful. 
7.4 CONSENSUS AND REALISED STRATEGY 
The theoretical justification for using the significance tested 
mean factor scores to classify SBUs was advanced in Chapters 1 
and 3. It was argued that managers perceptions would influence 
their actions, and that these actions, in turn, would influence 
realised strategy. In addition, it was suggested in Chapter 1 that 
managers were reliable and knowledgeable observers of the 
organizational scene, and hence their ratings would reflect 
reasonable accurately the priorities being pursued in the SBU. 
Thus the inferring of SBU realised strategy from the 
questionnaire responses rested on the assumption of the manager 
as an actor In the organization, directly influencing realised 
strategy, and the assumption that a manager is a reliable 
observer of and commentator on the organization's priorities. 
If consensus around a particular set of strategic priorities is 
revealed then it would be reasonable to argue that these 
statements describe the realised strategy of the SBU. 
Conversely, if the research reveals no consensus, following the 
same line of reasoning, we should conclude that the SBU has no 
coherent or consistent realised strategy (that is, within the 
constraints of the dimensions used to construct the 
questionnaire statements). And this, indeed, was the approach 
used in this study. 
The situation where consensus exists in an SBU causes few 
problems with this concept of the manager as actor and observer. 
A manager perceives certain priorities are extant in the 
organization, and he behaves accordingly. However, where a lack 
of consensus exists how can we make sense of the outcome in 
terms of managerial perceptions and managerial behaviour? A 
lack of consensus is indicating that one manager perceives, say, 
cost control priorities as predominating, whereas another 
manager sees differentiation priorities predominating. Can both 
managers be "right"? 
In the manager's role as actor this would suggest that, in the 
domain of the "cost control" manager he is pursuing cost cutting 
activities; whereas in the domain of the "differentiator" other 
priorities are being pursued. This may or may not lead to good 
SBU performance. Arguments advanced in favour of 
differentiated structures (Ashby 1956; Lawrence and Lorsch 
1967) may associate such differences in goal orientations as an 
appropriate response to environmental complexity. However, in 
constructing the questionnaire the intention was to avoid 
including strategic priorities that are clearly orientated to 
particular functions (although the analysis presented in Chapter 
6 indicates that managers nevertheless perceive these priorities 
differently according to their functional background). 
The role of the manager as observer of the organizational scene 
causes particular problems where the questionnaire responses 
reveal a lack of consensus. This may be explained by the 
parochial and narrowed perspectives generated within highly 
functional structures (as explored in Chapter 6). In this case the 
responses reflect the managers functionally influenced world 
view. They are "true" perceptions of his reality. However, a lack 
of consensus may indicate a "reality" that is not reflected in the 
responses of either of the managers. In this case, drawing 
inferences about realised strategy from these responses could be 
a problem. 
Clearly, research is needed into situations where a lack of 
consensus exists. The advantage of the methodology to research 
realised strategy developed in this study is that the basic 
instrument is parsimonious, and easy to administer to large 
numbers of managers. The disadvantages of the approach stem 
precisely from these advantages: 
because the questionnaire is short it can only address a 
very limited number of dimensions of competitive strategy 
the brief, generalized statements may be being interpreted 
differently by different managers 
there is no proven connection between the manager's 
questionnaire responses and his or her "true" perceptions of 
strategic pr ior i t ies 
consensus may well exist in the SBU about strategic 
priorities not covered by the questionnaire 
In order to address some of these methodological problems 
alternative approaches could be explored. Managerial perceptions 
could be accessed through the use of repertory grid techniques 
(Kelly 1955; Eden, Jones and Sims 1979; Reger 1990). 
Alternatively (or additionally) structured interviews could be 
held with individual managers to derive competitive strategy 
constructs without imposing a predetermined standard set of 
dimensions. These approaches could be used in combination with 
the questionnaire method employed here. For example, the 
interviews could be used to construct a set of statements that 
were more likely to be perceived to be relevant by other 
managers from the SBU. In this way richer studies of fewer SBUs 
would be possible, although the opportunities for deriving 
generalizable results would be reduced. 
7.5 CONSENSUS AND PERFORMANCE 
The results offered qualified support for the consensus- 
performance relationship (Hypothesis 8). The results do not 
provide overwhelming evidence for the benefits of consensus. 
Consensus is related to performance, but only i f  there is 
consensus about a positive strategy (either cost control, 
differentiation or a combination of both). But even with these 
qualifications, the link between consensus and performance is 
not strong. 
There are arguments that can be advanced in support of both a 
positive and a negative relationship between consensus and 
performance (Hrebiniak and Snow 1 982). In advancing arguments 
in support of a negative relationship between consensus and 
performance writers have adopted a contingency approach, 
arguing that where an SBU faces a highly complex environment 
subunit differences in goal orientation are functional (Hrebiniak 
and Snow 1982:1141). Weick (1 977) argues that organizational 
diversity and variety enhances the ability of the organization to 
adapt to changing environments, and Murray (1989) offers 
empirical evidence to support the links between top team 
heterogeneity and performance in changing environments. 
Nonaka (1 988), echoing Weick (1 977), suggests that: 
"It is more desirable for an organization to have several 
coexisting countercultures than to be dominated by a single 
value." (1 988:63) 
The arguments for and against the performance benefits of 
consensus suggest that a good deal of further work is required. 
In particular, we need to identify the organizational and 
environmental circumstances in which consensus about strategic 
priorities is positively or negatively related to performance. In 
the present study there was no attempt to control for 
environment, or the age or size of the SBU, or the nature of the 
SBU's task complexity. All these contingent conditions (and 
more) could conceivably influence the consensus-performance 
link. It should be possible to construct a research design that 
allows the influence of the more important contingent variables 
to be incorporated. 
7.6 SUPRA-INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES AND 
CONSENSUS 
Daft and Weick (1984) argue for the existence of organizational 
interpretat ions:  
"..the organizational interpretation process is something 
more than what occurs by individuals. Organizations have 
cognitive systems and memories. Individuals come and go, but 
organizations preserve knowledge, behaviors, mental maps, 
norms, and values over time. The distinctive feature of 
organization level information activity is sharing. A piece of 
data, a perception, a cognitive map is shared among managers 
who constitute the interpretation system.. ..Reaching convergence 
among members characterizes the act of organizing and enables 
the organization to interpret as a system." (Daft and Weick 
1984:285) 
Walsh (1 989) discusses this concept supra-individual knowledge 
structures. Collective knowledge structures have been variously 
termed a "collective cognitive map1', a "dominant logic", or a 
"negotiated belief structure" (Walsh and Fahey 1986). These 
knowledge structures are seen as the aggregation of individual 
knowledge structures. Some have taken this line of reasoning 
further, arguing for the existence of an "organization mind" 
(Sandelands and Stablein 1987). Attempts have been made to 
aggregate individual knowledge structures to reveal a collective 
cognitive map (Walsh 1989:15). 
However, Walsh offers a less controversial position: 
"While there is some controversy as to whether or not a 
system-level, supra-individual belief structure exists, there is 
general agreement that group membership or organizational 
membership affects individual cognition." (1 989:17) 
The model outlined in Chapter 1 (Figure 7.1) acknowledges that a 
manager's beliefs and values will be influenced by, inter alia, his 
or her organizational experiences. It follows that, if managers 
share very similar experiences they are likely to emerge with 
similar cognitive frameworks. These similar cognitive 
frameworks may cause managers to filter information in similar 
ways, and they may lead them to arrive at similar decisions. For 
these effects to occur it is not necessary to hypothesise the 
existence of a system level "organization mind". The processes 
that would lead to a group of managers having similar cognitive 
frameworks (common past experiences, group interactions, 
indoctrination processes etc) operate at the level of the 
individual, affecting the perceptual processes of an individual. 
As pointed out earlier, an important theme of my research has 
been the concept of consensus: shared perceptions of, in this 
case, SBU level strategic priorities. It seems reasonable to offer 
this methodological approach to the study of cognitive 
frameworks. By measuring the extent of agreement within a 
group of managers about, for example, assumptions about 
competitors, the degree to which managers share the same 
perceptions can be measured. Hence, there is no requirement to 
hypothesise the existence of a collective mind, a supra- 
individual, system level mental construct, and there is no need 
to try to synthesise a group cognitive map from the responses of 
individuals. The analysis can be done by comparing pairs of 
individuals within the group or organization. If there is 
consensus, then this indicates that managers share similar 
perceptions of the competition; a lack of consensus indicates 
that they do not. 
7.7 PORTER'S GENERIC STRATEGIES AND MANAGERS' 
GENERIC STRATEGIES 
The hypotheses established to explore realised strategy and 
performance assumed that managers perceive competitive 
strategy in line with Porter's generic strategies. A number of 
Hypotheses linked to Porter's approach to competitive strategy 
were established (Chapter 2), and tested (Chapter 4). The results 
support the view that where SBUs pursue a positive strategy of 
"cost Ieadershiplcost control", "differentiation" or a strategy 
which combines these two orientations, they achieve superior 
performance (Hypotheses H3, H4, H6). Moreover, firms that 
pursue neither of the generic strategies perform poorly (H5). 
The review of the literature concerning the generic strategies 
presented in Chapter 5 highlighted a number of problems with 
Porter's approach, and problems with attempts to empirically 
explore the concepts. Some of the more significant issues are as 
fo l lows:  
There is confusion about the strategy of cost leadership. It 
is not clear whether or not the strategy is associated with 
competing on price, or with "commodity" like industries. It is 
evident that some researchers are using the term very loosely to 
describe a general "cost control" orientation. 
If cost leadership SBUs compete on price then it is not 
clear that their lowest cost position would yield above average 
profits; nor is it clear what the appropriate industry definition 
should be for comparing performance (or relative costs). 
* There would appear to be confusion about whether the 
generic strategies are really about selecting WHERE to compete 
(ie segmentation, or domain selection decisions) rather than 
deciding HOW to compete in a particular domain. 
* It is not clear whether Differentiation requires premium 
pricing in order to achieve above average profitability (and as 
with the Cost Leadership strategy, what the relevant comparitor 
firms should therefore be). If Differentiation is a market share 
increasing strategy, it is not therefore certain that the strategy 
would yield above average profitability. 
Central to these issues surrounding the generic strategies is the 
definition of the industry. Three alternative definitions may be 
proposed of a given industry, reflecting different interest 
groups: 
* the researcher's definition (eg. "the car industry": defined 
very broadly to reflect the researchers interests in identifying 
the macroeconomic significance of the industry in different 
countr ies) 
the manager's definition (eg. "quality medium sized 
saloons") 
the customer's definition (eg. "potential suppliers of a 
cheap second car" which may include both new and used cars) 
Arguably, the most relevant definition for understanding 
management decision making behaviour would be the manager's 
definition. lnsofaras competitor considerations influence the 
decision making processes of managers, in trying to understand 
these decisions it is only relevant to include in the analysis 
those firms that the managers perceive their firm to be in 
competition with. 
Prescriptively, the most pertinent definition of a firm's 
competitors around which to construct a competitive strategy 
would be the target customer's definition. There would appear to 
be here, therefore, a fruitful area for research. For example, the 
following questions could be addressed: 
Do managers in the same SBU define the competition in the 
same way? If consensus exists how does this affect strategic 
decision making? If there is little agreement does this affect 
performance? 
Do customers define a firm's competitors in the same way 
as the management? If they do not, what are the implications for 
the competitive strategy of the SBU? 
Chapter 5 explored the "manager database" in order to test out 
whether practising managers do, in fact, conceive of competitive 
strategy in terms of Porter's generic strategies.The results of 
this part of the theses would suggest that managers perceive 
strategy differently from the two generic strategy options 
proposed by Porter. Specifically, the manager database revealed 
the presence of four competitive thrusts: two that could be 
associated with competing for market share (offering superior 
products/services; and competing on price); one concerned with 
cost control; and a fourth concerned with new product 
development. The results are in line with two prior 
investigations into the generic strategies (Miller and Friesen 
1986a; Dess and Davis 1984). 
An attempt was made to construct a "managerial" theory of 
competitive strategy around these empirical results. The 
"managerial theory" of competitive strategy developed in Chapter 
5 appears to be a coherent model for exploring issues in 
competitive strategy. Testable propositions can be derived from 
it, and managers have benefitted from its use as a teaching 
vehicle. 
The results of tests using the five factor "solution" revealed 
that the most successful strategic thrust was to offer "superior 
products/services". The "managerial theory" developed to explain 
the five factor solution indicated that, if an SBU successfully 
pursued this thrust the increases in market share that should 
result could be translated into a low cost position (by exploiting 
cost advantages accruing from scale and experience curve 
effects). Although there are difficulties in proactively managing 
a "cost leadership" strategy (not the least of which would be the 
problems in acquiring cost data on competitors), it is 
nevertheless quite plausible for an SBU to pursue a market share 
gaining strategy (through offering higher perceived use value to 
customers) with the attainment of a low cost position. 
In the discussion of the managerial theory the tendency for 
managers to pursue inward-looking cost orientated strategies 
was raised. Although there is evidence from the SBU database 
that cost control is a popular strategic thrust, the explanations 
for this outcome have not been investigated in this study. The 
arguments advanced in Chapter 5 were that managers are 
instinctively more comfortable pursuing cost control priorities: 
* there are many generally known and available prescriptions 
for cost control (systems; rules of thumb) 
* managers may know relatively little about customer needs, 
competitors, customer perceptions of their's and competitor's 
offerings, changing customer needs, upon which they could 
proactively manage a strategy of offering higher perceived use 
value than the competition. 
* due to the lack of management development activity in 
many UK firms, managers are more likely to search within their 
own experiences for strategic actions. These experiences may 
well reflect the limited strategic perceptions of their past 
superiors. 
* if the managers share a belief that they do understand what 
their customers value, and they are providing it, they are not 
likely to search to improve the products or services they offer, 
particularly in times of deteriorating performance. 
* short term pressures to produce bottom line results would 
encourage managers to cut costs as a typical reaction to 
declining sales. 
These explanations of a tendency for cost control priorities to 
predominate are no more than assertions. Research into these 
possible explanations should provide some valuable insights into 
managerial strategic thinking. 
A number of methodological issues are raised by the approach 
taken in the study: 
in the absence of the constrained options presented to the 
managers, would they conceive of a very different set of 
strategic priorities? These priorities may combine to reveal 
strategic thrusts that differ from both Porter and from the 
"managerial theory" derived in Chapter 5 .  
* would these priorities be very specific to SBUs, or would 
they tend to be similar across industries, or across all SBUs? 
* how volatile are the priorities perceived by managers? Do 
they alter in line with SBU performance? industry performance? 
or the performance of the economy? 
The data collected from managers to construct the SBU database 
includes statements about organizational change (changes in 
structures, processes, operations and strategy). Combining this 
change related data with the realised competitive strategy data 
provides us with an opportunity to explore whether these 
variables commonly cluster into a limited number of 
configurations. Clusters of SBUs that combine particular 
realised competitive strategies with particular dimensions of 
organizational change could be identified, and the performance of 
these clusters could be compared. In this way high and low 
performing configurations or gestalts could be identified (Miles 
and Snow 1978; Miller and Friesen 1986). 
7.8 FUNCTIONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDUSTRY 
INFLUENCES ON PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
Chapter 6 explored three sources of influence that may affect a 
manager's perceptions of the strategic priorities in the SBU. The 
model depicted in Figure 7.1 identifies internal and external (to 
the SBU) sources of stimuli. These stimuli are filtered and 
interpreted by the manager with reference to his or her beliefs 
("cognitive base") and values. It was argued that, in addition to 
organizational influences (which may include deliberate 
attempts by the top management to implant a particular set of 
priorities), the manager's functional experience, and the industry 
context in which he is operating would influence his perceptions 
of priorities. 
The manager database was used to search for evidence of 
functional, or industry influences on perceptions of strategic 
priorities. The investigations revealed support for both forms of 
influence. 
7.8.1 THE INFLUENCE OF FUNCTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
It appears that, in support of Dearborn and Simon's pioneering 
study (1959), there is evidence that a manager's functional 
background influences his or her perceptions of business level 
strategic priorities. It is not clear whether or not this affects 
SBU performance. Further work needs to be done to address the 
following questions: 
In what SBU situations does functional background emerge 
as a strong influence? Where is it a weak influence? Why? 
In what circumstances does functional bias help or hinder 
SBU performance? 
Is functional background generally the strongest influence 
on managers' perceptions of SBU level priorities? Does it emerge 
as the strongest influence where there are unsuccessful (or no) 
attempts to provide strategic direction? 
Does the strength of functional influence vary across 
industries? Is the age of the SBU relevant? 
The organizational, and personal processes and situations that 
result in functional influences predominating could also be 
further explored: 
* Does the strength of functional influence vary directly with 
the length of a manager's experience in the function? 
Are their differences in the strength of functional 
influence according to hierarchical level? Do some functions 
exert a more pervasive influence on perceptions of SBU strategy 
than others (eg. financelaccounting)? 
* Can functional influence be moderated by moving managers 
across functions, or by management development activities? 
More generally, the appropriateness of functional structures 
could be investigated. The strategy workshops referred to in 
Chapter 6 (and Appendix 6A) have posed some interesting issues 
in this regard. It seems that when the management team derive a 
mission statement that encapsulates a well thought through 
competitive strategy, the actions required to implement the 
strategy challenge the existing functional organization. In 
particular, it appears that most of the actions given high 
priority cannot be neatly allocated to one of the existing 
functions. This would suggest that in order to be truly 
competitive the SBU must find ways of working across and 
around the traditional functional organization. Although Porter's 
Value Chain (Porter 1985) has not been used in these workshops, 
his concept of linkages would seem to be making the same point. 
7.8.2 THE INFLUENCE OF INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
Chapter 6 included an investigation of industry influences on 
managers' perceptions of strategic priorities. The group of SBUs 
selected for this analysis belonged to the Regional Newspapers 
industry. However, they were also part of a newspaper 
corporation, so some caution needed to be exercised in 
interpreting evidence in support of industry influences. Further 
studies could done, using the same approach as applied here, but 
basing the analysis on a sample of independent, direct 
competitors. 
A number of issues emerge from this investigation that might 
prove worthy of further research: 
To what extent are the perceptions of managers about SBU- 
level strategy influenced by: 
functional background 
organizational context 
industry context 
national/cultural contexts (Calori, Johnson and Sarnin 1991) 
It may be possible to establish statistically the relative 
strength of these (and other) influences on the perceptions of a 
group of managers. Other issues worthy of further consideration 
would include the following: 
If there is evidence of a strong industry "recipe" is 
competitive advantage to be gained by working the "recipe" 
better than the competition, or by abandoning the recipe? 
What industry situations lead to strong recipes? Is 
industry life-cycle an important variable? 
' What processes lead to the emergence of strong industry 
influences? 
7.9 SURFACING REALISED STRATEGY IN STRATEGY 
DEBATES 
Chapter 6 reported a number of cases where the questionnaire 
analysis contributed to strategy debates among the Top 
Management Teams of SBUs. Examples were selected that 
illustrated the range of issues addressed in the discussions, and 
the different types of contribution that the analysis made to the 
debates. In retrospect, perhaps the most significant contribution 
of the analysis was the presentation of something tangible and, 
most importantly, visual into discussions that are usually 
(perhaps necessarily) somewhat abstract, generalized and 
impressionistic. The introduction of an easily interpreted plot, 
that purported to reflect the realised strategy of the SBU, often 
provided a focus for the discussions. 
All of the workshops where the analysis was presented were 
judged by the participants at the time, and on reflection to be 
most valuable events. Our impressions of the contribution of the 
analysis to the debates are clearly subjective judgements. It 
would be useful to explore the processes of these workshop to 
try to establish which of the activities, conceptual frameworks, 
and facilitator inputs were most influential in bringing about, 
inter alia, changes in perceptions, realisation about the need for 
change, and positive commitments to action. As Raimond and 
Eden (1990) point out, the emotional climate of these events 
seems to be a proxy measure of their potential success. In which 
case, how can this process dimension be best managed by the 
f a c i l i t a t o r ?  
More specifically, the presentation of the the analysis of 
managers' perceptions could be improved. The "strategy 
fingerprint" (Chapter 6) provides a concise picture of the SBU's 
realised strategy, and with more SBU data being added to the 
database it is possible to identify patterns to these fingerprints. 
It may eventually be possible to interpret a fingerprint with 
some accuracy, drawing upon past similar examples to make 
generalized comments about the SBU. This approach would be 
analogous to the interpretation of personality profiles for 
individuals. 
If this can be achieved, we would have a powerful diagnostic 
instrument, which can be easily administered, but one which can 
provide valuable insights into the SBU's situation. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE "PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC PRIORITIES" 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
PERCEPTTO\-S OF STR .ATEGl' 
Company: 
Division/Business Unit: 
(if  appropriate) 
Name: 
Position in Organisation: 
Indicate your position in 
relation to the Managing 
Director of firm - e.g. 
Managing Director 
c
Marketing 
Director 
Sales Manager 
(Me) 
PERCEPTIONS OF STRATEGY 
ISTRODUCTTON 
This brief questionnaire is designed to help discover your perceptions of your firm's strategy. In 
answering the questionnaire assume each statement applies to the most logical 'unit' in the firm. 
For example, in a diversified organisation, these statements would apply to a single business unit or 
division. If the statement does not apply at all to your firm/division/unit then circle ( 1 ) .  If the 
statement accurately describes the situation in the firm. circle ( 5 ) .  The numbers (2) to ( 4 )  enable 
you to indicate intermediate positions in between these two extremes. 
Please note that we are interested in your firm's CURRENT STRATEGY; the statements refer to 
what your f irm is doing NOW, not what you think it might be doing some time in the future. 
Thank you for your help. 
Cliff Bowman 
This statement 
does not apply 
to our firm 
This statement 
accurately 
describes the 
situation in 
our f irm 
We place considerable emphasis 
on the control of operating 
COS tS 
The strategic direction we are now 
pursuing represents a significant 
change from that pursued in the past 
We emphasise our  distinctive 
products or  image in our marketing 
communications 
Our organisation, and the way things 
get done within it, have changed 
little in recent times 
There is constant pressure here 
to cut overhead costs 
We make extensive efforts to secure 
the lowest cost sources of supply 
We regularly develop new products/ 
services, or  significantly change the 
line of products/services we offer 
We try hard to maintain the maximum 
feasible utilisation of our capacithr/ 
resources 
\Ye try to o f fe r  unique products/ 
services enabling us to charge 
premium prices 
\Ve gi1.e new product/service 
development top priority 
We emphasise competitive prices in 
our marketing conlmunications 
Our line of products/services seldom 
change in a substantive manner 
\Ve c;lrefull>t monitor operations to 
help us keep costs under control 
Currently, \vcr are tr\.ing to operate 
this business in signific;lntl\. different 
\ \ , s~ . s  to those u e  have in the past 
This statement 
does not apply 
to our firm 
This statemen: 
3ccurately 
describes the 
situation in  
our firm 
15. As our customers are very price 
sensitive, we devote considerable 
time and effort  into improving 
efficiency 
16. The organisational structure and/or 1 
processes we are now using represent 
a noticeable change from our recent past 
17. Information about sales performance 1 
is considered to be more important 
than cost control information 
18. We aim to offer  superior products/ 1 
services to those of our competitors 
19. \Ve aim to be the lowest cost 
producer in our  industry 
20. 1l.e try to operate this business in 1 
much the same way today as we have 
in the past 
? 
,1. Because we offer  very similar products/ 1 
services to the competition, we try to 
maintain competitive prices 
